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Summary (Abstract)
Thought suppression is the attempted removal of unwanted thoughts. A plethora 
of previous research suggests that thought suppression is ineffective and possibly even 
counterproductive. However, the psychological processes involved in suppression are 
still underspecified. The current thesis aimed to examine the processes involved in 
thought suppression and to provide alternative techniques that may be more effective in 
the management of unwanted thoughts. To that end, Chapters 2 and 3 of the current 
thesis investigated the two key phenomena in the thought suppression literature, the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects. Results from Experiments 1-4 indicated 
that participants, for the most part, found it difficult to suppress their thoughts during a 
five minute suppression phase, and also tended to have the unwanted thought re-emerge 
in a five minute phase following suppression, providing evidence for both the immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects. Chapter 4 (Experiment 5) provided a model of the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects in terms of derived stimulus relations. The 
findings suggested that thought suppression attempts are ineffective due to the large 
number of intended and unintended environmental reminders. Experiments 6(a) and 6(b) 
extended on Experiment 5 by demonstrating how those relations might affect overt 
behaviour. Finally, Chapter 5 aimed to compare thought suppression with alternative 
strategies for dealing with unwanted thoughts. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) was designed to undermine the negative behavioural consequences of derived 
stimulus relations. Experiments 7, 8 and 9 compared thought suppression with two 
components of the ACT model (i.e., mindfulness and defusion). The findings indicated, 
across both self report and behavioural measures, that the ACT techniques provided 
useful alternatives to thought suppression. In conclusion, the current thesis provides a 
behavioural model of the counterproductive nature of thought suppression whilst 
providing favourable evidence of alternative methods in the management of unwanted 
thoughts.
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Chapter 1
A Derived Relational Model of Thought
Suppression
cnapier i
1.1 Thought suppression in historical terms
Self doubt, fear of social inadequacy, moral shame, health worries, sexual 
thoughts, and aggressive thoughts are among common unwanted thoughts (Reed, 
1985). Problems in relationships and school, worries about life, the future, death, 
victimisation, sexual impulses and lack o f basic necessities are others (Shackleford 
& Wegner, 1984). When such unwanted thoughts arise they are typically met with a 
desire to remove them from consciousness. In fact research suggests that 4 out o f 5 
people will attempt suppression as the preferred coping strategy in dealing with 
unwanted thoughts (Rachman & Da Silva, 1978). According to Erdelyi and 
Goldberg (1979) that may be the case as thought suppression is seen as a way to 
reduce the distress associated with disturbing thoughts. However, over the past few 
decades a wide body of research in the area of thought suppression indicates that 
thought suppression does not reduce this distress, but rather increases it (Shackleford 
& Wegner, 1984; Purdon & Clark, 2000).
Wegner, Schneider, Carter and White conducted the first experimental 
investigation of thought suppression in 1987. In this study participants were 
randomly assigned to either a suppression or expression group. The suppression 
group were instructed to “think of anything but try not to think of a white bear” (p.6) 
for a phase of five minutes. Following this initial suppression phase the same group 
of participants were instructed to “think o f a white bear” for a further five minute 
phase. The expression group received the same instructions over two five minute 
phases, however they received them in reverse order. The findings indicated that 
both groups were unable to suppress thoughts of a white bear (i.e., the target 
unwanted thought) and that participants in the suppression/expression group 
demonstrated significantly more thoughts of a white bear during the second phase 
(i.e., expression phase) than participants who were initially instructed to think o f a 
white bear. Wegner et al. (1987) referred to the increase in the target thought (i.e. 
thoughts o f a white bear) during the suppression phase as the immediate 
enhancement effect and the increase in the target thought following suppression 
(during expression) the rebound effect. Wegner et al’s (1987) seminal study was the 
beginning of an extensive body o f experimental work on this coping strategy, 
although literature in the area of thought suppression probably dates back to 
Sigmund Freud.
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Freud was the first psychologist to recognise that human beings often have a 
desire to banish certain thoughts out of mind. According to Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory (1958) people can successfully suppress their thoughts. To account for this 
Freud coined the term repression, which essentially refers to the erasure o f thoughts 
from memory. Freud’s definition of repression suggests that it is possible to 
purposely ‘forget’ unwanted thoughts without ever having any knowledge of these 
attempts. This was believed to occur via unconscious processes, which aimed to 
protect us from harmful memories, by keeping them out o f consciousness. While
• tVipsychoanalytic theory gained popularity in the mid 20 century, the work has 
contacted much criticism in the last 50 years due to the lack of scientific or empirical 
support for its core concepts (Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1979). Despite this Freud can be 
commended on two aspects of his work in this domain. First, he suggested that 
mental control can ‘backfire’ (Wegner, 1989 pp 9), and research on various topics 
(e.g., depression, anxiety, weight loss, smoking cessation etc, Section 1.3.1) has 
supported this postulate, that is, mental control has been demonstrated to have 
maladaptive effects (Wenzlaff, Wegner & Roper, 1988; Salkovskis & Campbell, 
1994; Polivy & Herman, 1985; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994). Second, Freud was 
the first to understand the meta-cognitive element associated with thought 
suppression i.e. in order to suppress a thought one first has to know what that 
thought is. More specifically it is impossible to suppress a thought when that thought 
is part of the rule to suppress (Wegner, et al 1987). Other than Freud, William James 
had previously indirectly contributed towards thought suppression research with his 
work on mental control. Unlike Freud, who viewed mental control as something 
human beings struggle with internally (Wegner, 1989), James (1890) suggested, via 
I the application of will and attention, that one could purposefully and successfully
i
| control ones thoughts. John Dewey (1922), agreed with James on this point; however 
| he suggested that achieving suppression is more difficult than James (1890) would 
! have theorised, suggesting that in order to achieve successful thought suppression a 
certain amount of practice would first be needed.
Each of the aforementioned psychologists held a position in which thought 
suppression was deemed possible. However, despite the common conception that 
• people can change their thoughts, these hypotheses were put forward without any 
; empirical basis. Indeed, currently, there is research, which suggests that thought
i^napter 1
suppression is in fact very difficult, if  not impossible (see Section 1.2.2). Further 
research seems to suggest that thought suppression not only causes an increase in the 
unwanted thought, but may actually be a causal and maintaining factor in any 
number o f psychological disorders (see Section 1.3). Despite this research, theories 
which account for the unsuccessful nature of thought suppression are few and far 
between.
The ‘Theory o f Psychological Reactance’ as proposed by Brehm (1966) 
could account for the immediate enhancement effect. This theory suggests that 
people will naturally do the opposite to that which they are instructed, or will ‘react’ 
to any instruction which limits their freedom. In this case the typical participant 
exposed to a thought suppression preparation will think of the unwanted thought 
when instructed not to do so. However this theory fails to account for results found 
in the concentration phase of the original white bear study. According to the theory 
o f psychological reactance, when instructed to concentrate on the thought of a white 
bear, the participant should have done the opposite. However no such effect was 
found, thereby questioning the theories validity. Wegner et al (1987) named this 
‘Negative Injunction’, referring to the way in which the theory cannot account for 
the after effects (the concentration phase) o f attempted suppression. An alternative to 
psychological reactance was proposed under the rubric o f Self Perception Theory 
(Bern, 1972), according to which, a person, who carries out a certain behaviour when 
under constraint, will carry out that behaviour to a greater degree when the 
constraints are removed. As a simple metaphor, it is possible that when restricted to a 
30 mph driving zone that people may rise above the speed limit at times, however 
immediately after leaving that speed zone people may find themselves accelerating 
at higher speeds more often as a result o f the constraint removal. Although this 
theory provides little relevance to results associated with the typical suppression 
phase, it could account for the inflation o f thoughts experienced in the concentration 
phase. However, if  this were the case it would be predicted that the amount of 
concentration phase intrusions would be based upon the amount o f suppression 
phase intrusions i.e. the amount o f acceleration is based on the amount to which one 
was constrained. However no such relationship has been found (Wegner et al, 1987).
Without a full explanation o f the processes involved in thought suppression, 
Daniel Wegner aimed to build upon the aforementioned theories, beginning with his
4
unapter i
seminal study in 1987. This study was inspired primarily by a Russian Fairy Tale, 
which documents how a young Russian boy, named Tolstoy, was challenged by his 
brother to stand in the comer until he could stop thinking of a white bear (hence the 
use of ‘white bear’ as the unwanted thought in a number of thought suppression 
related studies). O f course Tolstoy was unable to stop thoughts o f a white bear 
entering his mind, demonstrating the futility of mental control. Upon reading this 
story, Daniel Wegner became interested in the topic o f thought suppression and 
created the aforementioned ‘white bear’ thought suppression experiment in 1987.
1.2 The basic areas of research
This initial seminal study generated a wealth o f research in the area of 
thought suppression. This research, in the non clinical research arena, centres on the 
following topics; the contemporary theories that attempt to account for unsuccessful 
suppression, the immediate enhancement effect, the rebound effect, the various 
distraction methods that may be used in attempting to achieve successful 
suppression, the effect o f suppression over time, the attempted suppression of higher 
valence thoughts, the physiological effects of thought suppression and the 
methodological problems associated with thought suppression research. The 
introduction to this thesis will aim to explore each of these areas in order to facilitate 
an understanding of the empirical work that will follow.
1.2.1 Contemporary theories of thought suppression
L2.1.1 Environmental Cueing Hypothesis (ECH)
In order to account for the counterproductive effects of thought suppression, 
Wegner (1989) has proposed the ‘Environmental Cueing Hypothesis’ (ECH). 
According to the ECH, suppression involves two cognitive control processes 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992). One process, which is not under conscious control, and is 
known as the automatic target search, automatically searches through consciousness 
for evidence of the unwanted thought. A second, intentional or consciously 
controlled process, referred to as the controlled distracter search, searches through 
memory and the environment looking for distracting information. As the automatic 
process does not require continuous monitoring it can detect evidence o f the
5
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unwanted thought more rapidly than an individual can consciously generate 
distracters. As a result, the unwanted thought re-emerges into consciousness and 
becomes associated with the intended distracter so that henceforward the distracter 
may be more likely to cue the unwanted thought. Once the first distracter has thus 
effectively failed to divert attention from the unwanted thought other distracting 
thoughts are generated. However, the same process occurs and eventually a number 
o f (intended distracter) stimuli within memory and the environment become 
associated with the unwanted thought and exposure to these previously encountered 
distracters prompts the re-emergence o f the unwanted thought into consciousness to 
an even greater extent. The end result is hyper-accessibility of the unwanted thought 
during a suppression episode, and rebound o f the thought following the attempt to 
suppress.
Wegner, Schneider, Knutson and McMahon (1991) provided evidence in 
favour o f ECH. Their experiment involved three five minute phases. In the first five 
minute phase participants were asked to suppress a target thought (i.e., thoughts of a 
white bear) whilst a slideshow (A) was shown in the background. Then, in the 
second phase, participants had to express thoughts of the target whilst a second 
slideshow (B) was shown in the background. Finally, in the third phase, participants 
had to express thoughts o f the target whilst slideshow A was again shown in the 
background. Participants were required to indicate any occurrence of the target 
thought by ringing a bell. The results indicated that the thought rebounded 
significantly more in an expression phase during which the same slideshow (A) that 
was shown in the initial suppression phase was shown, providing evidence that a 
suppressed thought could be triggered by cues in the environment.
In a subsequent study, Wegner and Erber (1992) extended the environmental 
cueing research. In this study, after an initial five minute suppression phase, 
participants were asked to continue to suppress a target word whilst completing 
another task concurrently. In this task participants were given one word at a time and 
were asked to provide a word associated with the supplied word. The results showed 
that participants, when given a word closely associated with the target word, would 
often say the target word that they were meant to be suppressing. The authors 
suggested that this happened because the target word had been directly cued by the 
closely linked (directly associated/related) words. Furthermore, in more recent
6
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research, Najmi and Wegner (2008) replicated these effects using a lexical decision 
paradigm. Participants in their study were instructed to either suppress or concentrate 
on a target word for a five minute phase. After the five minute phase they were 
instructed to continue to suppress/concentrate on the target word whilst completing 
an associative priming lexical decision task. The lexical task presented word pairs 
sequentially, participants were required to press the spacebar if the second word was 
written in English. The results indicated that when participants were primed with a 
word closely associated with the target word they responded significantly faster. This 
suggested, once again, that the suppressed word was cued by the closely linked 
(directly associated/related) words.
Muris, Merckelbach and De Jong (1993) provided further evidence for the 
ECH. They asked one group o f participants to complete the typical white bear study 
in a tidy room, whilst asking a second group to complete the same procedure in an 
untidy room. Results revealed that those asked to suppress in an untidy room 
experienced significantly more intrusions. This was said to have happened because 
participants had more in their environment to distract and therefore remind 
themselves of the unwanted thought.
The idea that environmental cues can serve to remind us of unwanted 
thoughts is not an idea that contradicts common sense. Kanfer (1980) gave evidence 
for such an assertion by suggesting that human beings will often alter their 
environment to either avoid unwanted thoughts, or to remind them of things they 
wished to hold in memory, for example, the way in which human beings will remove 
and replace photographs. In spite o f common sense examples, empirical research is 
needed to solidify such a theory. The research discussed in previous paragraphs 
seems to lend strong support to the notion that thought suppression is difficult due to 
directly associated environmental cues, however, a behavioural phenomenon known 
as stimulus equivalence suggests that if  there is intentional relating o f stimuli in the 
environment then unintentional relations may also emerge (Dymond & Roche, 
2009). If  so, then the futility of attempting to suppress one’s thoughts may be 
understood not only in terms o f intentional processes but also unintentional ones.
^ n a p ie i  x
1.2.1.2 A Behavioural Account of Cognition
Stimulus equivalence is an empirically demonstrable phenomenon in which, 
by training a series o f unidirectional relations between arbitrary stimuli, a number of 
untrained or derived relations emerge in an overall pattern according to which the 
stimuli seem subsequently to be treated as mutually substitutable or equivalent. 
Using the simplest possible example, imagine participants are trained, using arbitrary 
stimuli A, B and C to choose B in the presence of A, and C in the presence of B. 
Stimulus equivalence is subsequently demonstrated if they show a number of further 
‘derived’ relations including reversing the trained relations by choosing A in 
presence of B, and B in presence o f C; and combining the trained relations by 
choosing C with A and vice versa. If all emergent relations proposed here control 
responding, then A, B and C are effectively being treated by the participant as 
equivalent or mutually substitutable and are said to function as a derived equivalence 
relation or equivalence class (Sidman, Kirk, & Wilson-Morris, 1985; Sidman, 1994).
Equivalence is typically trained and tested using conditional discriminations / 
match-to-sample (MTS) procedures and is a well researched phenomenon within 
behaviour analysis, not least as a result o f its potential generativity. In this respect, a 
further effect associated with stimulus equivalence known as transfer of function, is 
of particular interest. Importantly, after an equivalence relation is formed, and a 
psychological function is established for one member of that relation, that function 
may transfer to other members o f that relation in the absence of explicit training. For 
example, if  A, B and C are members o f an equivalence relation as described in the 
previous paragraph and A acquires anxiety eliciting functions through pairing with 
shock, then B and C may acquire a similar function without needing to be similarly 
associated with shock but simply by virtue o f being in the equivalence relation with 
A.
Transfer o f function has been demonstrated with a number o f different 
behavioural functions, including avoidant responses, preferences, self discrimination, 
moods (See Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000 for a review). To take two examples of 
particular relevance to the current research; Smyth, Bames-Holmes and Forsyth 
(2006) conducted a study which aimed to display a derived transfer o f self reported 
arousal functions. In particular the study showed that spider fearful participants 
reported an increase in arousal not only when presented with the principal stimulus
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(in this case a spider attack video), but also when presented with the equivalence 
trained, direct and derived stimuli, thereby displaying a transfer o f stimulus 
functions. Additionally Auguston and Dougher (1997) demonstrated the transfer of 
avoidance functions through equivalence. Participants were first trained in two-four 
member equivalence relations. Next they were exposed to a conditioning procedure 
in which shock was paired with one member of one relation only. Participants were 
then trained in a differential signaled avoidance task during which they learned to 
avoid shock by making a particular response in the presence of the conditioned 
shock stimulus. Finally, it was demonstrated that they also displayed the avoidance 
response in the presence of stimuli equivalent to the conditioned shock stimulus but 
not to stimuli in the other equivalence relation.
The empirical phenomenon o f transfer o f function through derived 
equivalence may allow for the modelling and exploration of interference with 
thought suppression via unintentional relations. From the current perspective, 
thinking is part of our repertoire o f learned behaviour. More specifically, thinking is 
covert responding which produces thoughts which may then become stimuli for 
further covert responding. Thought suppression is the attempt to respond away from 
certain thought stimuli when they arise by focusing attention on alternative internal 
and external stimuli. Thought suppression interference occurs when the to-be- 
avoided stimulus is presented to the person. Thought suppression fails when the 
person responds to the to-be-avoided stimulus rather than responding away from it. 
This might occur with direct thought suppression interference or as a result of some 
other process that results in the presentation o f the thought. Amongst these latter 
processes is derived relational responding.
Derived (unintentional) relations may interfere with thought suppression in 
the following manner. Imagine a child who fears spiders. At some point, she might 
learn that spiders (A) lay eggs (B). She might also learn that eggs are one o f the 
ingredients of cake (C). These learned relations may allow her to derive a relation 
between spiders and cake without any direct association of these stimuli being 
necessary (see Bames-Holmes, Cochrane, Bames-Holmes, Stewart, & McHugh, 
2004). The child’s fear may lead to attempts to suppress thoughts o f spiders. 
However, there might also be a transfer of functions through equivalence from 
spiders to cake such that being reminded of the stimulus ‘cake’ might also be
9
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something that cues ‘spider’. Thus the unintentionally related stimulus ‘cake’ 
becomes something to be suppressed also. And of course if  these two apparently 
unconnected stimuli may be thus related then a vast array o f other stimuli may be 
similarly implicated, making thought suppression even more futile than even ECH 
might predict.
Chapter 4 o f the current thesis aims to further investigate the possible role 
that derived stimulus relations may have in the context of thought suppression, 
whilst also maintaining contact with the ECH. Specifically, it will use the stimulus 
equivalence paradigm to demonstrate that directly trained and derived stimuli may 
render thought suppression impossible.
1.2.2 The Immediate Enhancement Effect
The seminal thought suppression study (Wegner et al, 1987) found that when 
instructed not to think about a ‘white bear’ for a five minute phase that the exact 
thought would enter the mind of the participants between 6 and 7 times. This failure 
to banish an unwanted thought during the suppression phase was referred to as the 
immediate enhancement effect. Although the ECH would account for the immediate 
enhancement effect by suggesting that various external cues make thought 
suppression impossible, there has been both research for and against the idea that 
thought suppression and the immediate enhancement effect are possible. Indeed 
research validating the assumption that the attempted suppression of a target thought 
ironically leads to an increase in that thought has ‘yielded a morass o f conflicting 
results’ (Muris et al, 1993, p. 609).
The majority of research that has investigated the immediate enhancement 
effect has employed a similar experimental paradigm, based on the original white 
bear study. In short these preparations tend to include two five minute phases. In the 
first five minute phase the participants are instructed to suppress an unwanted 
thought, whilst in the second five minute phase they are instructed to 
concentrate/think freely. In both conditions the participant has to indicate the 
presence o f the unwanted thought each time it comes to mind by pressing an event 
marker/ringing a bell/ pressing the space bar. The dependent variable therefore is the 
amount of self reported unwanted thought intrusions that participants experience
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during each five minute phase. Due to this similarity in procedure, only a summary 
of the immediate enhancement effect research findings is necessary.
A number of studies have investigated the effect; Salkovskis and Campbell 
(1994) included a suppression group, a suppression group with a distraction 
instruction and a control group with no suppression instruction in their study. The 
results showed that the suppression and suppression with distraction groups both 
reported significantly more thought intrusions than the control group. Muris, 
Merckelback, Van Den Hout and De Jong (1992) conducted a similar study where 
they compared the suppression o f an emotional story with that of a neutral one. 
Results showed that when compared to a control group, participants instructed to 
suppress the neutral story exhibited an immediate enhancement effect. Interestingly 
those suppressing the emotional story did not; the possible reasons for such a finding 
are discussed in Section 1.2.6. Similarly Lavy and Van Den Hout (1990) found that 
when participants were instructed to suppress a neutral thought (that of a vehicle) 
they tended to have thoughts of vehicles enter their mind significantly more than 
controls. Additionally, whilst employing an identical experimental paradigm to the 
aforementioned studies previous research that employed longer suppression phases 
still found the immediate enhancement effect (Rassin, Merkelback & Muris, 1997; 
Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994).
In an attempt to move away from the self report measures used in the 
traditional thought suppression preparations, some research has been designed to 
provide implicit measures o f thought suppression. For example, Lavy and Van Den 
Hout (1994) asked participants to complete an implicit stroop task. The thought 
suppression stroop task required participants to indicate the colour o f a word 
appearing on the screen. A variety o f words, which included the target word, 
appeared in either red or blue and participants were required to identify the word 
colour by means o f pressing a pre-assigned key on the key board. The participants’ 
response time to the target word and the control words was measured. Half of the 
participants were asked to suppress a target thought while completing the stroop 
task, whilst half were provided with no instruction. The results found that 
participants instructed to suppress a target neutral thought showed an attentional bias 
towards the target word on the implicit measure, suggesting the existence of a 
slightly different but valid immediate enhancement effect. Results from a study by
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Wegner and Erber (1992; see Section 1.2.1.1) provided similar evidence to those of 
Lavy and Van Den Hout (1994). In experiment 1 Wegner and Erber (1992) asked 
participants to make word associations to a word prompt, whilst 
suppressing/concentrating on a target word. Results showed, in line with their 
predictions, that participants often provided the exact suppression target when 
prompted with related cues, in comparison to control words, and those in a 
concentration group. In the second experiment o f the paper Wegner and Erber (1992) 
utilized the stroop paradigm in a procedure identical to that o f Lavy and Van Den 
Hout (1994); specifically finding that thought suppression increased the accessibility 
of the unwanted thought. It was suggested that this increased accessibility o f the 
unwanted thought reflects the immediate enhancement effect seen in the traditional 
Wegner paradigm.
More recently, however, there has been some evidence to suggest that it may 
be possible to suppress one’s thoughts. For example, Anderson and Green (2001) 
employed the ‘think, no think’ paradigm. This procedure compared two conditions; 
first, all participants had to learn a number o f associations between a series o f two 
random noun pairs. Subsequently, one condition required participants to suppress 
these associations, whilst the second condition required the participants to try to 
remember them. For example, all participants might have been asked to 
suppress/remember that the words ‘house’ and ‘banana’ were linked. Subsequent 
recall tests would determine the effects o f each instruction. According to the ironic 
effects of suppression, the participants, when asked to suppress, should have been 
able to recall the word associations as well as those asked to remember. However, 
the findings indicated that participants were able to suppress the word associations 
relative to baseline. Nevertheless, the effect sizes in this study were small and the 
amount o f to-be suppressed words was high. Additionally, Bulevich, Roediger and 
Balota (2003) suggested that recent attempts have failed to replicate the think no 
think effect.
More relevant to the current perspective however, is that a number o f studies 
using the typical white bear paradigm have failed also to find the immediate 
enhancement effect (Muris Merkelback & De Jong, 1993; Roemer & Borkovec, 
1994). Clark Ball and Pape (1991) instructed their participants to either suppress or 
monitor their thoughts about a story that had been read to them. Their results
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revealed no immediate enhancement effect. However, the most notable study which 
provided evidence for the idea o f successful suppression was a meta-analysis 
conducted by Abramowitz, Tolin and Street (2001). Their analysis of 28 thought 
suppression studies aimed to assess the evidence for Wegner’s immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects. The meta-analysis suggested that there was, in 
fact, no immediate enhancement effect which would suggest that suppression in the 
short term may well be effective.
As the evidence for the immediate enhancement effect is mixed, Chapters 2 
and 3 of the current thesis will seek to further explore the immediate enhancement 
effect, by employing the typical thought suppression paradigm, whilst using a range 
of distraction techniques across both neutral and high valence thoughts.
1.2.3 The Rebound Effect
Wegner et al (1987) found, during the concentration phase that followed 
suppression, that participants would experience significantly more intrusions than 
those who were instructed to concentrate on the unwanted thought before 
suppression. Wegner et al (1987) suggested that the suppression attempt caused the 
unwanted thought to rebound an increased amount of times after the suppression 
phase had ended; this was labelled the rebound effect. The possibility that a rebound 
effect exists is important as it represents a laboratory model for the aetiology o f real 
life obsessions (Wegner, 1989). Specifically showing how the attempted suppression 
of an unwanted thought can cause that exact thought to enter consciousness on 
multiple occasions after the suppression attempt has ended.
However, research on the rebound effect is difficult to interpret due to the 
two different rebound instructions that participants have received across the 
empirical literature. In the original Wegner et al (1987) study participants were given 
the concentration rebound instruction, where participants were encouraged ‘to think 
about the unwanted thought’. Indeed a number of thought suppression studies have 
replicated the typical rebound results when the concentration instruction is employed 
(Lavy & Van Den Hout, 1990; Clark et al, 1991; McNally & Ricciardi, 1996). 
However this instruction has been heavily criticized for lacking in ecological validity 
(see Section 1.2.8), prompting the emergence of the think free instruction, where 
participants are instructed ‘to think of anything they like but that if  they should have
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the unwanted thought come to mind then they should press the space bar just as 
before’. The think free rebound instruction has become common place in thought 
suppression literature. Despite this procedural alteration, the definition o f the 
rebound effect has remained the same i.e. significantly more intrusions are needed in 
the rebound phase than in the suppression phase. This seems somewhat surprising as 
it is unlikely that participants who are given a think free instruction would signal as 
many intrusions as those asked to concentrate on an unwanted thought. Due to this 
alteration, the majority of thought suppression research finds no rebound effect. 
However, this may be a result o f the fact that they were testing for the original 
concentration definition o f the rebound effect, not a definition which took the 
procedural alteration into consideration.
The traditional thought suppression paradigm, utilizing the think free 
rebound instruction, has been employed across a number o f studies using a variety o f 
unwanted target thoughts, most of which found no rebound effect, according to the 
strict definition of rebound (Liberman & Forster, 2000; Merkelback, Muris Van den 
Hour & de Jong, 1991; Rutledge, Hollengurg & Hancock, 1993 and Nixon, Flood & 
Jackson, 2006). In contrast to this, Abramowitz et al (2001) in their meta-analysis 
did find evidence of a minor rebound effect, however a number of the studies used in 
this meta analysis used a concentration instruction. Finally, Clark, Ball and Pape 
(1991) and Roemer and Borkovec (1994) did find evidence of a rebound effect using 
a think free rebound instruction. Due to the mixed research findings, Chapters 2 and 
3 o f the current thesis aim to determine whether a rebound effect emerges across 
neutral and high valence thoughts, in both the short term and the long term, and 
across a number o f different distraction techniques.
1,2.4 Distraction methods
One potential reason that people engage in distraction when attempting to 
suppress an unwanted thought might be due to the supposed short term relief of 
anxiety that can be felt as a result o f it (Mullen & Suls, 1982). Indeed, Wegner and 
Gold (1995) suggested that the most common way in which one would attempt 
suppression would be via distraction. In other words, in order to suppress an 
unwanted thought we will often attempt to occupy ourselves with a variety o f other 
thoughts. O f course in accordance with the ECH, distraction attempts are eventually
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futile because the more distracters that one uses to divert attention away from the 
unwanted thought, the more environmental cues there are to remind us of it. With 
distraction holding such an important role in attempted suppression Chapters 2 and 3 
of the current thesis aim to determine the effect that different distraction techniques 
will have on the immediate enhancement and rebound effects.
The topic o f distraction within thought suppression has not received much 
attention since the inception o f the white bear study. Nevertheless a variety of 
distraction based studies have displayed some interesting results. Wegner (1989) 
suggested that the quality of the distracter is a pivotal factor if  successful suppression 
is to be achieved. Specifically, Wegner (1989) suggested that the distracter must be 
sufficiently absorbing, as distracters that were not interesting enough, or distracters 
that challenge our intellects too much would cause an early return to the unwanted 
thought. Indeed, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) previously proposed, in what he termed 
Flow Theory, that people are most absorbed when they are engaging in an activity 
which precisely matches their capabilities, a theory which may be applicable to the 
success that absorbing distracters may have in the area o f attempted thought 
suppression. Brucato (1978) found evidence to support this assumption. He 
instructed all participants to under-take a cold pressor task, whilst supplying the 
participants with a number o f different distracters. The findings from this study 
suggested that distracters that were too simple or too difficult cause an increased 
amount o f intrusions, compared to more absorbing distracters where the unwanted 
thought occurrence was less. Additionally, Corah, Gale and Illig (1979) found that 
participants who were played music (non absorbing distracter) during a dental 
procedure experienced significantly more self reported pain than those who played a 
video game (absorbing distracter). McCaul and Mallot (1984) also conducted a study 
on amount o f perceived pain and found that those participants with absorbing 
distracters reported less pain than those with distracters that were too simple or too 
difficult. It must be added that the authors only found this effect for mild pain, not 
severe. Finally, Westcott and Horan (1977) found that not all absorbing distraction 
needs to be pleasant. Their study found that students could withstand a cold pressor 
task for significantly longer than controls when asked to imagine having an argument 
with an intimidating professor.
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In terms of the quality o f the distracter, the research suggests that the more 
absorbing the distracter, the better one’s chances are of achieving successful 
suppression. However, objective research is difficult to conduct on the absorption of 
a distracter, due the subjective nature of absorbing distraction; what one person finds 
distracting, another would not. Empirically speaking, a more objective study of 
distraction, which has received more attention within the field of thought 
suppression, is the type of distraction technique that is used. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to 
address Wegner et al.’s (1987) assertion that the ironic effects o f thought suppression 
during the suppression phase could be undermined via the use o f a focussed 
distracter. Wegner (1989) argued that people will generally engage in unfocussed or 
self distraction where the number o f possible distracters is large, resulting in a 
greater number of environmental cues. With this as a logical back drop Wegner et al 
(1987) found that when they limited the amount of distracters that the number of 
unwanted thought intrusions in the suppression phase decreased. Specifically, 
Wegner et al (1987) demonstrated that when participants were asked to suppress via 
the use of a focussed distracter (i.e. red volkswagon) that the unwanted thought 
occurrence was reduced. In addition their study found that if one was ‘successful’ in 
a suppression attempt by using a focussed distracter that one subsequently 
experiences a larger post suppression rebound effect. Since the seminal research, a 
number of studies have demonstrated the advantages of using a focussed distracter. 
Lin and Wicker (2007) instructed participants either to suppress an unwanted 
thought via self distraction or via the use o f a focussed distraction task in a study 
which employed the typical thought suppression procedure. Results showed that 
participants in the focussed distraction condition experienced significantly less 
unwanted thought intrusions when compared to the suppression group. However the 
results showed no evidence of a post suppression rebound effect in the focussed 
distraction group. Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) also compared the use of self 
distraction versus focussed distraction in a similar preparation and their findings 
suggested that the focussed distraction group experienced fewer intrusions than the 
self distraction group. They additionally found no evidence of a heightened rebound 
effect. Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) and Cioffi and Hollaway (1993) employed a 
different dependent measure in the form of a cold pressor task. Specifically, both 
studies showed that those participants who suppressed their pain via a focused
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distracter kept their hand submerged in icy water (i.e. tolerated pain) significantly 
longer than those asked to self distract.
In all, the literature suggests that engaging in focussed distraction helps 
alleviate the amount of unwanted thought intrusions, whilst the effect that this has on 
post suppression rebound is uncertain. Chapters 2 and 3 of the current thesis explore 
the issue of distraction by comparing a number of distraction techniques, whilst 
employing both neutral and higher valence thoughts. If the use of a focussed 
distracter does help alleviate the effects of attempted suppression then such a finding 
could have broader implications within the clinical arena, where the management of 
unwanted thoughts is widely researched.
1.2.5 The effects of suppression over time
Despite advances in our research of the immediate enhancement and rebound 
effects in the short term, very little research has been conducted on the effects o f 
longer term repeated suppression attempts on thought occurrence during suppression 
and rebound/think free phases. The reason such research gains importance is due to 
the fact that it is unlikely that people will have to deal with an unwanted thought on 
only one occasion. It is more likely that we have to deal with unwanted thoughts 
over a certain period o f time, in a somewhat cyclical nature between suppression and 
think free phases (Wegner, 1989). Indeed Wegner (1989) coined a term for the 
everyday cycles o f suppression and non suppression that one may experience when 
attempting to banish an unwanted intrusive thought, an ‘indulgence cycle’.
An ‘indulgence cycle’ refers to the process by which a person will move 
from a phase o f suppression to a phase of expression. Wegner (1989) suggested that 
real life suppression attempts would occur on multiple occasions, so that one would 
repeatedly be entering phases o f suppression and expression. Wegner (1989) 
suggested that the first suppression-expression cycle (i.e. the first indulgence cycle) 
results in a rebound effect. This increases thought frequency and prompts further 
suppression. However, further suppression will be more difficult due to the increased 
frequency of thoughts. Subsequently thought suppression attempts in the 2nd 
suppression phase will be more difficult, prompting a second and larger rebound 
effect. This cycle continues until the thought is constantly on one’s mind, 
magnifying the futility associated with thought suppression attempts. This
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interpretation of how an unwanted target thought can gain further salience is 
consistent with Wegner’s (1989) Environmental Cueing Hypothesis. The more 
indulgence cycles one enters the more distracters will become linked to the unwanted 
target thought. This will make suppression attempts ever more futile as thought 
intrusions will increase as does the number o f retrieval cues in the environment.
According to Wegner (1989) over the course o f multiple cycles, the 
unwanted target thought occurrences may increase sufficiently to prompt the 
development of an obsession. Additionally, Hardy and Brewin (2005) suggested that 
indulgence cycles could provide the mechanism from which clinical obsessions 
form. This assumption is in line with research in the area o f the development of 
clinical disorders in which the role o f negative unwanted intrusive thoughts has been 
highlighted (Purdon & Clark, 1993). However, to date, only two studies have 
directly tested the impact of more than one indulgence cycle on thought occurrence.
In the first of these studies, Hardy and Brewin (2005) instructed two groups 
of participants (high vs. low obsessionality) to complete two indulgence cycles. An 
escalation of target thoughts in the high obsession group was predicted but no such 
escalation emerged. However, a small non significant increase in target thoughts 
from the first to second expression phase did emerge, suggesting that a more 
pronounced rebound effect may be forming over multiple indulgence cycles. Hardy 
and Brewin (2005) suggested that future research should include more indulgence 
cycles in order to determine whether a further escalation in thought frequency after 
repeated indulgence cycles would occur. Additionally, the authors suggested their 
use o f a personally relevant target thought may have confounded the impact of 
repeated indulgence cycles. Specifically, it is possible that the high obsession 
participants may have had a history o f practised suppression with the personally 
relevant target thought. According to Hardy and Brewin (2005) this could have 
afforded them increased effectiveness at suppressing the unwanted target when 
compared to their low obsession counterparts.
In the second o f these studies, Williams and Moulds (2007) determined the 
effects of repeated suppression on the frequency and features o f visual intrusions 
amongst high and low dysphoric undergraduates. Again, two indulgence cycles, and 
high valence (but not personally relevant) target thoughts were employed. The 
valence of the target thought was operationalised by exposing participants to a video
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clip of a suicide. In line with Hardy and Brewin (2005), no increase in reported 
target thought occurrence emerged in the phases following initial and repeated 
suppression attempts. Surprisingly, the results from both studies appear to contradict 
Wegner’s (1989) initial prediction that multiple indulgence cycles would induce an 
escalation in the occurrence o f an unwanted thought.
With this contradiction in mind Experiment 2 of the thesis will seek to further 
explore the effects of engaging in multiple indulgence cycles on unwanted thought 
occurrence. Specifically, the experiment will aim to determine, in terms of unwanted 
thought intrusions, if  the immediate enhancement and rebound effects will 
continue/escalate over a longer period o f time.
1.2.6 Suppressing high valence thoughts
The inability to successfully suppress ones thoughts becomes particularly 
relevant due to the link between attempted thought suppression and clinical disorders 
such as OCD (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997), GAD (Beckner, Rink, Roth & Margraf,
1988) PTSD (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Ehlers & Steil, 1995), specific 
phobias (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997) and depression (Wegner, 1994) (See Section 
1.3 for greater detail of this link). Although the futility of thought suppression and its 
link to clinical disorders have both been widely documented the relationship between 
thought suppression and clinical disorders, at a process level, is relatively 
underrepresented in the research field. That is, it is unclear as to what causes the 
supposed link between thought suppression and the development of psychological 
disorders.
Muris et al (1992) suggest that research on neutral thoughts may not 
generalise to psychopathology; citing that ‘clinical studies’ (Rachman & Hodgson, 
1980) indicate that obsessions mostly concern religious, sexual or aggressive themes, 
that is, emotional topics. Therefore perhaps research which investigates the 
suppression of personally relevant and high valence thoughts may be more 
appropriate, as it is unlikely that people engage in the suppression of neutral 
thoughts in everyday life. Additionally, it is possible that the high valence nature of 
an unwanted thought may play some part in the development of a psychological 
disorder. One reason this may be the case is due to the fact that it might be expected
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that an emotional and personally relevant thought will intrude more than a neutral 
thought (Muris & Merckelback, 1991). Perhaps this accelerated intrusion rate could 
provide the mechanism by which a psychological disorder could develop, as the 
greater the contact with the unwanted thought, the more one is reminded of 
unwanted feelings that may accompany it.
A number of basic studies have compared the suppression of neutral versus 
emotional thoughts (e.g., Muris et al., 1992; Kelly & Kahn, 1994). Davies and Clark 
(1998) found that participants asked to suppress high emotional disturbing material 
experienced a significant rebound when compared to controls. Whilst Harvey and 
Bryant (1998) found that participants who were asked to suppress thoughts of a 
violent film reported more film-related thoughts than participants who were asked to 
suppress thoughts of a neutral film. Likewise Petrie, Booth and Pennebaker (1998) 
found that participants found it easier to suppress thoughts about daily events than 
about emotional issues. Rachman (1982) found that college students reported more 
difficulties in suppressing thoughts that were emotionally distressing. They 
concluded that emotional reactions to a thought can cause impairment in one’s 
ability to suppress it. However, these studies were conducted with non-clinical 
populations where the emotional thought was created for each participant. Thus 
some researchers have speculated that emotional thoughts, which are not personally 
relevant, may not be appropriate to investigate the role of thought suppression in 
psychopathology (Muris et al., 1992). The degree to which participants find the 
thought personally relevant may affect the degree to which they are able to suppress 
the thought (Abramowitz, Tolin & Street, 2001); indeed Salkovskis and Campbell 
(1994) found that participants find it particularly difficult to suppress personally 
relevant thoughts.
Research investigating the suppression o f personally relevant thoughts has 
covered a variety of areas, for example, the suppression of food related thoughts 
leads to further binge eating (Keys, Brozek, Henshel Mickelson & Taylor, 1950), 
restrainers (people who were on a diet or were trying not to eat too much) actually 
ate more ice cream than any other group in a milkshake ice cream test (Herman & 
Mack, 1975), using suppression as a dietary technique actually lead to overeating 
(Polivy & Herman, 1985), worriers had twice as many unpleasant unwanted thoughts 
as did controls (Matthews & Milroy, 1993), bum victims who attempted to suppress
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thoughts of their bums reported significantly more unwanted intrusions compared to 
non suppressors (Lawrence, Fauerbach & Munster, 1996), the suppressing of 
stereotypic thoughts caused a shift in subsequent behaviour which emphasized these 
stereotypes (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994), people who tried not to 
think of a bereavement took longer to get over their loss (Lindemann, 1944), 
participants who had attempted to suppress a recent traumatic event, experienced 
intmsions that were more frequent, more intense and often more dramatic than the 
actual occurrence of the event (Rassin, Merkelback & Muris, 2000), people who 
were instructed to suppress thoughts of an imminent painful electric shock 
experienced huge increases in anxiety and anxious thoughts (Koster Rassin, 
Crombez & Naring, 2003), incest victims who try to block out their thoughts become 
‘obsessed’ by their memories (Silver, Boon & Stones, 1983), those required to 
complete a sentence after being told to suppress all sexist tendencies, tended to be 
more sexist in their sentence completion than controls (Wegner, Erber & Bowman, 
1993) and people who try to deceive others via suppression often give away the truth 
(De Paulo, Lanier & Davis, 1983). Each of these studies appears to demonstrate the 
futility associated with the suppression of a personally relevant thought. However, 
arguably the most widely employed clinical group when dealing with suppression 
and high valence personally relevant material, in a laboratory setting, involved 
phobic populations.
Specific phobias, which have a prevalence rate of 10-11% in the general 
population (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), involve personally relevant, 
high valence thoughts which may attract attempts at suppression. However, research 
has suggested that thought suppression may be a causal factor in the development 
and maintenance of a phobia (Wegner, 1989; Salkovskis, 1989). Muris, De Jong, 
Merkelbach, Postema and Vet (1998) found that dental fearful patients reported 
higher levels of intrusive and negative thinking during a dental procedure than non 
fearful patients. Similarly, Fawzy, Hecker and Clark (2006) found that participants 
who were instructed to suppress snake related thoughts exhibited a more pronounced 
attentional bias towards snake related pair words suggesting a causal relationship 
between thought suppression and attentional bias for snake related thoughts. Wenzel, 
Barth and Holt (2003) also reported that participants experienced fearful related 
thoughts for a longer phase of time when implementing suppression strategies.
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Amtz, Lavy, Van den Berg and Van Rijsoort (1993) found that spider fearful 
participants, using a suppression strategy, do report multiple negative distressing 
thoughts when confronted with a spider.
Despite the evidence which suggests that emotional, high valence and 
personally relevant thoughts render suppression attempts more difficult, there is 
nonetheless evidence to suggest that emotional valence o f the target thought may 
have no effect, or may actually cause a decrease in the target thought. Rachman 
(1982) proposed that when individuals become accustomed to unwanted thoughts 
through repeated exposure, their emotional response to those thoughts is reduced, 
and consequently they are able to forget them more easily. He suggested that 
habituation training (expression of unwanted thoughts) can thus lead to a decrease in 
subsequent emotional cognitive intrusions. A number o f studies have varied the 
emotional valence o f the target thought and have found that emotional valence target 
thoughts are actually easier to suppress than neutral target thoughts (Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). For example Roemer and Borkevec (1994) examined the effect of 
suppressed material with different emotional valence; neutral, anxious and 
depressing target thoughts. They predicted that participants would find it harder to 
suppress emotional material leading to a greater rebound effect. Contrary to their 
predictions the results indicated that participants suppressed the target thought 
irrespective of emotional valence. However, it has been argued that although the 
experimenters used emotionally distressing material, they were not personally 
relevant. The use o f a personally relevant distressing thought would hold more 
salience for an individual because o f a history with such an unwanted thought.
In a subsequent study on the effects o f thought suppression on personally 
intrusive thoughts, Kelly and Kahn (1994: Experiment 2) randomly assigned 
participants to four experimental groups. Group 1 involved initial suppression of a 
pleasant intrusive thought, group 2 involved initial expression of a pleasant intrusive 
thought, group 3 had to suppress an unpleasant intrusive thought and group 4 had to 
express an unpleasant intrusive thought. Results showed participants who suppressed 
a pleasant thought experienced the rebound effect whereas participants who were 
suppressing an unpleasant intrusive thought did not experience the rebound effect. 
Kelly and Kahn (1994) suggested that the failure to observe the rebound effect of 
personally intrusive thoughts may be linked to participant’s experience of
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suppressing such thoughts. As participants in this study were permitted to choose 
their own commonly occurring intrusive thought, they may have already had a set of 
“backup” distracters that have been effective in reducing those thoughts in the past, 
thus minimizing the rebound effect. Finally Muris, Merkelbach, Horselenberg, 
Sijsenaar and Leeuw (1997) found that spider fearful participants only experienced a 
similar increase of thought intrusions to that of a non spider fearful participant, when 
the suppression target was ‘spider’; suggesting that valence had no effect on thought 
intrusions.
The literature on thought suppression and high valence thoughts has mixed 
research findings. Therefore, the central theme of Experiment 3 of the current thesis 
is to determine the exact nature and relevance that valence has on attempted 
suppression. Specifically, Experiment 3 will seek to further explore the effect that 
suppressing a high valence thought has on unwanted thought occurrence, in terms of 
both the immediate enhancement and rebound effects.
1.2.7 The physiological effects of thought suppression
One common denominator in the majority o f typical thought suppression 
studies is the use o f self report measures. That is, each participant is responsible to 
report the intrusion of the unwanted thought based on their own awareness. 
However, the accuracy of self report has been brought into question (Purdon & 
Clark, 2000, see Section 1.2.8). Unfortunately, it is difficult to avoid such measures 
when studying participants’ thoughts, however one way, which may provide further 
evidence as to the effects of attempted suppression, may be the use o f physiological 
measures.
A number o f studies have used physiological measures within the area of 
thought suppression. If  ones physiology changes during the act o f suppression, then 
it could provide one link between thought suppression and psychological disorder, as 
a greater physiological reaction to an unwanted thought may be at the heart of 
physiological and psychological distress. In particular studies have been conducted 
which link thought suppression o f high valence thoughts with physiological 
measures; however mixed results have again emerged. Borkovec (1974) conducted a 
study on participants with snake phobias, where he gradually introduced each 
participant to a real life snake. However he encouraged one group to suppress
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thoughts of snakes and encouraged the other group to think about the snakes. Despite 
an initial increase, the people who attempted to think about the snake actually 
showed a reduced heart rate than those who tried to suppress it. Petrie, Booth and 
Pennebaker (1998) obtained results that suppression may affect the immune system. 
They asked participants to write either a factual or personally relevant passage for 15 
minutes a day for three days. Following each 15 minute phase half of the participants 
were asked to suppress all thoughts o f what they had written. The results showed that 
behaviourally the participants indicated the presence o f a personally relevant thought 
more so than a neutral thought. Physiologically, suppression caused a decrease in 
certain t lymphocytes; however this effect did not differ between the emotional and 
neutral suppressors. This result suggested that the valence o f the thought had no 
impact on the physiology of the participants; however it seemed that the simple act 
of suppressing, regardless of valence, caused a physiological change.
Gross and Levenson (1993; 1997) conducted two studies which produced 
opposite results to that o f Petrie et al (1998). In their first study Gross and Levenson
(1993) found that reported intrusions between the emotional and neutral groups did 
not differ, however reliable physiological differences were found between 
participants asked to suppress their emotional response to a disgust-inducing film 
and those who had to suppress their emotional response to a neutral film. In the latter 
study Gross and Levenson (1997) produced similar findings which suggested that the 
suppression o f emotional material produced different Skin Conductance Levels 
(SCL), respiratory and immune system functions to that suppression of neutral 
material. Wegner, Shortt, Blake and Page (1990) instructed participants to either 
suppress or express four thoughts; one thought was exciting, the other three were 
less so. Results showed that suppression o f exciting thoughts did not produce the 
immediate enhancement or rebound effect behaviourally, that is, participants did not 
signal different intrusion rates across the four words. However, the participants SCL 
showed that suppression of exciting (sex) thoughts produced a greater physiological 
arousal, suggesting that the suppression o f a high valence thought does produce a 
different physiological reaction to suppressing a neutral thought.
Wegner and Gold (1995) found similar results in their hot flame/ cold flame 
study. Participants underwent three 8 minute phases; in the first and third phases the 
participants were free to think of whatever they wanted, for the second 8 minute
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phase they were instructed to suppress. The to-be suppressed thought differed 
depending on which group the participant was randomly assigned to. That is, 
participants either had to suppress a past relationship they still cared for (i.e., hot 
flame group) or a past relationship that meant nothing to them (i.e., cold flame 
group). The findings indicated no group differences in terms of measured thought 
intrusions. The physiological data, however, showed that the suppression of the hot 
flame produced a greater SCL than the cold flame group. Wegner and Zanakos
(1994) re-analyzed the data from Wegner and Gold (1995) in order to determine the 
degree to which thought suppression predisposes someone to emotional 
dishabituation (emotional dishabituation suggests that those people who are high in 
thought suppression tendencies may be able to suppress their thoughts, due to 
practise effects, more successfully than those lower in thought suppression 
tendencies). Their results showed that those participants higher in thought 
suppression tendencies demonstrated a higher SCL response to suppressing a hot 
flame than those lower in thought suppression tendencies who also were suppressing 
thoughts o f a hot flame. This result contradicts the predictions of emotional 
dishabituation as suppression of high valence material produces inflated SCL 
responses.
Muris, Merkelbach, Van Den Hout and De Jong (1992) conducted two 
studies investigating thought suppression, valence and physiology. In their first study 
they employed only a neutral thought and found an SCL difference between the 
suppression and the non suppression groups. In their second study they introduced 
the topic of valence. They found, interestingly, a behavioural difference between the 
neutral and emotional groups, however the difference pointed in the opposite 
direction to what we would expect; participants suppressing the neutral story 
experienced more thought intrusions than those suppressing the emotional story. Due 
to failures in the SCL equipment, the results only showed a weak effect of general 
suppression and displayed no group differences in terms of SCL. Finally Cioffi and 
Hollaway (1993) conducted a study where participants had to complete a cold 
pressor task. Whilst their hand was submerged they had to either distract themselves 
by thinking o f their home, pay close attention to the pain in their hand or they had to 
suppress all pain related thoughts and feelings. The results showed that participants 
in the suppression group not only reported more pain in the 2 minutes that followed
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the cold pressor task than those in the other groups, but that during the task the 
suppression group had higher levels of skin conductance.
Experiment 4 of the thesis aims to investigate the use of physiological 
measures within thought suppression research. Specifically, it aims to determine if 
there are any physiological effects (SCL) of attempted thought suppression, o f either 
high valence or neutral stimuli via the traditional white bear paradigm.
1.2.8 Methodological issues
Before moving onto the more clinical applications of thought suppression, 
some empirical issues in the literature have caused debate and warrant discussion. 
The current thesis reports on a number of thought suppression studies, where such 
methodological issues both arise and are investigated; therefore Section 1.2.8 
attempts to explain the common criticisms and subsequent solutions that have been 
levelled against thought suppression related research. A secondary aim o f this 
section is to provide the reader with some background to the particular preparations 
that will be employed in the empirical chapters that follow.
The first o f these issues surrounds research that has criticized the 
expression/concentration instruction as having no real life applicability (Lavy & Van 
Den Hout, 1990). Rassin, Muris, Jong and De Bruin (2005) argue that the expression 
instruction is problematic, as it lacks external validity, which renders findings from 
studies involving this instruction limited. Specifically, in real life it is unlikely that 
people go through a phase of expression after suppression. In fact Wegner (1989) 
noted that suppression was normally followed by a phase during which the thought is 
not actively suppressed. In terms o f the effect such an instruction has on the 
experimental paradigm, the expression instruction seems to inflate the rebound 
effect, in terms of unwanted intrusions, when compared to liberal instructions, which 
more accurately reflects how phases o f suppression and non suppression work in real 
life. For these reasons the liberal rebound/think free instruction is currently used 
predominantly in thought suppression research (Liberman & Forster, 2000; 
Merkelback, Muris, Van den Hout & de Jong, 1991; Rutledge, Hollengurg & 
Hancock, 1993; Nixon, Flood & Jackson, 2006; Clark et al, 1991). This instruction 
informs the participant, during the phase after attempted suppression, that they are
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free to think o f anything they like, but that if  the unwanted thought should come to 
mind then they should indicate its presence by pressing the space bar. This 
instruction is thought to mirror a real life suppression episode more accurately than 
the expression/concentration instruction (McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Rassin, Muris, 
Jong & De Bruin, 2005). Thus, each rebound phase in the current thesis will involve 
a liberal rebound/think free instruction.
Second, it has been suggested that the traditional thought suppression 
experimental design, which instructs participants not to think of a ‘white bear’, may 
provide the typical thought suppression results, not as an artefact o f suppression, but 
as an artefact of the paradigm itself (Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991). It is possible that the 
somewhat peculiar and unrealistic experimental conditions o f being sat alone in a 
room and being asked to monitor ones thoughts may have caused the desired effects, 
regardless of whether the participants received a suppression or think free 
instruction. Indeed, to combat this issue, the majority of thought suppression related 
research now employs a baseline condition, in which participants are instructed to 
think of anything they like, but to indicate presence of the unwanted thought should 
it appear in consciousness. This baseline condition aims to determine the number of 
occurrences of the ‘unwanted thought’ in a five minute phase when there is no 
suppression instruction in place. Hypothetically speaking, if  participants with a think 
free instruction signals an intrusion a similar amount of times to a participant given a 
direct suppression instruction, then it could be assumed that the amount o f space bar 
presses signalled by those undergoing a suppression phase is no more than those 
receiving no suppression instruction, thereby suggesting that participants are 
signalling the intrusion as an artefact of the paradigm, and not due to the effects of 
attempted suppression. A baseline phase can be operationalised in one of two ways. 
One method is to employ a within subjects comparison where all participants in the 
study complete three phases: 1) a baseline phase, 2) a suppression phase, and 3) a 
liberal think free phase (for example, Wegner & Gold, 1995; Marcks & Woods, 
2005). In this case, participants in the second phase would have to signal the 
intrusion significantly more than they did in the first phase in order for there to be an 
immediate enhancement effect. The second method is a between subjects 
comparison, where the experimental group complete a suppression and subsequent 
think free phase, and a baseline group complete two think free phases sequentially
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(for example, Clark et al, 1991; Clark et al, 1993). Here, participants in the 
suppression group have to signal the intrusion significantly more than those in the 
baseline group in order for there to be an immediate enhancement effect. The 
relevant studies of the current thesis will employ the latter format as it avoids the 
effects that fatigue might have on participants having to monitor their thoughts for 
three successive five minute phases, although it must be added that both formats 
have been found to have the desired effects in the aforementioned research.
Third, criticisms have been made concerning the self report nature of thought 
suppression studies. That is, each participant is responsible for reporting the 
intrusion of the unwanted thought. However, there is no assurance that participants 
will engage in the experiment or report accurately the amount o f intrusions that they 
experience. Research specifically investigating self report measures, outside the 
thought suppression arena, have shown that self report measures can be somewhat 
unreliable (Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991). More importantly within 
the area of thought suppression, further criticisms have been made. Purdon and Clark 
(2000) infer that self report measures of thought suppression are unreliable as they 
promote participant reactivity, with subjects tending to overestimate or 
underestimate thought frequencies depending on the instructions they receive. 
Despite these criticisms recent research has been conducted which suggests that self 
report, especially in a research area where the amount of other options are limited 
(i.e. because thoughts are viewed as internal events), may be more reliable than first 
assumed. Criticisms o f self reports measures question whether the participants are 
susceptible to demand characteristics. However, Rassin (2005) suggests that the 
‘correct’ answer in a typical thought suppression study is not easy to ascertain, (that 
is, the amount of times one should signal the intrusion), prompting the participants to 
simply adhere to the experimental instructions. Empirically speaking, a number of 
studies have compared the number o f self reported intrusions and estimated 
frequency of intrusions and the findings suggest that self reports provide fairly 
accurate results (Nelson-Gray, Herbert, Herbert, Farmer, Badawi & Lin, 1990; 
Frederikson, Epstein & Kosevski, 1975 & Rassin, 2005). However, as there is no 
way to determine the exact number o f unwanted thought intrusions, this criticism 
will always maintain some relevance. In order to avoid the issue of self report, some 
thought suppression related research successfully employed alternative measures, for
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example, measuring participants physiology (Wegner, Shortt, Blake & Page, 1990; 
Petrie, Booth & Pennebaker, 1998) or employing implicit measures (e.g., the stroop 
task) or dependent variables based on retrieval of word associations (Wegner & 
Erber, 1992; Lane & Wegner, 1995; Anderson & Green, 2001). In the earlier studies 
of the current thesis the issue of self report is unavoidable whilst replicating the 
white bear paradigm. However, Chapter 3 and 4 aim to address the issue of self 
report in the thought suppression literature. Specifically, Chapter 3 systematically 
reports on the alternative dependent measure o f SCL during attempted suppression, 
while Chapter 4 details an alternative paradigm that circumvents the need for 
participants to report the number of unwanted thought intrusions.
To summarise, in light o f the methodological issues in the thought 
suppression literature detailed above the current thesis will employ the liberal think 
free rebound instruction, include baseline measures of unwanted intrusive thoughts, 
and employ both self report and non self report based dependent variables. Having 
reviewed basic areas of thought suppression research, let us now consider its clinical 
applications.
1.3 The clinical importance of thought suppression
1.3.1 Research linking thought suppression and psychopathology
Previous researchers have suggested that thought suppression may contribute 
to the aetiology and maintenance of many if not all disorders within 
psychopathology (Najmi & Wegner, 2008). This is a tentative suggestion as 
psychological theories which have attempted to trace the route of clinical disorders 
to one common cause have generally failed; repression (Freud, 1958), inferiority 
(Adler, 1956) and low self regard (Rogers, 1951). According to Najmi and Wegner 
(2008) the default coping strategy for unwanted thoughts is to attempt to get rid of 
them, and this rule applies to each unwanted thought across each disorder (e.g. 
thoughts o f fear in phobias, or low self esteem in depression) within 
psychopathology. The production o f undesirable thoughts is a by-product o f any 
clinical disorder (e.g., thoughts o f feared stimuli to an anxious client) and this 
promotes the need for a strategy to deal with this content. Given that attempted 
suppression is the most widely reported strategy for dealing with unwanted thoughts
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and the empirical evidence that suggests such attempts can be counterproductive, 
researchers have suggested that thought suppression may ‘expand the psychological 
damage, prolong the course, and make them more resistant to treatment’ (pp 447- 
448). Indeed, it has been suggested that the attempted suppression of unwanted 
content, could in fact exacerbate certain disorders (Salkovskis, 1996). Najmi and 
Wegner (2008) suggest that thought suppression does not necessarily cause a 
disorder; more that reacting to the unwanted thought with a suppression attempt may 
only serve to complicate the issue. This assertion is illustrated by research which 
successfully links thought suppression with a wide range of psychological disorders 
such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and Depression amongst others 
(Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wenzlaff et al, 1988).
The link between thought suppression and OCD across the research findings 
appears to be quite consistent. For example, studies have found that clients with 
OCD experience an increase in intrusive thoughts when asked to use suppression as 
a strategy, this was found both in a laboratory and a real world setting, over a short 
(5 minute) and a longer time phase (four days) when compared to non OCD controls 
(Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). Additionally, McNally 
and Ricciardi (1996) found that participants instructed to suppress an ‘obsessional 
thought’ had that thought come to occur significantly more than a neutral thought. 
Tolin, Abramowitz, Prezeworski and Foa (2002) investigated a deficit amongst OCD 
patients to suppress a neutral thought in a two experiment paper. Results from their 
first experiment found that OCD clients experienced an immediate enhancement of 
unwanted thought intrusions when compared to controls. In the second experiment 
participants, whilst receiving a suppression instruction, were required to indicate if a 
word appearing on a screen was a real word or a non word. The results displayed that 
participants had a decreased lexical decision time for suppressed words suggesting 
that deficiencies in suppression were existent. Finally, a study which displays the 
prevalence for suppression as a coping strategy in OCD populations, Freeston and 
Ladouceur (1997) found that 76% of OCD patients reported repeated attempts at 
suppressing their unwanted thoughts.
The links between thought suppression and depression can also be found in a 
number of research studies. In one such study Wenzlaff et al (1988) instructed 
depressed or normal individuals to suppress either a nice or distressing story. Results
30
showed that depressed participants experienced a similar amount of intrusions when 
suppressing the nice story, importantly however, the depression group suppressing 
the distressing story experienced far more target related intrusions. Conway, Howell 
and Giannopoulos (1991) found that dysphoric participants who had been given 
negative feedback regarding their performance on a bogus test experienced multiple 
intrusions of their ‘failure’ during a subsequent suppression phase, when compared 
to non dysphoric participants. Turner, Beidel and Nathan (1985) found that people 
with depression often experienced, despite attempts at thought suppression, a lack of 
ability to avoid unwanted thoughts. Finally, Bywaters, Andrade and Turpin (2004) 
found that depressed participants were worse at suppressing negative thoughts than 
non depressed participants.
OCD and depression are two o f the more prevalent psychological disorders; 
however thought suppression has been linked to a number of other psychological 
issues. For example, insomniacs who used thought suppression as a technique for 
dealing with their insomnia, sleep less and report having worse sleep when compared 
to controls (Harvey, 2003), participants asked to suppress their worries experienced 
significantly more intrusions than those suppressing a neutral thought (Beckner, 
Rinck, Roth & McGrath, 1998), participants wishing to quit smoking experience far 
more smoking related intrusions when asked to use suppression as a strategy 
(Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994) and heavy social drinkers instructed to suppress 
thoughts of the amount they were drinking, actually drank more units of alcohol than 
heavy drinker control participants given no instruction (Palfai, Colby, Monti & 
Rohsenow, 1997).
With the variety o f research evidence linking thought suppression to 
psychological disorders/issues it seems as though Najmi and Wegner (2008) may 
have found a common link between all disorders. Indeed this finding does not seem 
that surprising when one considers that co-morbidity rate between psychological 
disorders is so high (Strosahl, 1994). However what is surprising is that despite this 
evidence, thought suppression is the most popular way in which we deal with 
unwanted thoughts. With the aforementioned evidence suggesting that thought 
suppression may have unfortunate effects, it seems as though an alternative way to 
manage unwanted thoughts is needed. One way, which has emerged over the last 
three decades, is psychological acceptance. Indeed early research by Frankl (1960)
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and Solymon Garza-Perez, Ledwidge and Solymon (1972), which modelled a minor 
form o f acceptance by instructing clients to think about their unwanted thoughts, 
suggested that such a strategy could be effective. Later studies which compared 
thought suppression versus acceptance strategies (Eiffert & Heffner, 2003; Hayes et 
al, 1999) substantiated this claim. One therapy which has particular relevance to this 
thesis because o f the links it makes between thought suppression, acceptance and 
psychological disorder is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999). The reason ACT could be considered important in the 
current context is because not only does it also maintain that there is a common 
factor underlying all psychological dysfunction (ACT holds that experiential 
avoidance, such as suppressing thoughts, is the underlying factor) but it also 
provides a behavioural model o f psychological acceptance, which can be seen as an 
alternative to thought suppression in the management o f unwanted thoughts.
1.3.2 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: Haves et ah 1999) as an 
alternative
Thought suppression is the primary way in which most people will deal with 
their unwanted thoughts (Rachman & Da Silva, 1978). However, as detailed 
exhaustively above, such attempts, not only prove futile but may also at worst cause 
and maintain psychological disorders. Considering the extent to which thought 
suppression may affect levels o f psychological well being, the need for a viable 
alternative for dealing with unwanted thoughts is needed. Within psychotherapy 
thought suppression can be seen as an attempt at controlling unwanted thoughts. 
However, in spite o f the widespread knowledge o f the futile nature o f thought 
suppression, the majority of therapeutic approaches also emphasize control based 
strategies for dealing with imwanted thoughts. The therapist will generally encourage 
thought control via such techniques as distraction (James & Hardardottir, 2002; 
Jaremko, 1978) emotional manipulation (Ahles, Blanchard & Levanthal, 1983) stress 
inoculation (Hackett & Horan, 1980) and even suppression (Harvey & McGuire, 
2000). However, a growing body o f research has suggested that such attempts at 
control based strategies are futile and often counterproductive (Cioffi &Hollaway, 
1993; Hayes, Wilson, Follette, Gifford & Strosahl, 1996; Hayes et al, 1999; 
Waddell, 1987, Turner, Beidel & Nathan, 1985; Marcks & Woods, 2005).
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Indeed, according to recent behaviourally based therapies (e.g. DBT; 
Linehan, 2000; ACT; Hayes et al, 1999) such attempts at controlling private events 
are not possible due to the relational nature o f language (Blackledge, 2007; see 
Section 1.3.2.1). Thought suppression can be viewed as a form of experiential 
avoidance (Hayes et al, 1999). Experiential avoidance refers to attempts to alter the 
frequency, duration, or form o f negatively evaluated private events such as thoughts, 
feelings, memories, and the context that engenders them (Hayes et al, 1999). 
However, attempting to avoid such experiences is considered a core psychological 
process underlying the onset and maintenance o f psychological disorders (Boelen & 
Reijntjes, 2008). One therapy which provides an alternative to control based 
strategies, which has lately received strong support, is Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999).
ACT is a third wave behavioural therapy that encourages what is referred to 
in the literature as psychological flexibility. Psychological flexibility involves 
contacting the present moment fully and choosing to change or persist in behaviour 
in the service of valued ends (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006). Put 
more simply, ACT encourages clients to understand that they can still behave in a 
way that is consistent with their values, whilst having unwanted thoughts.
I.3.2.I. Relational Frame Theory (Haves, Barnes Holmes & Roche, 2001)
Possibly the most important feature o f ACT to the thought suppression 
literature is that it is grounded in a theory of language and cognition; Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT). A number o f species capable o f complex forms of learning can 
be taught to respond to relations among stimuli. For example, in Harmon, Strong 
and Pasnak’s study (1982), adult rhesus monkeys were consistently taught to select 
the taller of two stimuli, and in subsequent testing they chose a taller novel stimulus 
rather than the previously reinforced smaller stimulus, thus demonstrating that the 
critical responses were made on the basis of the relative rather than the absolute 
properties of the stimuli. This form of relational responding is referred to as physical 
or non-arbitrary relational responding because the relational responses are made on 
the basis of the physical or formal relations amongst stimuli. According to Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Bames-Holmes & Roche, 2001) language-able humans 
also show an additional, more specialised form o f relational responding of which 
neither non-language able humans nor other species seem capable. In this form of
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relational responding, referred to as arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
(AARR), responding is not controlled solely by the physical or non-arbitrary 
relations between the stimuli but by arbitrary contextual cues.
RFT proposes that humans learn AARR on the basis of a unique history of 
reinforcement provided by the human verbal community. The earliest and simplest 
form of AARR that humans learn is responding to the symmetrical relations between 
words and objects. For example, a child may be taught to orient towards a particular 
object in the presence of a novel word in the context of an interaction such as the 
following: ‘Where is Teddy?’ [Child looks at Teddy], ‘Good boy!’ This interaction 
may be represented as follows: Hear Name A - Orient towards Object B. The child 
may also be taught to produce the name or an approximation of the name in the 
presence of the object: [Teddy shown to Child] ‘Who is this?’ [Child: ‘Teddy’], 
‘Good boy!’ (See Object B -  Produce Name A). Initially, the child must be 
explicitly taught each such symmetrical relation (i.e., A-B; B-A). However, 
according to RFT, after a child has received a sufficient number of exemplars of bi­
directional training in this relational response, eventually generalization occurs so 
that contextual cues such as ‘is’ or the object-naming context itself become sufficient 
to instantiate derived symmetrical relational responding with novel word-object 
combinations. In other words, at this point, the child need be taught in only one 
direction (i.e., either ‘name-object’ or ‘object-name’) and can then derive in the other 
direction (i.e., ‘object-name’ or ‘name-object’, respectively).
As outlined in the preceding paragraph, the earliest and most basic form of 
AARR is also the earliest and most basic form of language (i.e., reference). From an 
RFT perspective, the continued development of AARR corresponds with the 
continued development of language and verbal skills, a contention supported by a 
growing body of empirical evidence (e.g., Barnes, McCullagh, & Keenan, 1990; 
DiFore, Dube, Oross, Wilkinson, Deutsch, & Mcllvane, 2001; Devany, Hayes, & 
Nelson, 1986; Dickins, Singh, Roberts, Bums, Downes, Jimmieson, & Bentall, 2001; 
Dugdale & Lowe, 1990; 2000; Hayes & Bissett, 1998; Hayes & Hayes, 1992; 
Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby, & 
Carrigan, 1982; Sidman & Tailby, 1982; Staunton, Bames-Holmes, Whelan, & 
Bames-Holmes, 2002).
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The symmetrical relational responding involved in the object-name reference 
relation is classified by RFT as a form of co-ordination or sameness responding 
because the object and the name are treated as being the same as each other. When 
more than two stimuli are involved in an arbitrarily applicable ‘sameness’ relation 
then the term ‘stimulus equivalence’ is often used to describe the relationship among 
the stimuli concerned (see Section 1.2.1.2). Sidman (1971) was one o f the first 
behavioural researchers to empirically demonstrate this phenomenon. He trained 
learning-disabled participants to form three member equivalence relations between 
pictures, objects and written words and demonstrated a consequent sizeable increase 
in these participants’ vocabulary and reading ability. RFT research has also 
identified and investigated a number of other forms of arbitrarily applicable 
relations, or relational frames, in addition to relations of co-ordination. These 
include relations o f opposition (Dymond & Barnes, 1997; Roche & Barnes, 1996; 
1997; Steele & Hayes, 1991), distinction (Roche & Barnes, 1996), comparison (e.g., 
more than, less than; see e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1995; O’ Hora, Roche, Bames- 
Holmes, & Smeets, 2002), perspective (McHugh, Bames-Holmes, & Bames- 
Holmes, 2004), analogy (Barnes, Hegarty & Smeets, 1997; Stewart, Bames-Holmes, 
& Roche, 2004), and temporal relations (O’ Hora et al., 2002; O’Hora, Bames- 
Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2004).
In spite of the fact that there is a multitude of forms of AARR, according to 
RFT, all examples of this phenomenon possess the following three characteristics:
(i) Mutual entailment refers to the fundamental bi-directionality o f relational 
responding. In a specified context, if  stimulus A is related to stimulus B in a 
characteristic way, it is entailed that in that context, stimulus B will be related to 
stimulus A in another characteristic way. For example in a specified context, if  A is 
more than B, then it can be derived that in that context, B is less than A.
(ii) Combinatorial entailment refers to a derived stimulus relation where two 
or more stimulus relations mutually combine. In a specified context, if  stimulus A is 
related to stimulus B in a characteristic way and stimulus B is also related to 
stimulus C in a characteristic way, a derived stimulus relation can be entailed 
between stimulus A and stimulus C in that context. For example, if  A is less than B 
and B is less than C then it can be derived that A is less than C and C is more than A.
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This combinatorially entailed relation between stimulus A and stimulus C however, 
may not always be specified. For example, if  A is less than B and B is more than C, 
it can be derived that A and C are in some way related but this relationship cannot be 
specified.
(iii) Transformation o f  stimulus functions refers to the transformation of 
psychologically relevant functions o f a stimulus in accordance with the underlying 
derived relation in a given context. If stimulus A is related to stimulus B then in a 
context that selects particular psychological functions o f A as relevant, the functions 
o f B may be transformed in accordance with the underlying relation and the 
particular functions of A that are relevant. . This phenomenon is what gives 
relational responding its psychological significance. It allows functions of an event 
to be determined not only by an individual’s direct history with that event but also by 
how that event participates in derived relations with other events (Wilson & 
Blackledge, 1999). For example, if  stimulus A is in an equivalence / co-ordination 
relation with the neutral stimulus B, and stimulus A acquires fear eliciting functions, 
these functions may be transferred to stimulus B, so that this previously neutral 
stimulus B may now elicit fear. Similarly, stimulus functions can also be 
transformed in accordance with other forms of arbitrarily applicable relations. For 
example if stimulus A is in a relation o f opposition with an initially neutral stimulus 
B and stimulus A subsequently acquires aversive functions, then in particular 
contexts in which the aversive functions o f A are relevant, stimulus B may be 
transformed in accordance with the underlying relation such that B acquires 
reinforcing functions. Parenthetically, note that when a relation is one of equivalence 
/ sameness / co-ordination the term ‘transfer’ is used, because the psychological 
function that is derived is the same as the original function whereas if the relation is 
other than equivalence (e.g., opposition, distinction) then the term ‘transformation’ is 
used because the function that is derived is not the same as the original function 
(e.g., in the example of transformation via opposition relations just given, the 
aversive function is transformed into a reinforcing function).
Transformation o f stimulus functions is particularly important in the RFT 
approach to language in that this phenomenon can account for how language can 
change the psychological functions o f an event. It also accounts for how words can 
acquire the meaning of their referents allowing the psychological functions of
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referents and events to be mediated or re-lived through the individual’s thoughts. 
Thus, a significant quantity o f empirical research has already been carried out in 
relation to this phenomenon. Transformation of a number o f different varieties of 
psychological function has already been empirically demonstrated. These include 
transformation o f conditioned reinforcing functions (Hayes, Brownstein, Devany, 
Kohlenberg, & Shelby, 1987; Hayes, Kohlenberg, and Hayes, 1991) discriminative 
functions (Hayes et al., 1987), elicited conditioned emotional responses (Dougher, 
Auguston, Markham, Greenway, & Wulfert, 1994), ordinal functions (Sigurdardottir, 
Green & Saunders, 1991), extinction functions (Dougher, et al., 1994), and self­
discrimination functions (Dymond & Barnes, 1994). Transformation of function has 
also been empirically demonstrated in accordance with a number of different 
arbitrarily applicable relational patterns including opposition (Roche & Barnes, 
1997; Roche, Bames-Holmes, Smeets, Bames-Holmes, & McGeady, 2000; Whelan 
& Bames-Holmes, 2004) and comparison (e.g., more than / less than, see e.g., 
Dymond & Barnes, 1995).
The foregoing provides a description of the main properties of arbitrarily 
applicable relational responding (AARR), which is the key to the RFT perspective 
on language and complex human behaviour more generally. As defined earlier, 
AARR is responding in accordance with relations between stimuli which is 
determined, not by the physical characteristics of the stimuli involved, but by 
additional, arbitrary contextual cues. Thus, one o f the key determining characteristics 
of AARR is contextual control. Contextual control is perhaps the most critically 
important feature o f AARR as it is this which allows relational responding to be 
arbitrarily applied. Contextual control permits virtually any arbitrary stimulus to 
participate in a relational class, regardless o f the physical properties o f that stimulus. 
It manages the complexity of AARR, determining the relations that will be formed 
and transformations of stimulus functions. Contextual cues themselves are those 
features of the environment that predict reinforcement for a certain form of AARR. 
Any feature of the environment can function as a contextual cue. Studies have 
demonstrated the ability of various stimuli such as tones (Bush, Sidman & de Rose,
1989), shapes (Kennedy & Laitinen, 1988) and background colours (Wulfert & 
Hayes, 1988) to function as contextual cues. In natural language words, phrases,
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tone of voice, facial expressions and the form or structure of a sentence often act as 
contextual cues.
RFT proposes that contextual control over relational responding is 
established through multiple-exemplar training (MET). In MET an individual is 
given multiple opportunities to make a particular response in a given context and to 
experience its consequences. The features o f the task irrelevant for obtaining 
reinforcement (e.g. the physical properties of the relata) will vary across 
opportunities while the conditions necessary for obtaining reinforcement (i.e., the 
contextual cues) will remain constant. Over a number o f trials the individual learns 
to discriminate the features o f the environment which are likely to predict 
reinforcement for a particular type o f relational response. These features of the 
environment become the contextual cues which control relational responding. The 
individual learns that in the presence of these cues a certain type o f relational 
response is likely to be reinforced even when it is not supported by the physical 
properties of relata. For example, after reinforcement over multiple trials for 
applying a ‘bigger than’ relational response to different stimuli in the presence of the 
arbitrary symbol ###, this symbol will predict reinforcement for applying a ‘bigger 
than’ relation to any stimuli. Therefore, in the presence of the symbol ###, an 
individual could learn that the nonsense syllable ‘gug’ is bigger than the nonsense 
syllable ‘xav’, and entail that ‘xav’ is smaller than ‘gug’ in this context. Another way 
in which it is thought that contextual control may emerge is on the basis of a trained 
or derived relation to an established contextual cue. For example, if  ‘greater than’ is 
in an equivalence class with ‘bigger than’, and ‘greater than’ predicts reinforcement 
for a certain type of relational response, through bi-directional transformation o f 
stimulus function, ‘bigger than’ is likely to also predict reinforcement for that type o f 
relational response, thus acquiring the function o f contextual control.
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is based on the principles o f 
Relational Frame Theory. According to RFT AARR and the transformation o f 
stimulus functions provide us with a behavioural model o f human language and 
cognition. Language and cognitive processes are associated with many 
psychopathologies (Williams, 2001) and RFT provides an account o f how these 
processes are learned. The contextually controlled relational nature of language as 
articulated by RFT suggests that rather than attempting to change aversive content,
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we should instead attempt to change the context in which aversive content occurs. 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is a treatment package that has been designed 
to directly break down the literal hold AARR has on human behaviour (see Chapter
5 and Section 1.3.2.2 for more detail on these processes).
1.3.2.2. ACT Related Research
Research investigating the efficacy of ACT has gained real impetus over the
last decade (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006). This evidence can be 
divided into 4 sections; 1). correlational research; 2). outcome studies; 3). case 
studies and 4). component studies. The current thesis does not report on correlational 
research, outcome studies or case studies. For this reason the work in this area will 
only be summarized below. However, Chapter 5 of the current thesis is comprised of 
three ACT component studies, which directly compare thought suppression versus 
components of the ACT model. For this reason the area of ACT component research 
is described in greater detail.
The primary aim o f ACT based correlational research is to determine the 
relationship between experiential avoidance (see Section 1.3.2) and clinically 
relevant behaviours. To that end, studies in this area have involved comparing scores 
on measures of psychological acceptance/experiential avoidance, via the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ II, Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz
6  Zettle, under review, see appendix 1), with a variety o f measures of 
psychopathology. The AAQ II is a 10 item questionnaire which aims to measure the 
individual’s tendency to view their thoughts as literally true, to avoid negative 
experiences and to be unable to choose how to overtly behave due to covert negative 
content. Thus the AAQ II measures psychological flexibility (see Section 1.3.2). To 
date, in terms o f two o f the major psychopathological disorders, 20 correlational 
studies on depression have provided positive correlations between r=0.37 and r = 
0.77, whilst 14 studies on anxiety have produced positive correlations between 
r=0.16 and r=0.76 (Ruiz, 2010), suggesting that higher levels of experiential 
avoidance are positively linked with higher levels of psychopathology. Additionally, 
the AAQ II has been positively correlated with psychological dysfunction in a 
number of other areas; chronic pain (McCracken & Vowles, 2007), mental health
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within a work setting (Bond & Bunce, 2003) stress caused by important life events 
(Farach, Menin, Smith & Mandelbaum, 2008) and the mediation of borderline 
personality disorder (Gratz, Tull & Gunderson, 2008).
Outcome studies aim to determine the success o f the ACT package as a 
whole in a variety of domains. Research has found positive clinical outcomes in a 
number of areas; depression (Zettle & Hayes, 1986; Zettle & Rains, 1989) anxiety 
disorders (Twohig, Hayes & Masuda, 2006; Twohig, 2007) social phobias (Block, 
2002; Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007) sub clinical worries (Montesinos, Luciano & 
Ruiz, 2006) psychotic symptoms (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006) 
personality disorders (Gratz & Gunderson, 2006) addictive behaviours (Hayes, 
Wilson, et al, 2004) chronic pain (Dahl, Wilson & Nilsson, 2004; Vowles & 
McCracken, 2008) smoking cessation (Gifford et al, 2004) reducing distress with 
cancer patients (Montesinos & Luciano, 2005) epilepsy (Lundgren, Dahl, Yardi & 
Melin, 2008) weight loss (Forman, Butryn, Hoffman & Herbert, 2009) in work 
settings (Bond & Bunce, 2000) and sports performance (Fernandes, Secades, 
Terrados, Garcia & Garcia, 2004; Ruiz & Luciano 2009). Finally, case studies, 
which are based around the improvement o f an individual patient, have also detailed 
the improvements that can be made as a result o f ACT. This evidence can also be 
found in the variety of disorders mentioned in the previous section. For a more 
detailed review of correlational research, outcomes studies and case studies see 
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis (2006) and Ruiz (2010).
ACT component studies involve specifically targeting the effectiveness of 
individual components of the ACT model as mediators of behavioural change. 
Currently, according to the ACT Hexaflex, there are six processes that contribute 
towards psychological flexibility that are magnified within a therapy context; 
Acceptance, Cognitive Defusion, Contact with the Present Moment (i.e., 
mindfulness), Self as Context, Values and Committed Action. Acceptance in the 
ACT model, which should not be confused with resignation, refers the way in which 
clients should embrace private events, and to be willing to have them when attempts 
at changing their frequency might seem more natural. Cognitive Defusion techniques 
encourage clients to step away from, or not to buy into their thoughts. This attempt at 
de-literalisation, via a variety of metaphors (Hayes & Strosahl, 2004), displays how 
the ACT model tries to change the way in which the client will interact with private
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events, by altering the underlying function of undesirable thoughts. Whilst Being 
Present encourages the client to maintain non judgemental contact with 
psychological and environmental events that occur, this is often accomplished 
through mindfulness exercises. Despite the majority of component studies being 
based around acceptance, defusion and being present/mindfulness (as described 
below), the other three processes are equally as important. Self as context, is a 
critical process, as without it the processes of mindfulness and defusion are not 
fostered. Specifically, self as context refers to the way in which clients are 
encouraged to take a number of different perspectives, allowing them to be aware of 
one’s flow o f experiences without becoming too attached to them. Values are equally 
as important as self as context, as they single handedly guide action (Plumb et al., 
2009). Through the processes o f mindfulness and defusion clients are encouraged not 
to act on the basis of their thoughts but rather to act in a value consistent manner. 
Without the specification of such values, the guide to action remains unclear. Finally 
Committed Action refers to way in which ACT encourages the development of 
larger patterns of behaviour that are consistent with the clients chosen values.
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis (2006) suggest that studies which 
investigate the individual components of the ACT model are crucial to the efficacy 
of such a treatment. They hold this view because outcome studies, which despite 
providing valuable evidence to the overall effectiveness o f the therapy, do not allow 
a microscopic view of the elements of the therapy that work, and those that work less 
well. Without such study, the improvement o f the therapy as a whole will suffer. 
Since the inception of ACT, researchers have been encouraged to investigate the 
efficacy of all six ACT components; however research currently published tends to 
centre on the processes of acceptance, defusion and mindfulness. Indeed, according 
to Ruiz (2010), the ACT component studies that centre on these three processes, can 
be divided into three sections; the effect of experiential avoidance on an 
experimental task, the effect of acceptance based coping instructions and the effect 
of brief ACT protocols.
There have been a number of studies which, among other dependent 
measures, have investigated the effect of high versus low experiential avoidance on 
behaviour. Generally research conducted in this area has involved a median split of 
participants based on their pre-experimental scores on the AAQ II. As an example,
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Cochrane, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, Stewart and Luciano (2007) found that 
those high in experiential avoidance, when undertaking a simple matching task, took 
longer to emit a correct response that produced an aversive rather than a neutral 
picture, than their low avoidance counterparts, whilst additionally reporting greater 
levels o f anxiety. Zettle, Hocker, Mick, Scofield, Peterson, Hyunsung & Sudarijanto 
(2005) provided a behavioural measure of the effects of being high or low in 
experiential avoidance, specifically finding that those participants high in 
experiential avoidance, instructed to keep their hands submerged in icy water, did so 
for significantly less time than those low in experiential avoidance. Feldner, 
Zvolencsky, Eifert and Spira (2003) found that participants high in experiential 
avoidance reported more discomfort and anxiety when completing a carbon dioxide 
enriched air challenge (i.e., an aversive task) than their low experiential avoidance 
counterparts. The study also compared the use o f a suppression versus acceptance 
instruction on high experiential avoiders and found that those given the suppression 
instruction reported higher discomfort and anxiety levels. Finally Sloan (2004) 
found that participants with high levels o f experiential avoidance demonstrated 
greater emotional reactivity compared to those low in experiential avoidance when 
watching pleasant and unpleasant film clips. The results indicated an overlap 
between high experiential avoiders and high emotionality (which is linked to 
neuroticism and psychopathology). The High EA group also demonstrated a higher 
level of emotional regulation in responding to emotive stimuli. Taken together these 
results seem to suggest that those participants high in experiential avoidance 
experience more discomfort in the management of unwanted thoughts.
As noted above ACT component studies can also involve comparing 
acceptance based strategies with alternative strategies for dealing with unwanted 
psychological content. Keogh, Bond, Hamner and Tilson (2005) found that female 
participants given an acceptance intervention kept their hands submerged under icy 
water for significantly longer than those supplied with a distraction based 
intervention. Campbell-Sils, Barlow, Brown and Hoffman (2006) compared the 
effects of suppression versus acceptance in dealing with unwanted thoughts arising 
from a highly emotional film. Specifically participants in the acceptance condition, 
in a self report measure following the emotional film, showed lower negative affect 
than those in the suppression condition. Together these two experiments suggest that
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participants provided with acceptance instructions perform in more clinically 
desirable ways.
One potential weakness of these studies may be that they do not strictly 
resemble acceptance as delivered in vivo ACT. Specifically, acceptance in the 
therapeutic setting is not presented via a direct instruction, but rather via a number of 
metaphors and experiential exercises. For this reason analogue studies that provide 
more experiential component inductions may be more relevant to the ACT model. 
Hayes, Bissett et al., (1999) showed that participants given a 90 minute ACT 
protocol scored significantly better on a cold pressor task than those given a 90 
minute control based protocol. Gutierrez, Luciano, Rodriguez and Fink (2004) found 
that participants given a 20 minute ACT protocol had a significantly greater 
tolerance on a pain task than those given a control based intervention, Additionally, 
participants in this study were supplied with a believability measure post 
intervention/task; a believability measure aims to determine how the participant 
interacts with their thoughts after having received the intervention. One primary aim 
of ACT is to enable clients to step away from their thoughts, or lessen their 
believability. In line with this rationale the participants given the acceptance 
intervention also scored lower on a believability measure, suggesting that they were 
able to step away from their thoughts and control their actions significantly more 
than a group exposed to a control based intervention.
One study that directly examined the difference between instruction and 
experiential protocol was conducted by McMullen, Bames-Holmes, Bames-Holmes, 
Stewart, Luciano and Cochrane (2009). These researchers replicated the Gutierrez et 
al (2004) study, with the addition o f two conditions; an acceptance instmction and a 
control based instmction. The results showed that only those participants who 
underwent the ACT based protocol showed an increased tolerance o f pain. Finally, 
Forman, Hoffman, McGrath, Herbert, Brandsma and Lowe (2007) found that those 
given acceptance based protocols, versus distraction/cognitive re-structuring 
protocols, demonstrated a greater ability to deal with food cravings. Overall research 
which compares ACT versus control based protocols tend to display the advantages 
o f an ACT based approach. Chapter 5 o f the current thesis aims to compare the 
usefulness of thought suppression based inductions to ACT component inductions. 
As the ACT components of mindfulness and defusion receive the most research
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attention in this area, and as they are arguably easier to study in an experimental 
setting, Chapter 5 will specifically compare thought suppression versus 
mindfulness/defusion inductions in the management of unwanted thoughts.
1.4 Conclusion
The current thesis has three main aims; first, it aims to determine whether 
thought suppression is possible. To that end, key processes in the thought 
suppression literature will be systematically manipulated, namely, the immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects, across both neutral and high valence stimuli 
utilizing a number of distraction techniques (Chapter 2 and 3). Second, the current 
work aims to investigate whether a behavioural model of equivalence could account 
for the unsuccessful nature of thought suppression (Chapter 4). And finally it aims to 
determine whether psychological acceptance is a viable alternative to thought 
suppression for dealing with unwanted thoughts (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 2
Testing immediate enhancement and rebound
effects.
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2. Introduction
Rachman and Da Silva (1978) suggest that 80% of people will attempt to 
control their thoughts via suppression, so that when an unwanted thought is in 
consciousness, many people will try their best to avoid it. In spite of this, a plethora 
of previous research suggests that thought suppression is not possible (Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994; Lavy & Van Den Hout, 1990). The first empirical model of thought 
suppression was reported in the seminal paper by Wegner et al (1987) which found 
that the more one tries to banish a certain thought the more it will appear in 
consciousness. Wegner et al (1987) employed a self report paradigm that required 
participants to ‘not think about a white bear’ for a five-minute phase. Participants 
were instructed that if  they were to think o f a ‘white bear’ to ring a bell that was 
placed in front o f them on a table. During the second five-minute phase participants 
were cycled into what the researchers referred to as the ‘concentration’ phase. In this 
phase participants had to concentrate on the thought o f a ‘white bear’ as much as 
possible, once again indicating the presence of this thought by ringing the bell. The 
study comprised of two groups, the first group were exposed to the ‘suppress phase’ 
for the first five minutes followed by the ‘concentration phase’ for the second five 
minutes, whereas the second group were exposed to the phases in the reversed order 
(i.e. concentration first followed by suppression).
The results o f the study were two fold. First, it appeared that participants, 
when asked not to think o f a neutral thought (white bear), proceeded to have that 
unwanted thought enter consciousness around 6 or 7 times within the suppression 
phase. Wegner et al (1987) labelled this inability to suppress ones thoughts the 
‘Immediate Enhancement Effect’. Since its conception the immediate enhancement 
effect has received both support for (Bowers & Woody, 1996; Lavy & Van Den 
Hout, 1990) and against it (Clark et al, 1991; Clark et al, 1993). Second, Wegner et 
al (1987) found that those who had spent an initial 5 minute phase suppressing the 
unwanted thought, would then have that thought come to mind an inflated amount of 
times during the concentration phase, when compared to those who had not initially 
attempted to suppress the thought. This phenomenon was labelled ‘The Rebound
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Effect’ and was taken as evidence that the effects o f attempted suppression 
(unwanted thought intrusions) may still be apparent after a phase of suppression. 
Again the rebound effect has supporting research (Abramowitz et al, 2001; Clark et 
al, 1990) and research which questions its validity (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Nixon & 
Jackson, 2006). For more in depth details of research based on the immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects see Chapter 1.
Due to the conflicting results in the literature, the aim of this first empirical 
chapter is to study in greater detail the immediate enhancement effect and the 
rebound effect. Specifically aiming to determine if  thought suppression is possible, 
whilst also investigating the after effects of attempted suppression. As distraction is 
the principal way in which we attempt to suppress unwanted thoughts (Gold & 
Wegner, 1995) the first experiment of the thesis will study the effects that various 
distraction techniques have on the aforementioned phenomena. Rachman and Da 
Silva (1978) found that people will almost always give ‘distraction’ as their answer 
when asked ‘how do you avoid unwanted thoughts?’ A number of studies have 
tested the effects of distraction on thought suppression. This work primarily stems 
from the original white bear study (Wegner et al, 1987) in which Wegner 
demonstrated the ironic effects of attempted suppression could be bypassed by the 
use o f a focussed distracter. Since then Lin and Wicker (2007) and Salkovskis and 
Campbell (1994) have both found that focussed distraction has indeed lessened the 
amount of unwanted thought intrusions, whilst Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) and 
Cioffi and Holloway (1993) found the positive effects o f focussed distraction in the 
areas o f smoking cessation and pain tolerance, respectively.
Such research gains applied importance for a few reasons. First, if  focussed
distraction does obliterate the effects of thought suppression then this technique
could be used to help those dealing with negative unwanted thoughts. Second, if
focussed distraction did provide a way around the effects of thought suppression then
various clinical therapies (for example, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; ACT
Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), which encourage people to accept rather than
avoid their unwanted experiences (e.g., thoughts), could be brought into question.
For these reasons Experiment 1 will aim to determine the effects of various
distraction techniques on the number o f unwanted thought intrusions. Specifically, it
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aims to determine whether the immediate enhancement and rebound effect still exist 
under self, multiple and focussed distraction techniques.
Experiment 2 of the current chapter has a slightly different methodology but 
with similar aims to that of Experiment 1. Instead of examining the effects of 
different distraction techniques on the immediate enhancement effect and the 
rebound effect, Experiment 2 will aim to further investigate the underlying process 
o f the aforementioned phenomena by examining the effects that thought suppression 
has over a longer period o f time. Indeed such an experimental idea is not entirely 
novel as Wegner (1989) coined the term ‘indulgence cycle’, which refers to the 
cycles of suppression and non suppression that one will experience over time during 
everyday life. According to this account the more cycles one enters the more 
pronounced rebound effect would occur. Despite Wegner (1989) having coined this 
term only two empirical experiments have studied indulgence cycles, both Hardy and 
Brewin (2005) and Williams and Mould (2007) found that engaging in repeated 
suppression induced a maintained rebound effect. Experiment 2 o f this chapter aims 
to determine the effect o f engaging in multiple suppression cycles, and whether the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects will persist over time.
2.1 Experiment 1
Wegner (1989) suggested that the most common way to avoid ‘thoughts o f
X ’ is to distract oneself by ‘thinking o f Y \  Within his research Wegner (1989)
proposed that in order for a distracter to successfully over-ride unwanted thought
intrusions the distracter would have to be sufficiently ‘absorbing’. Evidence in
favour o f such an assertion arises in research on pain tolerance. For example, both
McCaul and Mallot (1984) and Corah, Gale and Illig (1979) found that the use of
absorbing distracters enabled participants to endure significantly more pain than
those encouraged to self distract. Wegner (1989) therefore advocated that the
‘quality of the distracter could have a critical influence on the degree to which the
distraction can hold one’s attention away from the unwanted thought’ (pp. 63).
According to Wegner (1987) the typical method of thought suppression is to engage
in unfocussed self distraction. This technique refers to the natural way in which one
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will jump from thought to thought in search of respite from an unwanted thought. He 
suggested that such a strategy would be futile and could even cause a pre-occupation 
with the unwanted thought due to the way in which these distracters would later 
serve as environmental reminders (ECH), advocating that the use of a focussed 
distracter may be more appropriate.
The current study aims to test the efficacy of a number o f distraction 
techniques, in terms of the number of occurrence o f the unwanted thoughts 
produced. To that end four groups will be employed. The first group is the ‘self 
distraction group’ which refers to the typical thought suppression group where no 
exact distraction technique is in place. Instead participants are asked to suppress all 
thoughts o f a specified ‘unwanted thought’, in which they are encouraged to provide 
their own distracters. The second is referred to as the ‘focussed distraction group’, in 
which the participants are asked to concentrate on one distracter for the duration of 
the five minute phase, whilst attempting to suppress an unwanted thought. Previous 
research on focussed distraction suggests that it may lessen the effects of attempted 
suppression (Lin & Wicker, 2007; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). Third, a novel 
distraction technique will be employed, in which the participants will receive 
multiple distracters in the form of words, for the five minute phase, whilst attempting 
to suppress a target thought. This group will provide a comparison that is directly 
opposite to focussed distraction in order to determine the effect that this will have on 
thought occurrence, in terms o f the immediate enhancement effect and the rebound 
effect. This group will be labelled the ‘multiple distraction group’. Lastly a group of 
participants will undergo two think free phases which will serve as a baseline 
condition. The baseline condition is in place to measure the importance of the 
intrusion rate experienced by the other three experimental groups. If participants in 
those groups press the space bar no more than the baseline group, then the effects of 
attempted suppression could be said to be minimal. This group will be referred to as 
the ‘baseline group’.
It is predicted, in accordance with the aforementioned literature, that the 
focussed distraction group will experience no more thought intrusions than that of 
the baseline group. Whilst it is expected that the self distraction group and the
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multiple distraction group will experience a larger number of unwanted thought 
intrusions.
2.1.1. Method
Participants
60 undergraduates (48 female and 12 male) at Swansea University were paid 
2 credits for their participation in the experiment. The credit system at Swansea 
University allows each undergraduate to receive up to 48 credits in order to run 
research for their final year project, each credit is worth 15 minutes o f participation 
in a study. The participants had a mean age of 22.4 years (SD; 9.007). The sample 
was non clinical. However participants were screened for depression, thought 
suppression tendencies and emotional avoidance (see later). The assignment of 
participants to experimental conditions was randomized. 15 participants were 
assigned to the self distraction group, 15 were assigned to the multiple distraction 
group, 15 were assigned to the focused distraction group and 15 were assigned to the 
baseline group.
Design
The study involved a 4 (group; self distraction, multiple distraction, focussed 
distraction and baseline) x 2 (phase; suppression and think free) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the second factor. The dependent variable in this experiment 
was the number of times the participants from each group would press the space bar 
in each of the two phases.
Apparatus
The experiment was completed in a laboratory at the Swansea University. 
The laboratory was quiet and free from distraction. It contained a desk, a chair, a 
standard computer (Processor) with a 14-inch screen and standard computer mouse. 
The participant’s responses were controlled by the computer program, which was 
created in Visual Basic TM 6.
Materials
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In order to avoid confounding the results three screening questionnaires were 
administered. The questionnaires consisted o f the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire II (AAQ II; Bond et al., 2005), the White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al, 1961). 
See below for further details. The data for 2 participants was removed for a high 
score on the depression inventory (a score o f 10 or more warranted exclusion). Each 
participant was given details of the University counselling service in the debriefing 
session following the study, no direct action was taken as a result o f a high BDI 
score. The remainder of the participants scored within the normal range (Overall 
mean scores: AAQ II = 54.15, WBSI = 44.5, BDI = 5.2)
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2: Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, 
Orcutt, Waltz & Zettle, under review, see appendix 1)
This is a self report measure created to assess a person experiential 
avoidance. Experiential avoidance, which is also called experiential control, is when 
a person endeavour’s to control or alter the form, frequency or situational sensitivity 
of internal experiences (Hayes et al., 1996). A 10 item version of the questionnaire 
was completed by each participant. The ten statements vary from “It’s ok if  I 
remember something unpleasant” to “emotions cause problems in my life”. There are 
seven response choices and scores may range from 7 to 70. High scores infer a high 
rate of experiential avoidance and low scores are said to indicate acceptance and 
commitment to action.
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI: Wegner and Zanakos, 1994, see 
appendix 2)
This is also a self report measure. The WBSI aims to measure a person’s 
tendency to suppress unwanted negative thoughts. It is a 15 item questionnaire with 
statements ranging from “I have thoughts that I cannot stop” to “I have thoughts that 
I try to avoid”. Answers are given on a 5 point scale o f how much the participant 
agrees or disagrees with the particular statement. Scores may range 15 to 75. High 
scores suggest a tendency to suppress unpleasant thoughts. Research generated by
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Muris, Merckelbach and Horselenberg (1996) showed the instrument to be reliable in 
terms of internal consistency and test re-test stability.
Beck's depression inventory (BDI; Beck Steer & Brown, 1996, see appendix 3)
The BDI is a questionnaire utilized to measure for signs of depression and 
can provide an estimate of depressive severity. The questionnaire consists o f 21 
statements. Status is assessed in terms of how the subject has felt in the week before 
that present moment and including the day of testing. The participant picks one of 
four statements for each of the 21 components. Each statement has a numerical value 
beside it going from 0 to 3. The values are accumulated to give individual BDI score. 
A participant’s score is then compared to the following ratings to determine level of 
depression; 0-9 normal non-depressed range; 10-15 mild depression; 16-19 mild to 
moderate depression; 20-29 moderate to severe depression; 30-63 severe depression. 
Participants with scores of nine and lower were employed in this study.
Procedure
On each subject’s arrival at the experimental lab, the participant was greeted 
by a male experimenter. Upon completion o f the consent form the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups (i.e., self distraction, multiple 
distraction, etc).
Self distraction group
If assigned to the self distraction group the following procedure occurred; via 
verbal and written instructions the participants were instructed that for the following 
five minute phase they had to try their best to suppress a certain thought that would 
be given to them by the experimenter (the ‘unwanted thought’) and that if  they did 
happen to think of the ‘unwanted thought’ in this five minute phase then they were 
required to press the space bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The 
instruction was as follows; ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a 'white 
bear Every time you have ‘white bear ’ come to mind, though, please press the 
space bar in front o f  you
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After the initial five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and 
gave the participant the think free instruction. Participants were told that for this final 
five minute phase that they could think about anything they liked (including the 
unwanted thought). The participants were again told that if  they did happen to think 
of the ‘unwanted thought’ from stage 1 then they should continue to press the space 
bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The instruction was as follows;
‘Now fo r  the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  
however the thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then you should 
press the space bar as before I
Multiple distraction group
If assigned to the multiple distraction group the following procedure 
occurred; participants were instructed, via verbal and written instructions, that for the 
following five minute phase they would have to try their best to suppress a certain 
thought that the experimenter would provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However 
they were told that in order to help them in their suppression attempt that 60 random 
words (see appendix 4) would appear every five seconds on the computer screen in 
front of them, and that they should think o f these words instead o f the unwanted 
thought. Most importantly the participants were told that if  they were to think of the 
unwanted thought then they must press the space bar on the computer keyboard each 
time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The instruction was as follows; ‘In the next 
five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear Instead think o f  the words that 
will appear on the screen to distract yourself However, i f  you do have ‘white bear ’ 
come to mind, though, please press the space bar in fron t o f  you ’.
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
think free instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; ‘Now fo r the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then 
you should press the space bar as before I
Focussed distraction group
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If assigned to the focussed distraction group the following procedure 
occurred; participants were instructed, via verbal and written instructions, that for the 
following five minute phase they would have to try their best to suppress a certain 
thought that the experimenter would provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However 
they were told that in order to help them in their suppression attempt that they should 
focus on one thought instead, which in this case, was the thought o f a ‘red 
volkswagon’. Then the participants were told that if  they were to think o f the 
unwanted thought then they must press the space bar on the computer keyboard each 
time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The instruction was as follows; 'In the next 
five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear ’. Instead try to think o f  a red 
volkswagon. However i f  you do have ‘white bear ’ come to mind, though, please 
press the space bar in front o f  you ’.
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
think free instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; ‘Now fo r  the following five minute phase you are free  to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear’ happens to enter your mind, then 
you should press the space bar as before.’
Baseline group
If assigned to the baseline group the participants received two think free five 
minute phases. Before the first five minute phase the researcher, in written and 
verbal form, gave the following instruction 'Now fo r  the following five minute phase 
you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear’ 
happens to enter your mind, then you should press the space bar as before\ Upon 
completion of the first five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and gave 
the identical think free instruction for the second time.
Finally, the importance of signalling the presence of each unwanted thought 
was stressed to each participant via the following instruction, which was 
administered immediately prior to engaging in the first five minute period; ‘if  you  
should happen to think o f  the ‘unwanted thought ’ in either phase then it is important
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that you press the space bar each time it comes to m ind’. After completing the study, 
subjects were debriefed and their credit was administered.
2.1,2. Results
Questionnaires
In order to ensure that the results were obtained as a result o f the independent 
variable manipulated (i.e., distraction technique) and not pre-experimental 
experiential avoidance, sub clinical depression or high levels of suppression, it was 
important that there are no differences between the groups on the screening 
questionnaires (i.e., the AAQ, WBSI and BDI). A 3 (Questionnaire; AAQ II, WBSI, 
BDI) x 4 (Group; self distraction, multiple distraction, focussed distraction, baseline) 
mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Questionnaire, F  (2,108) = 
0.803; p  > 0.05, and no significant interaction between Questionnaire and Group, F  
(6, 108) = 0.715; p  > 0.05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests additionally revealed no 
significant difference (see Table 1) between the self distraction group (AAQ II = 
53.6, WBSI = 43.6, BDI = 4.2), the multiple distraction group (AAQ II = 55.2, 
WBSI = 44.7, BDI = 4.9), the focussed distraction group (AAQ II = 55.4, WBSI =
44.1, BDI = 5.6), and the baseline group (AAQ II = 52.4, WBSI = 45.4, BDI = 6.1) 
on any o f the questionnaires.
Comparison AAQ WBSI BDI
Self v Multiple t(26) = -0.502 1(26) = -0.358 t(26) = 0.343
Self v focussed t(28) = 0.487 t(28) = 0.286 t(28) = -0.521
Self v baseline t(28) = 0.-631 t(28) = 0.241 t(28) = -0.892
Multiple v focussed 1(26) = 0.-113 t(26) = -0.168 t(26) = 0.487
Multiple v baseline t(26) = 0.740 t(26)=  0.153 t(26) = 0.635
Focussed v baseline t(28) = 0.810 1(28) = 0.220 1(28) = 0.276
Table 1. The difference between each group on the various questionnaires. All non 
significant at the 0.05 level, Experiment 1.
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Number o f  intrusions
The dependent variable in the study was the number o f times each participant 
pressed the space bar in both the suppression and think free/rebound phases. Figure 1 
displays that the multiple distraction group (suppression phase M = 15.46, SD = 
10.95; rebound phase M = 10.07, SD = 8.27) and the self distraction group 
(suppression phase M = 11.86, SD = 8.7; rebound phase M = 8.4, SD = 8.6) 
indicated presence o f the unwanted thought the most. Whilst the focussed distraction 
group (suppression phase M = 8.33, SD = 6.66; rebound phase M = 6.73, SD = 5.88) 
and the baseline group (suppression phase M = 6.46, SD = 2.53; rebound phase M = 
3.53, SD = 2.58) appeared to press the space bar less.
Figure 1. Number o f  unwanted thought intrusions fo r  each group in each phase, 
Experiment 1.
H Suppression  
□  Rebound
focussed baseline
Statistical analyses were conducted to determine any differences between the
groups. A 2 (Phase: Suppression versus Rebound) x 4 (Group: Self, Multiple,
Focussed, Baseline) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Phase,
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F(l,54) = 18.708; = p  < 0.05, and no significant main interaction between Phase 
and Group, F  (3, 54) = 0.986; p >  0.05.
In order to determine the between group differences in the number of space 
bar presses post hoc Tukey HSD tests (Table 2) were conducted between the four 
groups across the suppression and think free phases. For the suppression phase, the 
analyses revealed no significant main effect between the self distraction group and 
the multiple distraction group, or between the self distraction group and the focussed 
distraction group. However, a significant main effect was found between the self 
distraction group and the baseline group. Further Tukey HSD tests revealed a 
significant main effect between the multiple distraction group and the baseline 
group, and between the multiple distraction group and the focussed distraction group 
(p<.05). Finally, no significant main effect was found between the focussed
distraction group and the baseline group.
These results suggest that participants in the self distraction and the multiple 
distraction groups indicated unwanted thought intrusions significantly more than the 
baseline group. Therefore, thought suppression via these forms of distractions 
appears to be ineffective. However, the results for the focussed distraction group 
indicated a similar number of unwanted thought intrusions compared to baseline. 
That is, participants in this group did not press the space bar more than the baseline 
group, suggesting that focussed distraction might bypass the ironic effects of thought 
suppression.
In terms of rebound the post hoc Tukey HSD tests (Table 2) revealed a 
significant main effect between the self distraction group and the baseline group and 
between the multiple distraction group and the baseline group. However, no
significant main effect was found between the focussed distraction group and the
baseline group, between the multiple distraction group and the self distraction group, 
between the multiple distraction group and the focussed distraction group, or 
between the focussed distraction group and the self distraction group. These results 
suggest that in the think free phase following attempted suppression, that those 
participants in the multiple and self distraction groups indicated a greater number of 
unwanted intrusions than the baseline group. However, the focussed distraction
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group demonstrated no such effect suggesting that focussed distraction eradicated the 
rebound effect found in the other groups.
Comparison Suppression Phase Rebound Phase
Self v Multiple t(26) = -0.967; p >  0.05 t(26) = -0.523; p >  0.05
Self v focussed t(28) = 1.249;p  > 0.05 t(28) = 0.619;p  > 0.05
Self v baseline t(28) = 2.308;p  < 0.05 t(28) = 2.097;p  < 0.05
Multiple v focussed t(26) = 2.112;p  < 0.05 t(26) = 1.245;p  > 0.05
Multiple vbaseline t(26) = 3.093;p  < 0.05 t(26) = 2.911;p  < 0.05
Focussed v baseline t(28) = 1.014;p  > 0.05 t(28) = 1.928;p  > 0.05
Table 2. The post hoc Tukey HSD tests conducted between the se lf distraction, 
multiple distraction, focussed distraction and baseline groups, Experiment 1.
Finally, paired sample t tests were conducted to determine if any differences 
emerged, in terms of thought intrusions, between the suppression and think free 
phases within each group. The results showed a significant main effect for the self 
distraction group, t(14) = 2.374; p  < 0.05, and the baseline group , t(14) = 3.803; p  
< 0.05. However, no significant difference was found for the multiple distraction 
group, t(12) = 2.063; p  > 0.05, or the focussed distraction group, t(14) = 1.524; p  > 
0.05. These results show that those participants in the self and baseline groups 
experienced the unwanted thought significantly more in the suppression phase than 
the think free phase. The participants in the multiple and focussed groups however, 
experienced a similar number of thought intrusions in both phases.
In summary, participants in the focussed distraction group experienced a 
similar amount of thought intrusions as those in the baseline condition, where as 
those in the self and multiple distraction groups experienced significantly more, this 
was the case for both the suppression and think free phases. In addition to this, in no 
group did the participants experience an increased amount o f intrusions during the
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think free phase. However participants in the multiple and self distraction groups did 
experience the unwanted thought significantly more than the baseline group for this 
second phase.
2.1.3. Discussion
The results o f Experiment 1 suggest that engaging in focussed distraction 
may obliterate the normal ironic effects of attempted thought suppression. Namely, 
participants who engaged in focussed distraction demonstrated no immediate 
enhancement effect and no rebound effect. In contrast to this, participants exposed to 
either self or multiple distraction techniques experienced an inflation o f unwanted 
thought intrusions in both the suppression and think free phases, providing evidence 
in favour of the immediate enhancement effect and the rebound effect.
These results concur with the previous literature on focussed distraction. Lin 
and Wicker (2007) and Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) both found that engaging in 
focussed distraction aided suppression attempts. Additionally, the findings that the 
self and multiple distraction techniques produced an inflation in the number of 
unwanted thoughts also agrees with previous research. Wegner (1989) suggested that 
when engaging in self distraction we naturally consult a number of distracters. With 
this in mind it is no surprise that those engaging in the multiple distraction technique, 
experienced a similar amount o f intrusions as those in a self distraction technique 
where participants may have engaged with multiple distracters independently and 
without direct instruction. In addition to agreeing with previous literature, the results 
of the current study also concur with the predictions o f Wegner’s ECH, which 
suggests that limiting the number of distracters also limits the amount of 
environmental reminders.
This finding is also o f clinical relevance. Specifically, it suggests that the
immediate enhancement effect and the rebound effect, which underpin the
counterproductive nature o f attempted suppression can be circumvented via focussed
distraction. However, perhaps more importantly, according to Wegner (1989) and
Hayes et al (1999) engaging in focussed distraction has low ecological validity, as in
everyday life thought suppression would be rendered impossible given the multiple
cues in our environment that serve to remind us of the unwanted target. The results
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from the multiple and self distraction conditions, that demonstrated the inflated 
occurrence of the unwanted thought, bolster this argument.
Taken together the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the most commonly 
employed techniques for suppressing an unwanted thought are at best ineffective and 
at worst counterproductive. Participants who engage in self and multiple distraction 
techniques experience both the immediate enhancement and rebound effects. One 
possible reason for this may lie in the fact that both groups were reacting similarly 
when receiving the thought suppression instruction, namely they were both drawing 
on multiple distracters. In future research, one could ascertain how the participants 
interact with each technique by including a ‘speak aloud’ instruction. Such a 
manipulation could also be used to ascertain the number/type o f distracters being 
used in the self suppression condition. These distracters could then be used as the 
stimuli in the multiple distraction group. This would ensure that the differences 
between the groups were due to self generation and not the number of words 
generated.
Nevertheless the results demonstrate the futile nature o f attempted 
suppression via distraction. One final limitation of Experiment 1 is that only the 
effects of attempted suppression, over a short 5-10 minute phase was measured. 
However, according to Wegner (1989) it is more likely that unwanted thoughts 
return in a cyclical nature. Experiment 2 aims to determine the effect o f multiple 
suppression and think free phases on thought occurrence.
2.2. Experiment 2
In order to further investigate the immediate enhancement effect and the
rebound effect Experiment 2 of the thesis aims to study the effects of engaging in
repeated suppression over time. Wegner (1989) coined the term ‘indulgence cycle’ to
refer to the cycles of suppression and non suppression that one will engage in on a
day to day basis (for a more in depth review o f the indulgence cycle literature please
refer to Section 1.2.5 of the General Introduction). Despite Wegner (1989) coining
this term only two previous studies, that of Hardy and Brewin (2005) and Williams
and Moulds (2007) have researched these phenomena using a paradigm which
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studies the effects of suppression over time. Both of these studies found an 
immediate enhancement effect, in that participants would repeatedly experience the 
intrusion in the suppression periods. Additionally both studies found a minor 
rebound effect in that engaging in repeated suppression produced maintenance of 
intrusions in each of the respective rebound periods. However, it is hard to draw 
basic conclusions on the impact of multiple indulgence cycles from these studies as 
both demonstrations employed populations instructed to suppress high valence 
material. It is possible that the high valence nature of the suppressed items 
confounded the effect of the indulgence cycles. Additionally, while both studies 
exposed participants to two indulgence cycles, neither involved exposure to multiple 
indulgence cycles.
The current study will therefore differ from the two previous studies in four 
key ways. First, by only studying personally relevant or high valence target thoughts, 
the previous studies do not provide evidence as to how individuals’ respond when 
attempting to suppress a neutral thought. When dealing with high valence thoughts it 
is likely that participants engage in suppression attempts with the material even when 
not instructed to do so, thus confounding the experimental findings. As suggested by 
Hardy and Brewin (2005), participants’ history of practised suppression may have 
impacted on their suppression attempts. The current study controls for participants’ 
history with the to-be-suppressed item by employing a neutral rather than high 
valence target thought. Second, the suppression and expression phases in the 
previous studies have been between two and three minutes. This does not reflect the 
timeframe typically employed in thought suppression studies (e.g. Wegner, et al., 
1987). The current study employs five minute suppression and expression phases in 
line with seminal thought suppression studies (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Merckelbach, 
Muris, Van Den Hout & De Jong, 1991).
Third, the current study will employ three indulgence cycles, as opposed to
two, to determine the effects of an inflated number o f indulgence cycles. Lastly,
previous studies in this area have employed two groups who both completed two hill
indulgence cycles. The current study aims to determine the effect o f multiple
indulgence cycles on target thought occurrence. To that end, a group of control
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participants will be recruited. This group will only be instructed to complete one 
suppression attempt and thereafter the number of target thought occurrences across 
the same timeframe as the repeated suppression group will be recorded.
Therefore, the aim of the study is to determine the effect o f repeated 
indulgence cycles of a neutral target thought on thought occurrence. Participants will 
be assigned to one of two groups. The ‘repeated suppression’ group will be 
instructed to complete three indulgence cycles. The ‘suppress think-free’ group will 
be instructed to suppress a target thought once for one five minute phase, and 
thereafter to think freely for five, five minute phases. It is predicted, within the 
repeated suppression group, that participants will continue to experience an 
immediate enhancement effect in each of the suppression periods. Between the 
groups it is predicted that participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group, during 
each of the three comparable rebound phases (phase 2, phase 4 and phase 6), will 
report an inflated number of target thoughts when compared to those in the ‘suppress 
think-free’ group. This finding would provide evidence that engaging in multiple 
indulgence cycles, even of pre-experimentally neutral thoughts, can cause an 
increase in the occurrence of a target thought. This result would lend support to 
Wegner‘s (1989) Environmental Cueing Hypothesis of how thought intrusions can 
escalate in everyday life, as the ECH would suggest that the more indulgence cycles 
one enters, the more distracters will be used, meaning that more environmental cues 
will render the attempt less likely to be successful.
Additionally, a novel analysis will be conducted on the data. According to 
Wegner (1989) participants will re-engage with a suppression attempt once the target 
thought has occurred in a rebound phase. Therefore, it can be understood that the 
first time an unwanted thought re-surfaces is the most important intrusion as it will 
prompt the next suppression attempt. Indeed this would analogue more accurately 
how suppression and rebound occur in everyday life. People do not experience 
suppression and rebound phases, instead they attempt not to think about a certain 
thought, and then they move on, before an environmental cue prompts the re- 
emergence of the unwanted thought. Importantly at this point, people do not enter a
five minute think free phase; instead they immediately attempt to suppress it again.
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To this end, it is predicted that the ‘repeated suppression’ group will have the target 
thought re-enter consciousness significantly more quickly than the ‘suppress think 
free’ group. If this is the case then it might provide valuable information as to how 
an unwanted target thought becomes an obsession, because the more we suppress, 
the more quickly the unwanted thought will return.
2,2.1. Method
Participants
Thirty-four undergraduates at Swansea University were paid 3 credits for 
their participation in the experiment. (Mean age; 20.11 years, SD; 3.97). 29 females 
and 5 males participated in the study. The sample was non clinical.
Design
The study was a 2 (group; repeated suppression vs. suppress think-free) x 6 
(five minute phases) mixed design. There were two dependent variables; number of 
space bar presses in each of the five minute phases, and response latencies in each of 
the expression phases of the first unwanted thought intrusion.
Stimuli
Screening questionnaires
In order to avoid confounding the results three screening measures were 
administered: the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II  (AAQ II; Bond et al., 
2005), the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI, Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) to screen for pre- 
experimental levels of emotional avoidance, thought suppression and depression, 
respectively (for further details on these questionnaires see Experiment 1). The data 
for 6 participants was omitted based on a high BDI score (10 or over). The remaining 
28 participants (14 in each group) scored within a normal range. (Overall mean 
scores: AAQ II = 53.54, WBSI = 44.31, BDI = 5.39)
63
unapter z
Procedure
On each subject’s arrival at the experimental laboratory participants were 
randomly assigned to one o f two experimental groups (i.e., the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group or the ‘suppress think free’ group).
(i) Repeated suppression group: Participants were first exposed to the ‘suppression 
instruction’: ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear ’. Every 
time you have ‘white bear ’ come to mind, though, please press the space bar in front 
o f y o u ’. This was followed by the ‘liberal rebound’ instruction: ‘Now fo r  the 
following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  however the 
thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then you should press the 
space bar as before.’ The participants repeated this procedure another two times. 
Therefore, in total, the participants from the ‘repeated suppression’ group alternated 
between three suppression instructions and three liberal rebound instructions.
(ii) Suppress think-free group: Participants assigned to this group were provided 
with identical instructions for the first two five minute phases (i.e., suppression and 
liberal rebound instructions). However, for the third five minute phase, rather than 
receiving the suppression instruction participants received the liberal rebound 
instruction. Participants continued to receive the liberal rebound instruction for the 
remainder of the three five minute phases.
Upon completion of the final liberal rebound phase all participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
2.2.2. Results
Questionnaires
In order to ensure that the results were attained as a result o f the independent
variable manipulated and not individual differences, it is important that there are no
differences between the groups in terms of questionnaires scores. A 2 (Group;
repeated suppression vs suppress think free) x 3 (Questionnaire; AAQ II, WBSI,
BDI) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Questionnaire, F (1, 50)
= 0.592; p  > 0.05, and no significant interaction between Questionnaire and Group,
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F  (3, 50) = 0.253; p  > 0.05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed no significant 
difference (see Table 3) between the repeated suppression group (AAQ II = 53.37, 
WBSI = 46.18, BDI = 5.62) and the suppress think free group (AAQ II = 53.72, 
WBSI = 42.44, BDI = 5.16)
Comparison AAQ WBSI BDI
Repeated suppression t(26) = 0.187 t(26) = 0.408 t(26) = 0.201
vs. Suppress think free
Table 3. The difference between the repeated suppression group and suppress think 
free group on the pre screening questionnaires. All non significant at the 0.05 level, 
Experiment 2.
Number o f  intrusions
The mean amount of times that the participants from the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group and the ‘suppress think-free’ group pressed the space bar in each 
phase are represented in Table 4. The amount o f target thought occurrences across 
the suppression phases, for the repeated suppression group, remained constant (Phase 
1 M = 6.35, Phase 3 M = 5.07, Phase 5 M = 5.64). There also appeared to be no 
difference between the three liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group (Phase 2 M = 4.07, Phase 4 M = 4.14, Phase 6 M = 3.57), indicating that 
repeated suppression caused neither an increase nor a decrease in target thought 
occurrences. However, a different pattern emerged for the ‘suppress think-free’ 
group, with a gradual decline of space bar presses across the five liberal rebound 
phases (Phase 1 M = 6.85, Phase 2 M = 3.57, Phase 3 M = 3.14, Phase 4 M = 2.5, 
Phase 5 M = 2.64, Phase 6 M = 1.78)
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6
Suppression Rebound Suppression/ Rebound Suppression/ Rebound 
Rebound Rebound
Repeated suppression 6.35 4.07 5.07 4.14 5.64 3.57
Suppress think free 6.85 3.57 3.14 2.5 2.64 1.78
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Table 4. The mean amount o f  space bar presses across the 6 phases fo r  both groups, 
Experiment 2.
In order to determine any significant differences and interactions across 
group and phase a 2 (repeated suppression group vs. suppress think free) x 6 (phase) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for 
phase, F  (5, 130) = 10.305; p  < 0.05 suggesting that there was a difference in the 
amount o f times that the target thought occurred depending on the phase participants 
were in. The results also revealed a near interaction between phase and group, F(5, 
130) = 2.140; p  = 0.065 suggesting that the difference in the occurrence o f the target 
thought across phases varied depending on whether the participants were in the 
‘repeated suppression’ or the ‘suppress think free’ group. This suggests that the 
occurrence of the target thought was inflated in the ‘repeated suppression’ group 
when compared to the ‘suppress think free’ group.
Suppression versus Rebound 
Suppression phases
In order to determine whether there was any significant difference in the 
number of space bar presses across the three suppression phases for the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group, using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, paired samples t 
tests revealed that there was no significant difference emerged between the first and 
second suppression phases, t(13) = 1.93; p  > 0.05, between the second and the third 
suppression phases, t(13) = -0.62; p  > 0.05, and between the first and the third 
suppression phases, t(13) = 0.65; p  > 0.05. These results suggest that the intrusion 
rate did not increase, but, rather, it was maintained across phases.
Liberal Rebound phases
In order to determine if there were any significant differences between the 
two groups across the three comparable liberal rebound phases, a 2 (repeated 
suppression group vs. suppress think free group) x 3 (phase 2, phase 4 and phase 6) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for 
phase, F(2, 52) = 2.85; p  < 0.05, suggesting that the phase affected the amount of
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target thought occurrences. In addition to this the analysis revealed a significant 
linear trend, F(l,26) = 5.35; p  < 0.05, suggesting that the space bar presses 
gradually declined across phases.
In order to explore any significant differences between phases 2, 4 and 6 for 
the repeated suppression group, using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, 
paired sample t tests were conducted. The results revealed no significant differences 
between the three phases. Phase 2 and 4, t(13) =-0.78, p  > 0.05, Phase 4 and 6, t(13) 
= 1.23; p  > 0.05, Phase 2 and 6, t(13) = 0.68; p  > 0.05. These results suggest that 
over the three liberal rebound phases the number o f space bar presses (i.e. target 
thought occurrences) was again maintained, but did not increase.
For the ‘suppress think-free’ group, despite the trend towards a gradual 
decline, the difference between phase 2 and 4, t(13) =1.48; p  > 0.05 and the 
difference between phase 4 and 6, t(13) = 1.51; p  > 0.05, were not significant. 
However, the difference between phase 2 and phase 6 was significant, t(13) = 2.77; 
p  <0.05. The result suggests that the amount o f target thought occurrences for the 
‘suppress think free’ group in the liberal rebound phases gradually declines over time 
when compared to the ‘repeated suppression’ group where the number o f intrusions 
across liberal rebound phases was maintained.
Repeated Suppression group versus Suppress think free group
In order to determine if  there was any difference between the comparable 
liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the ‘suppress think 
free’ group a series of independent sample t tests were conducted. There was no 
significant difference between the two groups, in the number o f target thought 
occurrences, for phase 2, after both groups had completed one indulgence cycle, 
t(26) =0.44; p  > 0.05. There was also no significant difference between phase 4 of 
each group, t(26) = 1.46; p  > 0.05. However, a significant difference did emerge in 
the number o f space bar presses in phase 6 between the two groups, t(26) = 1.74; 
p<0.05, indicating that participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group had the 
target thought intrude significantly more in the last liberal rebound phase than those 
in the suppress think-free group.
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Response latency o f  first thought occurrence
Further analysis was conducted in order to determine whether there were any 
differences within and between groups in terms o f the first target thought occurrence 
(i.e., the response latency before the first space bar press) in each o f the liberal 
rebound phases. Figure 2 shows the mean amount o f lapsed time before the thought 
occurred in each o f the three comparable liberal rebound phases. In the first liberal 
rebound phase the response latency was similar in the ‘repeated suppression' group 
(M  = 35.44 seconds) and the ‘suppress think free' group (M  =38.53 seconds). 
However, by the second liberal rebound phase the gap had increased between the 
‘repeated suppression’ group (M  = 69.58 seconds) and the ‘suppress think-free’ 
group (M = 93.51 seconds). Finally, the response latencies in the third liberal 
rebound phase indicated a larger difference between the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group (A/ = 96.49 seconds) and the ‘suppress think-free’ group (M  = 171.19 
seconds). For both groups, the amount o f time taken for the first target thought 
intrusion to occur increased from the first to the second and second to the third 
liberal rebound phases. Additionally, the target thought, for those participants in the 
‘repeated suppression’ group, tended to re-emerge more quickly in the second and 
third liberal rebound phases in comparison to the ‘suppress think-free’ group.
Figure 2. The amount o f  lapsed time (in seconds) before the space bar was pressed  
in both groups, Experiment 2.
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In order to determine if there were any significant differences across both 
groups for the three comparable rebound phases a 2 (Group; repeated suppression 
group vs. suppress think free group) x 3 (Phase; phase 2, phase 4, phase 6) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for Phase, F  
(2,46) = 10.01; p  < 0.05, and no interaction was found between Phase and Group, F  
(2, 46) = 2.03; p  > 0.05. Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach paired 
sample t tests were conducted to determine where the differences emerged between 
the liberal rebound phases within each o f the groups. For the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group, it was found that there was no significant difference between the first liberal 
rebound phase and the second, t(13) = -1.60; p  > 0.05, between the first liberal 
rebound phase and the third, t(13) = -1.80; p  > 0.05 and between the second and the 
third liberal rebound phases, t(13) = -1.45; p  > 0.05, suggesting that the target 
thought re-occurred equally as quickly across all three liberal rebound phases.
For the ‘suppress think-free’ group there was no significant difference 
between the first liberal rebound phase and the second, t(13) = -0.70; p  > 0.05. 
However, there was a significant difference between first liberal rebound phase and 
the third, t(13) = -4.17; p<0.05 and between the second liberal rebound phase and 
the third, t(13) = -2.67; p<0.05, suggesting that the target thought gradually re­
occurred significantly more slowly across time.
Independent sample t tests were conducted to determine if there were any 
significant differences between the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the ‘suppress 
think free’ group. The t tests revealed no significant main effect between either 
group in the first liberal rebound phase, t(26) = -0.16; p  > 0.05, or in the second 
liberal rebound phase, t(26) = -0.58; p  > 0.05. However by the third rebound phase 
there was a significant difference between the first time that the target thought re­
occurred between the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the suppress think-free 
group, t(26) = -1.84; p<0.05, suggesting that participants who repeatedly 
suppressed, by the third liberal rebound phase, experienced the target thought 
significantly more quickly than those in the ‘suppress think-free’ group
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Summary
The current results suggested that engaging in multiple indulgence cycles 
maintains the intrusion rate of an unwanted thought. Those who only suppressed 
once experienced a gradual decline in thought intrusions over the course o f the three 
comparable liberal rebound phases. The results also suggest that those participants 
who engaged in multiple indulgence cycles had the target thought re-occur 
significantly more quickly, in each comparable rebound phase, than those in the 
suppress think-free group.
2.2.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2 participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group 
demonstrated neither an increase nor decrease in target thought occurrences across 
suppression or liberal rebound phases. However, these participants did produce 
significantly more target thought occurrences in the liberal rebound phases when 
compared to the ‘suppress think-free’ group, whose intrusion rate significantly 
declined across liberal rebound phases. Additionally, the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group also had the target thought re-emerge significantly more quickly than the 
‘suppress think-free’ group across the three liberal rebound phases. These results 
seem to suggest that repeatedly engaging in attempted thought suppression will 
maintain the immediate enhancement effect and a rebound effect across time.
According to the Environmental Cueing Hypothesis (ECH), multiple 
indulgence cycles over time should cause an increase in the number of unwanted 
thoughts in both suppression and expression phases (Wegner, 1989). Our finding 
supports previous research that demonstrated no increase in the number of unwanted 
thoughts across suppression and rebound phases (Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Williams 
& Mould, 2007). However, it is important to note that although repeated thought 
suppression may not cause an increase in unwanted thoughts during multiple 
indulgence cycles, it does appear to have a maintenance effect. Specifically, 
maintenance in the number of unwanted thoughts was found in both the suppression 
and liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ but not the ‘suppress think 
free’ group.
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The current study also involved a novel comparison between the latency until 
the occurrence of the first target thought in each liberal rebound phase, indicating a 
shorter latency between onset of initial thought occurrence for the repeated 
suppression group in comparison to the suppress think free group. This analysis 
extends on the Environmental Cueing Hypothesis indicating that thought suppression 
and expression are cyclical in nature, that is, we alternate between phases of 
suppression and expression (think-free phases). When attempting to suppress a target 
thought, individuals will alternate between attempting to suppress and subsequently 
moving onto another activity to further distract themselves. At a later point the initial 
target thought will likely rebound (Wegner, 1989). Only one instance of the target 
thought is necessary for an individual to re-engage in a phase of attempted 
suppression. Thus, it suggests that the most important target thought in a liberal 
rebound phase may be the initial thought occurrence. The results of the current study 
demonstrate that repeated suppression causes the target thought to re-enter 
significantly more quickly. This rapid re-occurrence of the target thought could 
represent the method by which the thought suppression becomes increasingly 
counterproductive, as across indulgence cycles, the thought continues to re-emerge 
more quickly.
Abramowitz et al (2001) found minor evidence for a Rebound Effect 
suggesting that attempted suppression may have longer term effects, this result was 
partly replicated in the current study as participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group continued to think of the target thought when they were provided with think- 
free instructions. However, the ECH would predict an escalation in the amount of 
intrusions during rebound phases, whereas the current experiment did not produce 
such an escalation. One possible explanation for this result could be the clinical 
nature of the experimental laboratory. Each participant completed the experiment in 
a blank room with no windows, thereby limiting the amount o f external distracters. 
Possibly in a real life scenario, where multiple external distracters are available, the 
target thought would escalate in the rebound phase due to increasing number of 
distracters becoming associated with and thus cueing the target thought. Such an 
escalation would be consistent with Wegner’s (1989) ECH. Future research should
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provide participants with multiple distracters in order to determine whether these 
distracters would come to cue the target thought.
One issue worth noting in the current study is that the level of effort involved 
in instructional adherence differed across groups, that is, the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group had to suppress the target thought for a total o f 15 minutes whereas the 
‘suppress think free’ group only had to suppress the target for 5 minutes. This 
activity no doubt primed the thought in a way that did not occur for the free think 
group. Specifically, the participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group were sitting 
inactive, monitoring thoughts, no doubt cycling between idle thoughts (e.g. what to 
have for lunch, what to do after the study, whether their roommate is angry about 
something, etc.) and a return to the task at hand -  “what am I doing? Oh yes, I’m 
suppressing thoughts about white bears...”). Whereas participants in the ‘suppress 
think free’ group were simply allowed to think about whatever they liked, with only 
one task, which was to register whether they had the target thought. It could 
reasonably be argued that the suppression instructions resulted in greater priming of 
the target thought than the think free instructions. However, in real life terms this 
reflects the distinction between two different coping strategies in dealing with 
unwanted thoughts, namely, attempted suppression versus acceptance of thought 
occurrence (for a detailed account o f acceptance see Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2001). In addition to the issue o f motivation there is also the possibility of 
habituation occurring, that is, perhaps participants in both groups through multiple 
five minute periods became less sensitive to the unwanted thought through repeated 
exposure, therefore decreasing the amount o f unwanted thought intrusions signalled. 
Indeed, the results from the suppress think free group suggest that such habituation 
may have occurred. However, those repeatedly suppressing maintained the level o f 
intrusions in both suppression and think free phases, suggesting that habituation does 
not occur when participants are given repeated suppression instructions.
One potential weakness with the current study was that no baseline group
was included in order to determine what the average number o f thought occurrences
would be without the suppression instruction. Rather than including a pre
experimental baseline to collate the number of pre experimental thoughts about the
target a between participant control group was employed in the current study in
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which participants were provided with no suppression instruction during the second 
two suppression phases. Importantly, a recent study by Marcks and Woods (2005) 
took a baseline measure of the amount of thought intrusions in a baseline five minute 
phase (identical to the experimental phase length herein) and found that the mean 
number of target thought occurrences in a group o f undergraduate participants was
2.2. The ‘repeated suppression’ group from the current study reported between 4-6 
intrusions for each suppression and liberal think free phase, suggesting that the 
number of thoughts about a target was inflated when the target was a to-be- 
suppressed item. Finally, it is worth noting that all participants in Experiment 2 
were exposed to the self suppression instruction, this instruction was chosen as self 
suppression is the most widely employed suppression strategy in the thought 
suppression literature. Nevertheless it is possible that within self suppression, 
participants may have used multiple distracters or a focused distracter in their 
attempt to suppress. The variability between the two techniques would have an effect 
on the amount of unwanted thought intrusions; therefore future research should 
include post phase questions which ascertain the type o f technique used.
The current study only exposed participants to three indulgence cycles, future 
research should include additional indulgence cycles in order to provide more 
information as to whether occurrence of the target thought would continue to be 
maintained across repeated suppression attempts, in both the repeated suppression 
and the suppress think-free groups, or whether after an increased number of 
suppression attempts the occurrence of the target thought would gradually fade. 
However, the findings herein provide tentative evidence that the occurrence o f the 
target thought would be maintained across multiple indulgence cycles. Such 
maintenance highlights the counterproductive nature of suppression as a coping 
strategy for unwanted thoughts, a suggestion that has been iterated by behavioral and 
cognitive psychotherapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, 
Strosahl &Wilson, 1999).
2.3. Concluding Comments
Experiment 1 aimed to determine the effect that engaging in different
distraction techniques would have on unwanted thought intrusions in both the
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suppression and think free periods. When compared to baseline, an inflation of target 
unwanted thoughts experienced in a suppression period would qualify as an 
immediate enhancement effect, whilst an inflation o f target unwanted thoughts 
experienced in the think free phase would qualify as a rebound effect. The study 
found that engaging in multiple and self distraction caused both an immediate 
enhancement effect and a rebound effect, whilst engaging in focussed distraction 
obliterated both effects.
These results are consistent with Wegner’s (1989) ECH as well as being 
consistent with the stimulus equivalence theory of thought suppression that was 
described in the general introduction. Specifically, limiting the amount o f distracters 
also limits the amount of environmental cues that serve to remind us of unwanted 
thoughts. At first glance this could be seen as having some important clinical 
relevance, however the idea of using focussed distraction as a way of dealing with 
unwanted thoughts becomes a ridiculous notion when one considers the way in 
which we generally live our lives; we do not live our lives in one room where there 
are no external reminders, but in a world where there are multiple 
distracters/reminders available to us. Considering such an inference is important for 
one crucial reason; the fact that engaging in multiple and self distraction, two 
techniques that reflect the types o f strategies available to us on a daily basis, does not 
work, suggests that engaging in the suppression of unwanted thoughts, is indeed a 
futile strategy. In terms of both immediate enhancement and rebound, the results 
suggest that not only will one struggle to actively suppress a thought during a 
suppression period, but that thought will also re-appear and rebound at a later stage.
With the way in which thought suppression occurs in everyday life becoming 
the focal point o f this research, Experiment 2 aimed to study the effects of engaging 
in multiple indulgence cycles, which, according to Wegner (1989), mirrors the way 
in which we experience unwanted thoughts in an everyday sense. According to the 
ECH, the more one engages in thought suppression, the more external distracters will 
be used, meaning that more environmental reminders will serve to remind us of the 
unwanted thought causing a gradual inflation of the amount o f unwanted thought 
intrusions experienced.
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The results o f Experiment 2, however, did not find such an inflation when the 
effects of repeatedly suppressing over time was studied. Specifically the results 
found that engaging in repeated suppression merely caused a maintenance o f the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects, when compared to controls, instead of 
causing the expected inflation of unwanted thoughts. Immediately this provides 
evidence which contradicts the ECH, and also the behavioural account of thought 
suppression. However when one considers more closely the laboratory setting in 
which the study was conducted, it becomes apparent that these results should have 
perhaps been expected. Simply put, the aforementioned theories suggest that the 
more distracters there are the more one will experience the unwanted thought, 
however in an experimental setting where there are a limited amount o f distracters 
present in the room, it is no surprise that such a ceiling effect was reached in terms of 
the amount of unwanted thought experienced. Despite not strictly adhering to the 
predictions of the ECH, Experiment 2, much like Experiment 1, seems to suggest 
that engaging in thought suppression is a futile strategy for dealing with unwanted 
thoughts, as the more one tries to banish an unwanted thought, the more that thought 
will appear, both during and after the suppression period.
In conclusion, Experiments 1 and 2 both lend support to the immediate 
enhancement effect and the rebound effect. However, in applied terms, it is difficult 
to suggest that the ironic results associated with the suppression of a neutral thought 
can also be generalized to the suppression of high valence thoughts. Considering that 
the majority of people experiencing psychological dysfunction are dealing with high 
valence, personally relevant thoughts, the need for thought suppression research 
utilising high valence thoughts becomes evident. Chapter 3 of the thesis will attempt 
to study the effects o f suppressing such high valence thoughts.
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Chapter 2
Testing immediate enhancement and rebound
effects.
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2. Introduction
Rachman and Da Silva (1978) suggest that 80% of people will attempt to 
control their thoughts via suppression, so that when an unwanted thought is in 
consciousness, many people will try their best to avoid it. In spite of this, a plethora 
of previous research suggests that thought suppression is not possible (Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994; Lavy & Van Den Hout, 1990). The first empirical model of thought 
suppression was reported in the seminal paper by Wegner et al (1987) which found 
that the more one tries to banish a certain thought the more it will appear in 
consciousness. Wegner et al (1987) employed a self report paradigm that required 
participants to ‘not think about a white bear’ for a five-minute phase. Participants 
were instructed that if  they were to think of a ‘white bear’ to ring a bell that was 
placed in front of them on a table. During the second five-minute phase participants 
were cycled into what the researchers referred to as the ‘concentration’ phase. In this 
phase participants had to concentrate on the thought o f a ‘white bear’ as much as 
possible, once again indicating the presence of this thought by ringing the bell. The 
study comprised of two groups, the first group were exposed to the ‘suppress phase’ 
for the first five minutes followed by the ‘concentration phase’ for the second five 
minutes, whereas the second group were exposed to the phases in the reversed order 
(i.e. concentration first followed by suppression).
The results o f the study were two fold. First, it appeared that participants, 
when asked not to think of a neutral thought (white bear), proceeded to have that 
unwanted thought enter consciousness around 6 or 7 times within the suppression 
phase. Wegner et al (1987) labelled this inability to suppress ones thoughts the 
‘Immediate Enhancement Effect’. Since its conception the immediate enhancement 
effect has received both support for (Bowers & Woody, 1996; Lavy & Van Den 
Hout, 1990) and against it (Clark et al, 1991; Clark et al, 1993). Second, Wegner et 
al (1987) found that those who had spent an initial 5 minute phase suppressing the 
unwanted thought, would then have that thought come to mind an inflated amount of 
times during the concentration phase, when compared to those who had not initially 
attempted to suppress the thought. This phenomenon was labelled ‘The Rebound
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Effect’ and was taken as evidence that the effects of attempted suppression 
(unwanted thought intrusions) may still be apparent after a phase o f suppression. 
Again the rebound effect has supporting research (Abramowitz et al, 2001; Clark et 
al, 1990) and research which questions its validity (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Nixon & 
Jackson, 2006). For more in depth details of research based on the immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects see Chapter 1.
Due to the conflicting results in the literature, the aim o f this first empirical 
chapter is to study in greater detail the immediate enhancement effect and the 
rebound effect. Specifically aiming to determine if thought suppression is possible, 
whilst also investigating the after effects o f attempted suppression. As distraction is 
the principal way in which we attempt to suppress unwanted thoughts (Gold & 
Wegner, 1995) the first experiment of the thesis will study the effects that various 
distraction techniques have on the aforementioned phenomena. Rachman and Da 
Silva (1978) found that people will almost always give ‘distraction’ as their answer 
when asked ‘how do you avoid unwanted thoughts?’ A number of studies have 
tested the effects o f distraction on thought suppression. This work primarily stems 
from the original white bear study (Wegner et al, 1987) in which Wegner 
demonstrated the ironic effects of attempted suppression could be bypassed by the 
use of a focussed distracter. Since then Lin and Wicker (2007) and Salkovskis and 
Campbell (1994) have both found that focussed distraction has indeed lessened the 
amount of unwanted thought intrusions, whilst Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) and 
Cioffi and Holloway (1993) found the positive effects o f focussed distraction in the 
areas o f smoking cessation and pain tolerance, respectively.
Such research gains applied importance for a few reasons. First, if  focussed
distraction does obliterate the effects o f thought suppression then this technique
could be used to help those dealing with negative unwanted thoughts. Second, if
focussed distraction did provide a way around the effects o f thought suppression then
various clinical therapies (for example, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; ACT
Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999), which encourage people to accept rather than
avoid their unwanted experiences (e.g., thoughts), could be brought into question.
For these reasons Experiment 1 will aim to determine the effects o f various
distraction techniques on the number of unwanted thought intrusions. Specifically, it
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aims to determine whether the immediate enhancement and rebound effect still exist 
under self, multiple and focussed distraction techniques.
Experiment 2 of the current chapter has a slightly different methodology but 
with similar aims to that o f Experiment 1. Instead of examining the effects of 
different distraction techniques on the immediate enhancement effect and the 
rebound effect, Experiment 2 will aim to further investigate the underlying process 
of the aforementioned phenomena by examining the effects that thought suppression 
has over a longer period o f time. Indeed such an experimental idea is not entirely 
novel as Wegner (1989) coined the term ‘indulgence cycle’, which refers to the 
cycles of suppression and non suppression that one will experience over time during 
everyday life. According to this account the more cycles one enters the more 
pronounced rebound effect would occur. Despite Wegner (1989) having coined this 
term only two empirical experiments have studied indulgence cycles, both Hardy and 
Brewin (2005) and Williams and Mould (2007) found that engaging in repeated 
suppression induced a maintained rebound effect. Experiment 2 of this chapter aims 
to determine the effect of engaging in multiple suppression cycles, and whether the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects will persist over time.
2,1 Experiment 1
Wegner (1989) suggested that the most common way to avoid ‘thoughts of
X ’ is to distract oneself by ‘thinking of Y \ Within his research Wegner (1989)
proposed that in order for a distracter to successfully over-ride unwanted thought
intrusions the distracter would have to be sufficiently ‘absorbing’. Evidence in
favour of such an assertion arises in research on pain tolerance. For example, both
McCaul and Mallot (1984) and Corah, Gale and Illig (1979) found that the use of
absorbing distracters enabled participants to endure significantly more pain than
those encouraged to self distract. Wegner (1989) therefore advocated that the
‘quality of the distracter could have a critical influence on the degree to which the
distraction can hold one’s attention away from the unwanted thought’ (pp. 63).
According to Wegner (1987) the typical method of thought suppression is to engage
in unfocussed self distraction. This technique refers to the natural way in which one
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will jump from thought to thought in search of respite from an unwanted thought. He 
suggested that such a strategy would be futile and could even cause a pre-occupation 
with the unwanted thought due to the way in which these distracters would later 
serve as environmental reminders (ECH), advocating that the use of a focussed 
distracter may be more appropriate.
The current study aims to test the efficacy o f a number of distraction 
techniques, in terms of the number of occurrence o f the unwanted thoughts 
produced. To that end four groups will be employed. The first group is the ‘self 
distraction group’ which refers to the typical thought suppression group where no 
exact distraction technique is in place. Instead participants are asked to suppress all 
thoughts of a specified ‘unwanted thought’, in which they are encouraged to provide 
their own distracters. The second is referred to as the ‘focussed distraction group’, in 
which the participants are asked to concentrate on one distracter for the duration of 
the five minute phase, whilst attempting to suppress an unwanted thought. Previous 
research on focussed distraction suggests that it may lessen the effects of attempted 
suppression (Lin & Wicker, 2007; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). Third, a novel 
distraction technique will be employed, in which the participants will receive 
multiple distracters in the form of words, for the five minute phase, whilst attempting 
to suppress a target thought. This group will provide a comparison that is directly 
opposite to focussed distraction in order to determine the effect that this will have on 
thought occurrence, in terms of the immediate enhancement effect and the rebound 
effect. This group will be labelled the ‘multiple distraction group’. Lastly a group of 
participants will undergo two think free phases which will serve as a baseline 
condition. The baseline condition is in place to measure the importance of the 
intrusion rate experienced by the other three experimental groups. If participants in 
those groups press the space bar no more than the baseline group, then the effects o f 
attempted suppression could be said to be minimal. This group will be referred to as 
the ‘baseline group’.
It is predicted, in accordance with the aforementioned literature, that the 
focussed distraction group will experience no more thought intrusions than that of 
the baseline group. Whilst it is expected that the self distraction group and the
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multiple distraction group will experience a larger number of unwanted thought 
intrusions.
2.1.1. Method
Participants
60 undergraduates (48 female and 12 male) at Swansea University were paid 
2 credits for their participation in the experiment. The credit system at Swansea 
University allows each undergraduate to receive up to 48 credits in order to run 
research for their final year project, each credit is worth 15 minutes of participation 
in a study. The participants had a mean age of 22.4 years (SD; 9.007). The sample 
was non clinical. However participants were screened for depression, thought 
suppression tendencies and emotional avoidance (see later). The assignment of 
participants to experimental conditions was randomized. 15 participants were 
assigned to the self distraction group, 15 were assigned to the multiple distraction 
group, 15 were assigned to the focused distraction group and 15 were assigned to the 
baseline group.
Design
The study involved a 4 (group; self distraction, multiple distraction, focussed 
distraction and baseline) x 2 (phase; suppression and think free) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the second factor. The dependent variable in this experiment 
was the number of times the participants from each group would press the space bar 
in each o f the two phases.
Apparatus
The experiment was completed in a laboratory at the Swansea University. 
The laboratory was quiet and free from distraction. It contained a desk, a chair, a 
standard computer (Processor) with a 14-inch screen and standard computer mouse. 
The participant’s responses were controlled by the computer program, which was 
created in Visual Basic TM 6.
Materials
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In order to avoid confounding the results three screening questionnaires were 
administered. The questionnaires consisted of the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire II (AAQ II; Bond et al., 2005), the White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al, 1961). 
See below for further details. The data for 2 participants was removed for a high 
score on the depression inventory (a score of 10 or more warranted exclusion). Each 
participant was given details of the University counselling service in the debriefing 
session following the study, no direct action was taken as a result o f a high BDI 
score. The remainder of the participants scored within the normal range (Overall 
mean scores: AAQ II = 54.15, WBSI = 44.5, BDI = 5.2)
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2: Bond, Hayes, Baer, Carpenter, 
Orcutt, Waltz & Zettle, under review, see appendix 1)
This is a self report measure created to assess a person experiential 
avoidance. Experiential avoidance, which is also called experiential control, is when 
a person endeavour’s to control or alter the form, frequency or situational sensitivity 
of internal experiences (Hayes et al., 1996). A 10 item version of the questionnaire 
was completed by each participant. The ten statements vary from “It’s ok if  I 
remember something unpleasant” to “emotions cause problems in my life”. There are 
seven response choices and scores may range from 7 to 70. High scores infer a high 
rate of experiential avoidance and low scores are said to indicate acceptance and 
commitment to action.
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI: Wegner and Zanakos, 1994, see 
appendix 2)
This is also a self report measure. The WBSI aims to measure a person’s 
tendency to suppress unwanted negative thoughts. It is a 15 item questionnaire with 
statements ranging from “I have thoughts that I cannot stop” to “I have thoughts that 
I try to avoid”. Answers are given on a 5 point scale of how much the participant 
agrees or disagrees with the particular statement. Scores may range 15 to 75. High 
scores suggest a tendency to suppress unpleasant thoughts. Research generated by
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Muris, Merckelbach and Horselenberg (1996) showed the instrument to be reliable in 
terms of internal consistency and test re-test stability.
Beck’s depression inventory (BDI; Beck Steer & Brown, 1996, see appendix 3)
The BDI is a questionnaire utilized to measure for signs o f depression and 
can provide an estimate of depressive severity. The questionnaire consists of 21 
statements. Status is assessed in terms o f how the subject has felt in the week before 
that present moment and including the day of testing. The participant picks one of 
four statements for each of the 21 components. Each statement has a numerical value 
beside it going from 0 to 3. The values are accumulated to give individual BDI score. 
A participant’s score is then compared to the following ratings to determine level of 
depression; 0-9 normal non-depressed range; 10-15 mild depression; 16-19 mild to 
moderate depression; 20-29 moderate to severe depression; 30-63 severe depression. 
Participants with scores of nine and lower were employed in this study.
Procedure
On each subject’s arrival at the experimental lab, the participant was greeted 
by a male experimenter. Upon completion of the consent form the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups (i.e., self distraction, multiple 
distraction, etc).
Self distraction group
If assigned to the self distraction group the following procedure occurred; via 
verbal and written instructions the participants were instructed that for the following 
five minute phase they had to try their best to suppress a certain thought that would 
be given to them by the experimenter (the ‘unwanted thought’) and that if  they did 
happen to think o f the ‘unwanted thought’ in this five minute phase then they were 
required to press the space bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The 
instruction was as follows; ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white 
bear’. Every time you have ‘white bear’ come to mind, though, please press the 
space bar in front o f  you ’.
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After the initial five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and 
gave the participant the think free instruction. Participants were told that for this final 
five minute phase that they could think about anything they liked (including the 
unwanted thought). The participants were again told that if  they did happen to think 
of the ‘unwanted thought’ from stage 1 then they should continue to press the space 
bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The instruction was as follows;
‘Now fo r  the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  
however the thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then you should 
press the space bar as before I
Multiple distraction group
If assigned to the multiple distraction group the following procedure 
occurred; participants were instructed, via verbal and written instructions, that for the 
following five minute phase they would have to try their best to suppress a certain 
thought that the experimenter would provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However 
they were told that in order to help them in their suppression attempt that 60 random 
words (see appendix 4) would appear every five seconds on the computer screen in 
front o f them, and that they should think o f these words instead o f the unwanted 
thought. Most importantly the participants were told that if  they were to think of the 
unwanted thought then they must press the space bar on the computer keyboard each 
time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The instruction was as follows; ‘In the next 
five  minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear ’. Instead think o f  the words that 
will appear on the screen to distract yourself However, i f  you do have ‘white bear ’ 
come to mind, though, please press the space bar in fron t o f  you
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
think free instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; H ow  fo r  the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear’ happens to enter your mind, then 
you should press the space bar as before I
Focussed distraction group
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If assigned to the focussed distraction group the following procedure 
occurred; participants were instructed, via verbal and written instructions, that for the 
following five minute phase they would have to try their best to suppress a certain 
thought that the experimenter would provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However 
they were told that in order to help them in their suppression attempt that they should 
focus on one thought instead, which in this case, was the thought of a ‘red 
volkswagon’. Then the participants were told that if  they were to think of the 
unwanted thought then they must press the space bar on the computer keyboard each 
time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The instruction was as follows; ‘In the next 
five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear Instead try to think o f  a red 
volkswagon. However i f  you do have ‘white bear ’ come to mind, though, please 
press the space bar in front o f  you \
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
think free instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; ‘Now fo r  the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then 
you should press the space bar as before.’
Baseline group
If assigned to the baseline group the participants received two think free five 
minute phases. Before the first five minute phase the researcher, in written and 
verbal form, gave the following instruction 'Now fo r  the following five  minute phase 
you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ 
happens to enter your mind, then you should press the space bar as before\ Upon 
completion of the first five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and gave 
the identical think free instruction for the second time.
Finally, the importance of signalling the presence of each unwanted thought 
was stressed to each participant via the following instruction, which was 
administered immediately prior to engaging in the first five minute period; ‘if you 
should happen to think o f  the ‘unwanted thought ’ in either phase then it is important
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that you press the space bar each time it comes to m ind’. After completing the study, 
subjects were debriefed and their credit was administered.
2.1.2. Results
Questionnaires
In order to ensure that the results were obtained as a result o f the independent 
variable manipulated (i.e., distraction technique) and not pre-experimental 
experiential avoidance, sub clinical depression or high levels of suppression, it was 
important that there are no differences between the groups on the screening 
questionnaires (i.e., the AAQ, WBSI and BDI). A 3 (Questionnaire; AAQ II, WBSI, 
BDI) x 4 (Group; self distraction, multiple distraction, focussed distraction, baseline) 
mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Questionnaire, F  (2,108) = 
0.803; p  > 0.05, and no significant interaction between Questionnaire and Group, F  
(6, 108) = 0.715; p  > 0.05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests additionally revealed no 
significant difference (see Table 1) between the self distraction group (AAQ II = 
53.6, WBSI = 43.6, BDI = 4.2), the multiple distraction group (AAQ II = 55.2, 
WBSI = 44.7, BDI = 4.9), the focussed distraction group (AAQ II = 55.4, WBSI =
44.1, BDI = 5.6), and the baseline group (AAQ II = 52.4, WBSI = 45.4, BDI = 6.1) 
on any of the questionnaires.
Comparison AAQ W BSI BDI
Self v Multiple t(26) = -0.502 t(26) = -0.358 t(26) = 0.343
Self v focussed t(28) = 0.487 t(28) = 0.286 t(28) = -0.521
Self v baseline t(28) = 0.-631 t(28) = 0.241 t(28) = -0.892
Multiple v focussed t(26) = 0.-113 t(26) = -0.168 t(26) = 0.487
Multiple v baseline t(26)= 0.740 t(26)= 0.153 t(26) = 0.635
Focussed v baseline t(28) =0.810 t(28) = 0.220 t(28) = 0.276
Table 1. The difference between each group on the various questionnaires. All non 
significant at the 0.05 level, Experiment 1.
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Number o f intrusions
The dependent variable in the study was the number o f times each participant 
pressed the space bar in both the suppression and think free/rebound phases. Figure 1 
displays that the multiple distraction group (suppression phase M = 15.46, SD = 
10.95; rebound phase M = 10.07, SD = 8.27) and the self distraction group 
(suppression phase M = 11.86, SD = 8.7; rebound phase M = 8.4, SD = 8.6) 
indicated presence o f  the unwanted thought the most. W hilst the focussed distraction 
group (suppression phase M = 8.33, SD = 6.66; rebound phase M = 6.73, SD = 5.88) 
and the baseline group (suppression phase M = 6.46, SD = 2.53; rebound phase M = 
3.53, SD = 2.58) appeared to press the space bar less.
Figure 1. Number o f  unwanted thought intrusions fo r  each group in each phase, 
Experiment 1.
■  Suppression  
□  Rebound
multiple focussed
Statistical analyses were conducted to determine any differences between the
groups. A 2 (Phase: Suppression versus Rebound) x 4 (Group: Self, Multiple,
Focussed, Baseline) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Phase,
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F(l,54) = 18.708; = p  < 0.05, and no significant main interaction between Phase 
and Group, F (3, 54) = 0.986; p  > 0.05.
In order to determine the between group differences in the number o f space 
bar presses post hoc Tukey HSD tests (Table 2) were conducted between the four 
groups across the suppression and think free phases. For the suppression phase, the 
analyses revealed no significant main effect between the self distraction group and 
the multiple distraction group, or between the self distraction group and the focussed 
distraction group. However, a significant main effect was found between the self 
distraction group and the baseline group. Further Tukey HSD tests revealed a 
significant main effect between the multiple distraction group and the baseline 
group, and between the multiple distraction group and the focussed distraction group 
(p<.05). Finally, no significant main effect was found between the focussed 
distraction group and the baseline group.
These results suggest that participants in the self distraction and the multiple 
distraction groups indicated unwanted thought intrusions significantly more than the 
baseline group. Therefore, thought suppression via these forms of distractions 
appears to be ineffective. However, the results for the focussed distraction group 
indicated a similar number of unwanted thought intrusions compared to baseline. 
That is, participants in this group did not press the space bar more than the baseline 
group, suggesting that focussed distraction might bypass the ironic effects of thought 
suppression.
In terms of rebound the post hoc Tukey HSD tests (Table 2) revealed a 
significant main effect between the self distraction group and the baseline group and 
between the multiple distraction group and the baseline group. However, no 
significant main effect was found between the focussed distraction group and the 
baseline group, between the multiple distraction group and the self distraction group, 
between the multiple distraction group and the focussed distraction group, or 
between the focussed distraction group and the self distraction group. These results 
suggest that in the think free phase following attempted suppression, that those 
participants in the multiple and self distraction groups indicated a greater number of 
unwanted intrusions than the baseline group. However, the focussed distraction
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group demonstrated no such effect suggesting that focussed distraction eradicated the 
rebound effect found in the other groups.
Comparison Suppression Phase Rebound Phase
Self v Multiple t(26) = -0.967; p >  0.05 t(26) = -0.523; p >  0.05
Self v focussed t(28) = 1.249;p  > 0.05 t(28) = 0.619;p  > 0.05
Self v baseline t(28) = 2.308;p  < 0.05 t(28) = 2.097;p  < 0.05
Multiple v focussed t(26) = 2.112;p  < 0.05 t(26) = 1.245;p  > 0.05
Multiple v baseline t(26) = 3.093;p  < 0.05 t(26) = 2.911;p  < 0.05
Focussed v baseline t(28) = 1.014;p  > 0.05 t(28) = 1.928;p  > 0.05
Table 2. The post hoc Tukey HSD tests conducted between the se lf distraction, 
multiple distraction, focussed distraction and baseline groups, Experiment 1.
Finally, paired sample t tests were conducted to determine if  any differences 
emerged, in terms of thought intrusions, between the suppression and think free 
phases within each group. The results showed a significant main effect for the self 
distraction group, t(14) = 2.374; p  < 0.05, and the baseline group , t(14) = 3.803; p  
< 0.05. However, no significant difference was found for the multiple distraction 
group, t(12) = 2.063; p  > 0.05, or the focussed distraction group, t(14) = 1.524; p  > 
0.05. These results show that those participants in the self and baseline groups 
experienced the unwanted thought significantly more in the suppression phase than 
the think free phase. The participants in the multiple and focussed groups however, 
experienced a similar number of thought intrusions in both phases.
In summary, participants in the focussed distraction group experienced a 
similar amount of thought intrusions as those in the baseline condition, where as 
those in the self and multiple distraction groups experienced significantly more, this 
was the case for both the suppression and think free phases. In addition to this, in no 
group did the participants experience an increased amount of intrusions during the
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think free phase. However participants in the multiple and self distraction groups did 
experience the unwanted thought significantly more than the baseline group for this 
second phase.
2.1.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that engaging in focussed distraction 
may obliterate the normal ironic effects of attempted thought suppression. Namely, 
participants who engaged in focussed distraction demonstrated no immediate 
enhancement effect and no rebound effect. In contrast to this, participants exposed to 
either self or multiple distraction techniques experienced an inflation of unwanted 
thought intrusions in both the suppression and think free phases, providing evidence 
in favour of the immediate enhancement effect and the rebound effect.
These results concur with the previous literature on focussed distraction. Lin 
and Wicker (2007) and Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) both found that engaging in 
focussed distraction aided suppression attempts. Additionally, the findings that the 
self and multiple distraction techniques produced an inflation in the number of 
unwanted thoughts also agrees with previous reseairch. Wegner (1989) suggested that 
when engaging in self distraction we naturally consult a number of distracters. With 
this in mind it is no surprise that those engaging in the multiple distraction technique, 
experienced a similar amount o f intrusions as those in a self distraction technique 
where participants may have engaged with multiple distracters independently and 
without direct instruction. In addition to agreeing w ith previous literature, the results 
of the current study also concur with the predictions o f Wegner’s ECH, which 
suggests that limiting the number of distracters also limits the amount of 
environmental reminders.
This finding is also of clinical relevance. Specifically, it suggests that the
immediate enhancement effect and the rebouind effect, which underpin the
counterproductive nature of attempted suppression can be circumvented via focussed
distraction. However, perhaps more importantly, according to Wegner (1989) and
Hayes et al (1999) engaging in focussed distraction has low ecological validity, as in
everyday life thought suppression would be rendered impossible given the multiple
cues in our environment that serve to remind us off the unwanted target. The results
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from the multiple and self distraction conditions, that demonstrated the inflated 
occurrence of the unwanted thought, bolster this argument.
Taken together the results o f Experiment 1 suggest that the most commonly 
employed techniques for suppressing an unwanted thought are at best ineffective and 
at worst counterproductive. Participants who engage in self and multiple distraction 
techniques experience both the immediate enhancement and rebound effects. One 
possible reason for this may lie in the fact that both groups were reacting similarly 
when receiving the thought suppression instruction, namely they were both drawing 
on multiple distracters. In future research, one could ascertain how the participants 
interact with each technique by including a ‘speak aloud’ instruction. Such a 
manipulation could also be used to ascertain the number/type o f distracters being 
used in the self suppression condition. These distracters could then be used as the 
stimuli in the multiple distraction group. This would ensure that the differences 
between the groups were due to self generation and not the number of words 
generated.
Nevertheless the results demonstrate the futile nature of attempted 
suppression via distraction. One final limitation of Experiment 1 is that only the 
effects of attempted suppression, over a short 5-10 minute phase was measured. 
However, according to Wegner (1989) it is more likely that unwanted thoughts 
return in a cyclical nature. Experiment 2 aims to determine the effect of multiple 
suppression and think free phases on thought occurrence.
2.2. Experiment 2
In order to further investigate the immediate enhancement effect and the
rebound effect Experiment 2 of the thesis aims to study the effects o f engaging in
repeated suppression over time. Wegner (1989) coined the term ‘indulgence cycle’ to
refer to the cycles of suppression and non suppression that one will engage in on a
day to day basis (for a more in depth review of the indulgence cycle literature please
refer to Section 1.2.5 o f the General Introduction). Despite Wegner (1989) coining
this term only two previous studies, that of Hardy and Brewin (2005) and Williams
and Moulds (2007) have researched these phenomena using a paradigm which
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studies the effects of suppression over time. Both o f these studies found an 
immediate enhancement effect, in that participants would repeatedly experience the 
intrusion in the suppression periods. Additionally both studies found a minor 
rebound effect in that engaging in repeated suppression produced maintenance o f 
intrusions in each of the respective rebound periods. However, it is hard to draw 
basic conclusions on the impact of multiple indulgence cycles from these studies as 
both demonstrations employed populations instructed to suppress high valence 
material. It is possible that the high valence nature o f the suppressed items 
confounded the effect of the indulgence cycles. Additionally, while both studies 
exposed participants to two indulgence cycles, neither involved exposure to multiple 
indulgence cycles.
The current study will therefore differ from the two previous studies in four 
key ways. First, by only studying personally relevant or high valence target thoughts, 
the previous studies do not provide evidence as to how individuals’ respond when 
attempting to suppress a neutral thought. When dealing with high valence thoughts it 
is likely that participants engage in suppression attempts with the material even when 
not instructed to do so, thus confounding the experimental findings. As suggested by 
Hardy and Brewin (2005), participants’ history of practised suppression may have 
impacted on their suppression attempts. The current study controls for participants’ 
history with the to-be-suppressed item by employing a neutral rather than high 
valence target thought. Second, the suppression and expression phases in the 
previous studies have been between two and three minutes. This does not reflect the 
timeframe typically employed in thought suppression studies (e.g. Wegner, et al., 
1987). The current study employs five minute suppression and expression phases in 
line with seminal thought suppression studies (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Merckelbach, 
Muris, Van Den Hout & De Jong, 1991).
Third, the current study will employ three indulgence cycles, as opposed to
two, to determine the effects of an inflated number of indulgence cycles. Lastly,
previous studies in this area have employed two groups who both completed two full
indulgence cycles. The current study aims to determine the effect o f multiple
indulgence cycles on target thought occurrence. To that end, a group of control
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participants will be recruited. This group will only be instructed to complete one 
suppression attempt and thereafter the number of target thought occurrences across 
the same timeframe as the repeated suppression group will be recorded.
Therefore, the aim of the study is to determine the effect o f repeated 
indulgence cycles of a neutral target thought on thought occurrence. Participants will 
be assigned to one of two groups. The ‘repeated suppression’ group will be 
instructed to complete three indulgence cycles. The ‘suppress think-free’ group will 
be instructed to suppress a target thought once for one five minute phase, and 
thereafter to think freely for five, five minute phases. It is predicted, within the 
repeated suppression group, that participants will continue to experience an 
immediate enhancement effect in each of the suppression periods. Between the 
groups it is predicted that participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group, during 
each of the three comparable rebound phases (phase 2, phase 4 and phase 6), will 
report an inflated number o f target thoughts when compared to those in the ‘suppress 
think-free’ group. This finding would provide evidence that engaging in multiple 
indulgence cycles, even of pre-experimentally neutral thoughts, can cause an 
increase in the occurrence of a target thought. This result would lend support to 
Wegner‘s (1989) Environmental Cueing Hypothesis of how thought intrusions can 
escalate in everyday life, as the ECH would suggest that the more indulgence cycles 
one enters, the more distracters will be used, meaning that more environmental cues 
will render the attempt less likely to be successful.
Additionally, a novel analysis will be conducted on the data. According to 
Wegner (1989) participants will re-engage with a suppression attempt once the target 
thought has occurred in a rebound phase. Therefore, it can be understood that the 
first time an unwanted thought re-surfaces is the most important intrusion as it will 
prompt the next suppression attempt. Indeed this would analogue more accurately 
how suppression and rebound occur in everyday life. People do not experience 
suppression and rebound phases, instead they attempt not to think about a certain 
thought, and then they move on, before an environmental cue prompts the re- 
emergence of the unwanted thought. Importantly at this point, people do not enter a
five minute think free phase; instead they immediately attempt to suppress it again.
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To this end, it is predicted that the ‘repeated suppression’ group will have the target 
thought re-enter consciousness significantly more quickly than the ‘suppress think 
free’ group. If this is the case then it might provide valuable information as to how 
an unwanted target thought becomes an obsession, because the more we suppress, 
the more quickly the unwanted thought will return.
2.2.1. Method
Participants
Thirty-four undergraduates at Swansea University were paid 3 credits for 
their participation in the experiment. (Mean age; 20.11 years, SD; 3.97). 29 females 
and 5 males participated in the study. The sample was non clinical.
Design
The study was a 2 (group; repeated suppression vs. suppress think-free) x 6 
(five minute phases) mixed design. There were two dependent variables; number of 
space bar presses in each of the five minute phases, and response latencies in each of 
the expression phases of the first unwanted thought intrusion.
Stimuli
Screening questionnaires
In order to avoid confounding the results three screening measures were 
administered: the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II  (AAQ II; Bond et al., 
2005), the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI, Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) to screen for pre- 
experimental levels o f emotional avoidance, thought suppression and depression, 
respectively (for further details on these questionnaires see Experiment 1). The data 
for 6 participants was omitted based on a high BDI score (10 or over). The remaining 
28 participants (14 in each group) scored within a normal range. (Overall mean 
scores: AAQ II = 53.54, WBSI = 44.31, BDI = 5.39)
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Procedure
On each subject’s arrival at the experimental laboratory participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups (i.e., the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group or the ‘suppress think free’ group).
(i) Repeated suppression group: Participants were first exposed to the ‘suppression 
instruction’: ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘white bear ’. Every 
time you have ‘white bear ’ come to mind, though, please press the space bar in front 
o f  you'. This was followed by the ‘liberal rebound’ instruction: ‘Now fo r  the 
following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  however the 
thought o f  a ‘white bear ’ happens to enter your mind, then you should press the 
space bar as before I  The participants repeated this procedure another two times. 
Therefore, in total, the participants from the ‘repeated suppression’ group alternated 
between three suppression instructions and three liberal rebound instructions.
(ii) Suppress think-free group: Participants assigned to this group were provided 
with identical instructions for the first two five minute phases (i.e., suppression and 
liberal rebound instructions). However, for the third five minute phase, rather than 
receiving the suppression instruction participants received the liberal rebound 
instruction. Participants continued to receive the liberal rebound instruction for the 
remainder of the three five minute phases.
Upon completion of the final liberal rebound phase all participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
2.2.2. Results
Questionnaires
In order to ensure that the results were attained as a result o f the independent
variable manipulated and not individual differences, it is important that there are no
differences between the groups in terms of questionnaires scores. A 2 (Group;
repeated suppression vs suppress think free) x 3 (Questionnaire; AAQ II, WBSI,
BDI) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Questionnaire, F  (I, 50)
= 0.592; p  > 0.05, and no significant interaction between Questionnaire and Group,
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F (3, 50) = 0.253; p  > 0.05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed no significant 
difference (see Table 3) between the repeated suppression group (AAQ II = 53.37, 
WBSI = 46.18, BDI = 5.62) and the suppress think free group (AAQ II = 53.72, 
WBSI = 42.44, BDI = 5.16)
Comparison AAQ WBSI BDI
Repeated suppression t(26) = 0.187 t(26) = 0.408 t(26) =  0.201
vs. Suppress think free
Table 3. The difference between the repeated suppression group and suppress think 
free group on thepre screening questionnaires. All non significant at the 0.05 level, 
Experiment 2.
Number o f  intrusions
The mean amount o f times that the participants from the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group and the ‘suppress think-free’ group pressed the space bar in each 
phase are represented in Table 4. The amount o f target thought occurrences across 
the suppression phases, for the repeated suppression group, remained constant (Phase 
1 M = 6.35, Phase 3 M = 5.07, Phase 5 M = 5.64). There also appeared to be no 
difference between the three liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group (Phase 2 M = 4.07, Phase 4 M = 4.14, Phase 6 M = 3.57), indicating that 
repeated suppression caused neither an increase nor a decrease in target thought 
occurrences. However, a different pattern emerged for the ‘suppress think-free’ 
group, with a gradual decline o f space bar presses across the five liberal rebound 
phases (Phase 1 M = 6.85, Phase 2 M = 3.57, Phase 3 M = 3.14, Phase 4 M = 2.5, 
Phase 5 M = 2.64, Phase 6 M = 1.78)
Group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6
Suppression Rebound Suppression/ Rebound Suppression/ Rebound 
Rebound Rebound
Repeated suppression 6.35 4.07 5.07 4.14 5.64 3.57
Suppress think free 6.85 3.57 3.14 2.5 2.64 1.78
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Table 4. The mean amount o f  space bar presses across the 6 phases fo r  both groups, 
Experiment 2.
In order to determine any significant differences and interactions across 
group and phase a 2 (repeated suppression group vs. suppress think free) x 6 (phase) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for 
phase, F  (5, 130) = 10.305; p  < 0.05 suggesting that there was a difference in the 
amount of times that the target thought occurred depending on the phase participants 
were in. The results also revealed a near interaction between phase and group, F(5, 
130) = 2.140; p  = 0.065 suggesting that the difference in the occurrence of the target 
thought across phases varied depending on whether the participants were in the 
‘repeated suppression’ or the ‘suppress think free’ group. This suggests that the 
occurrence of the target thought was inflated in the ‘repeated suppression’ group 
when compared to the ‘suppress think free’ group.
Suppression versus Rebound
Suppression phases
In order to determine whether there was any significant difference in the 
number of space bar presses across the three suppression phases for the ‘repeated 
suppression’ group, using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, paired samples t 
tests revealed that there was no significant difference emerged between the first and 
second suppression phases, t(13) = 1.93; p  > 0.05, between the second and the third 
suppression phases, t(13) = -0.62; p  > 0.05, and between the first and the third 
suppression phases, t(13) = 0.65; p  > 0.05. These results suggest that the intrusion 
rate did not increase, but, rather, it was maintained across phases.
Liberal Rebound phases
In order to determine if there were any significant differences between the 
two groups across the three comparable liberal rebound phases, a 2 (repeated 
suppression group vs. suppress think free group) x 3 (phase 2, phase 4 and phase 6) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for 
phase, F(2, 52) = 2.85; p  < 0.05, suggesting that the phase affected the amount of
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target thought occurrences. In addition to this the analysis revealed a significant 
linear trend, F(l,26) = 5.35; p  < 0.05, suggesting that the space bar presses 
gradually declined across phases.
In order to explore any significant differences between phases 2, 4 and 6 for 
the repeated suppression group, using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach, 
paired sample t tests were conducted. The results revealed no significant differences 
between the three phases. Phase 2 and 4, t(13) =-0.78, p  > 0.05, Phase 4 and 6, t(13) 
= 1.23; p  > 0.05, Phase 2 and 6, t(13) = 0.68; p  > 0.05. These results suggest that 
over the three liberal rebound phases the number o f space bar presses (i.e. target 
thought occurrences) was again maintained, but did not increase.
For the ‘suppress think-free’ group, despite the trend towards a gradual 
decline, the difference between phase 2 and 4, t(13) =1.48; p  > 0.05 and the 
difference between phase 4 and 6, t(13) = 1.51; p  > 0.05, were not significant. 
However, the difference between phase 2 and phase 6 was significant, t(13) =2.77; 
p  <0.05. The result suggests that the amount of target thought occurrences for the 
‘suppress think free’ group in the liberal rebound phases gradually declines over time 
when compared to the ‘repeated suppression’ group where the number of intrusions 
across liberal rebound phases was maintained.
Repeated Suppression group versus Suppress think free group
In order to determine if there was any difference between the comparable 
liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the ‘suppress think 
free’ group a series of independent sample t tests were conducted. There was no 
significant difference between the two groups, in the number o f target thought 
occurrences, for phase 2, after both groups had completed one indulgence cycle, 
t(26) =0.44; p  > 0.05. There was also no significant difference between phase 4 of 
each group, t(26) = 1.46; p  > 0.05. However, a significant difference did emerge in 
the number of space bar presses in phase 6 between the two groups, t(26) = 1.74; 
p<0.05, indicating that participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group had the 
target thought intrude significantly more in the last liberal rebound phase than those 
in the suppress think-free group.
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Response latency o f  first thought occurrence
Further analysis was conducted in order to determine whether there were any 
differences within and between groups in terms o f the first target thought occurrence 
(i.e., the response latency before the first space bar press) in each o f the liberal 
rebound phases. Figure 2 shows the mean amount o f lapsed time before the thought 
occurred in each o f the three comparable liberal rebound phases. In the first liberal 
rebound phase the response latency was similar in the ‘repeated suppression’ group 
(A/ = 35.44 seconds) and the ‘suppress think free’ group (M  =38.53 seconds). 
However, by the second liberal rebound phase the gap had increased between the 
‘repeated suppression’ group (M  = 69.58 seconds) and the ‘suppress think-free’ 
group (M = 93.51 seconds). Finally, the response latencies in the third liberal 
rebound phase indicated a larger difference between the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group (M  = 96.49 seconds) and the ‘suppress think-free’ group (M  = 171.19 
seconds). For both groups, the amount o f time taken for the first target thought 
intrusion to occur increased from the first to the second and second to the third 
liberal rebound phases. Additionally, the target thought, for those participants in the 
‘repeated suppression' group, tended to re-emerge more quickly in the second and 
third liberal rebound phases in comparison to the ‘suppress think-free’ group.
Figure 2. The amount o f  lapsed time (in seconds) before the space bar was pressed 
in both groups, Experiment 2.
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In order to determine if there were any significant differences across both 
groups for the three comparable rebound phases a 2 (Group; repeated suppression 
group vs. suppress think free group) x 3 (Phase; phase 2, phase 4, phase 6) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant main effect for Phase, F  
(2,46) = 10.01; p  < 0.05, and no interaction was found between Phase and Group, F  
(2, 46) = 2.03; p  > 0.05. Using Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach paired 
sample t tests were conducted to determine where the differences emerged between 
the liberal rebound phases within each of the groups. For the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group, it was found that there was no significant difference between the first liberal 
rebound phase and the second, t(13) = -1.60; p  > 0.05, between the first liberal 
rebound phase and the third, t(13) = -1.80; p  > 0.05 and between the second and the 
third liberal rebound phases, t(13) = -1.45; p  > 0.05, suggesting that the target 
thought re-occurred equally as quickly across all three liberal rebound phases.
For the ‘suppress think-free’ group there was no significant difference 
between the first liberal rebound phase and the second, t(13) = -0.70; p  > 0.05. 
However, there was a significant difference between first liberal rebound phase and 
the third, t(13) = -4.17; p<0.05 and between the second liberal rebound phase and 
the third, t(13) = -2.67; p<0.05, suggesting that the target thought gradually re­
occurred significantly more slowly across time.
Independent sample t tests were conducted to determine if  there were any 
significant differences between the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the ‘suppress 
think free’ group. The t tests revealed no significant main effect between either 
group in the first liberal rebound phase, t(26) = -0.16; p  > 0.05, or in the second 
liberal rebound phase, t(26) = -0.58; p  > 0.05. However by the third rebound phase 
there was a significant difference between the first time that the target thought re­
occurred between the ‘repeated suppression’ group and the suppress think-free 
group, t(26) = -1.84; p<0.05, suggesting that participants who repeatedly 
suppressed, by the third liberal rebound phase, experienced the target thought 
significantly more quickly than those in the ‘suppress think-free’ group
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Summary
The current results suggested that engaging in multiple indulgence cycles 
maintains the intrusion rate of an unwanted thought. Those who only suppressed 
once experienced a gradual decline in thought intrusions over the course o f the three 
comparable liberal rebound phases. The results also suggest that those participants 
who engaged in multiple indulgence cycles had the target thought re-occur 
significantly more quickly, in each comparable rebound phase, than those in the 
suppress think-free group.
2.2.3. Discussion
In Experiment 2 participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group 
demonstrated neither an increase nor decrease in target thought occurrences across 
suppression or liberal rebound phases. However, these participants did produce 
significantly more target thought occurrences in the liberal rebound phases when 
compared to the ‘suppress think-free’ group, whose intrusion rate significantly 
declined across liberal rebound phases. Additionally, the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group also had the target thought re-emerge significantly more quickly than the 
‘suppress think-free’ group across the three liberal rebound phases. These results 
seem to suggest that repeatedly engaging in attempted thought suppression will 
maintain the immediate enhancement effect and a rebound effect across time.
According to the Environmental Cueing Hypothesis (ECH), multiple 
indulgence cycles over time should cause an increase in the number of unwanted 
thoughts in both suppression and expression phases (Wegner, 1989). Our finding 
supports previous research that demonstrated no increase in the number o f unwanted 
thoughts across suppression and rebound phases (Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Williams 
& Mould, 2007). However, it is important to note that although repeated thought 
suppression may not cause an increase in unwanted thoughts during multiple 
indulgence cycles, it does appear to have a maintenance effect. Specifically, 
maintenance in the number of unwanted thoughts was found in both the suppression 
and liberal rebound phases for the ‘repeated suppression’ but not the ‘suppress think 
free’ group.
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The current study also involved a novel comparison between the latency until 
the occurrence of the first target thought in each liberal rebound phase, indicating a 
shorter latency between onset o f initial thought occurrence for the repeated 
suppression group in comparison to the suppress think free group. This analysis 
extends on the Environmental Cueing Hypothesis indicating that thought suppression 
and expression are cyclical in nature, that is, we alternate between phases of 
suppression and expression (think-free phases). When attempting to suppress a target 
thought, individuals will alternate between attempting to suppress and subsequently 
moving onto another activity to further distract themselves. At a later point the initial 
target thought will likely rebound (Wegner, 1989). Only one instance of the target 
thought is necessary for an individual to re-engage in a phase of attempted 
suppression. Thus, it suggests that the most important target thought in a liberal 
rebound phase may be the initial thought occurrence. The results o f the current study 
demonstrate that repeated suppression causes the target thought to re-enter 
significantly more quickly. This rapid re-occurrence of the target thought could 
represent the method by which the thought suppression becomes increasingly 
counterproductive, as across indulgence cycles, the thought continues to re-emerge 
more quickly.
Abramowitz et al (2001) found minor evidence for a Rebound Effect 
suggesting that attempted suppression may have longer term effects, this result was 
partly replicated in the current study as participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group continued to think of the target thought when they were provided with think- 
free instructions. However, the ECH would predict an escalation in the amount of 
intrusions during rebound phases, whereas the current experiment did not produce 
such an escalation. One possible explanation for this result could be the clinical 
nature of the experimental laboratory. Each participant completed the experiment in 
a blank room with no windows, thereby limiting the amount of external distracters. 
Possibly in a real life scenario, where multiple external distracters are available, the 
target thought would escalate in the rebound phase due to increasing number of 
distracters becoming associated with and thus cueing the target thought. Such an 
escalation would be consistent with Wegner’s (1989) ECH. Future research should
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provide participants with multiple distracters in order to determine whether these 
distracters would come to cue the target thought.
One issue worth noting in the current study is that the level o f effort involved 
in instructional adherence differed across groups, that is, the ‘repeated suppression’ 
group had to suppress the target thought for a total of 15 minutes whereas the 
‘suppress think free’ group only had to suppress the target for 5 minutes. This 
activity no doubt primed the thought in a way that did not occur for the free think 
group. Specifically, the participants in the ‘repeated suppression’ group were sitting 
inactive, monitoring thoughts, no doubt cycling between idle thoughts (e.g. what to 
have for lunch, what to do after the study, whether their roommate is angry about 
something, etc.) and a return to the task at hand -  “what am I doing? Oh yes, I’m 
suppressing thoughts about white bears...”). Whereas participants in the ‘suppress 
think free’ group were simply allowed to think about whatever they liked, with only 
one task, which was to register whether they had the target thought. It could 
reasonably be argued that the suppression instructions resulted in greater priming of 
the target thought than the think free instructions. However, in real life terms this 
reflects the distinction between two different coping strategies in dealing with 
unwanted thoughts, namely, attempted suppression versus acceptance of thought 
occurrence (for a detailed account of acceptance see Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2001). In addition to the issue of motivation there is also the possibility of 
habituation occurring, that is, perhaps participants in both groups through multiple 
five minute periods became less sensitive to the unwanted thought through repeated 
exposure, therefore decreasing the amount of unwanted thought intrusions signalled. 
Indeed, the results from the suppress think free group suggest that such habituation 
may have occurred. However, those repeatedly suppressing maintained the level of 
intrusions in both suppression and think free phases, suggesting that habituation does 
not occur when participants are given repeated suppression instructions.
One potential weakness with the current study was that no baseline group
was included in order to determine what the average number o f thought occurrences
would be without the suppression instruction. Rather than including a pre
experimental baseline to collate the number of pre experimental thoughts about the
target a between participant control group was employed in the current study in
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which participants were provided with no suppression instruction during the second 
two suppression phases. Importantly, a recent study by Marcks and Woods (2005) 
took a baseline measure of the amount of thought intrusions in a baseline five minute 
phase (identical to the experimental phase length herein) and found that the mean 
number of target thought occurrences in a group of undergraduate participants was
2.2. The ‘repeated suppression’ group from the current study reported between 4-6 
intrusions for each suppression and liberal think free phase, suggesting that the 
number of thoughts about a target was inflated when the target was a to-be- 
suppressed item. Finally, it is worth noting that all participants in Experiment 2 
were exposed to the self suppression instruction, this instruction was chosen as self 
suppression is the most widely employed suppression strategy in the thought 
suppression literature. Nevertheless it is possible that within self suppression, 
participants may have used multiple distracters or a focused distracter in their 
attempt to suppress. The variability between the two techniques would have an effect 
on the amount of unwanted thought intrusions; therefore future research should 
include post phase questions which ascertain the type of technique used.
The current study only exposed participants to three indulgence cycles, future 
research should include additional indulgence cycles in order to provide more 
information as to whether occurrence of the target thought would continue to be 
maintained across repeated suppression attempts, in both the repeated suppression 
and the suppress think-free groups, or whether after an increased number of 
suppression attempts the occurrence of the target thought would gradually fade. 
However, the findings herein provide tentative evidence that the occurrence of the 
target thought would be maintained across multiple indulgence cycles. Such 
maintenance highlights the counterproductive nature of suppression as a coping 
strategy for unwanted thoughts, a suggestion that has been iterated by behavioral and 
cognitive psychotherapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, 
Strosahl &Wilson, 1999).
2.3. Concluding Comments
Experiment 1 aimed to determine the effect that engaging in different
distraction techniques would have on unwanted thought intrusions in both the
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suppression and think free periods. When compared to baseline, an inflation o f target 
unwanted thoughts experienced in a suppression period would qualify as an 
immediate enhancement effect, whilst an inflation of target unwanted thoughts 
experienced in the think free phase would qualify as a rebound effect. The study 
found that engaging in multiple and self distraction caused both an immediate 
enhancement effect and a rebound effect, whilst engaging in focussed distraction 
obliterated both effects.
These results are consistent with Wegner’s (1989) ECH as well as being 
consistent with the stimulus equivalence theory of thought suppression that was 
described in the general introduction. Specifically, limiting the amount of distracters 
also limits the amount of environmental cues that serve to remind us of unwanted 
thoughts. At first glance this could be seen as having some important clinical 
relevance, however the idea of using focussed distraction as a way of dealing with 
unwanted thoughts becomes a ridiculous notion when one considers the way in 
which we generally live our lives; we do not live our lives in one room where there 
are no external reminders, but in a world where there are multiple 
distracters/reminders available to us. Considering such an inference is important for 
one crucial reason; the fact that engaging in multiple and self distraction, two 
techniques that reflect the types of strategies available to us on a daily basis, does not 
work, suggests that engaging in the suppression of unwanted thoughts, is indeed a 
futile strategy. In terms of both immediate enhancement and rebound, the results 
suggest that not only will one struggle to actively suppress a thought during a 
suppression period, but that thought will also re-appear and rebound at a later stage.
With the way in which thought suppression occurs in everyday life becoming 
the focal point o f this research, Experiment 2 aimed to study the effects of engaging 
in multiple indulgence cycles, which, according to Wegner (1989), mirrors the way 
in which we experience unwanted thoughts in an everyday sense. According to the 
ECH, the more one engages in thought suppression, the more external distracters will 
be used, meaning that more environmental reminders will serve to remind us o f the 
unwanted thought causing a gradual inflation o f the amount o f unwanted thought 
intrusions experienced.
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The results of Experiment 2, however, did not find such an inflation when the 
effects of repeatedly suppressing over time was studied. Specifically the results 
found that engaging in repeated suppression merely caused a maintenance of the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects, when compared to controls, instead of 
causing the expected inflation o f unwanted thoughts. Immediately this provides 
evidence which contradicts the ECH, and also the behavioural account o f thought 
suppression. However when one considers more closely the laboratory setting in 
which the study was conducted, it becomes apparent that these results should have 
perhaps been expected. Simply put, the aforementioned theories suggest that the 
more distracters there are the more one will experience the unwanted thought, 
however in an experimental setting where there are a limited amount of distracters 
present in the room, it is no surprise that such a ceiling effect was reached in terms of 
the amount of unwanted thought experienced. Despite not strictly adhering to the 
predictions of the ECH, Experiment 2, much like Experiment 1, seems to suggest 
that engaging in thought suppression is a futile strategy for dealing with unwanted 
thoughts, as the more one tries to banish an unwanted thought, the more that thought 
will appear, both during and after the suppression period.
In conclusion, Experiments 1 and 2 both lend support to the immediate 
enhancement effect and the rebound effect. However, in applied terms, it is difficult 
to suggest that the ironic results associated with the suppression of a neutral thought 
can also be generalized to the suppression of high valence thoughts. Considering that 
the majority of people experiencing psychological dysfunction are dealing with high 
valence, personally relevant thoughts, the need for thought suppression research 
utilising high valence thoughts becomes evident. Chapter 3 of the thesis will attempt 
to study the effects o f suppressing such high valence thoughts.
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Chapter 3
The immediate enhancement effect, the rebound
effect and valence.
3. Introduction
The counterproductive nature of thought suppression has been well 
documented in the literature and it has been demonstrated that people have difficulty 
suppressing a neutral thought (Lavy & Van den Hout, 1990; Rassin, Merkelback & 
Muris, 1997; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; Clark, Ball & Pape, 1991; Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994). Indeed Chapter 2 of the current thesis (Experiments 1 and 2) found 
that suppression attempts were futile, when participants attempted to suppress via 
multiple and self distraction techniques, both over a short and longer period of time. 
Interestingly, in accordance with previous literature, the use of focused distraction 
seemed to obliterate the immediate enhancement and rebound effects.
However, Muris et al (1992) suggested that the suppression of neutral 
thoughts may not generalize to psychopathology, suggesting instead that people are 
likely to engage in the suppression of personally relevant high valence thoughts. 
Personally relevant high valence thoughts refer to those thoughts which are most 
likely to bother people due to their meaningful nature. In particular neutral thoughts 
differ from high valence thoughts in how emotional they are, how familiar they are, 
how easily imaginable they are and how complex they are (Kelly & Kahn, 1994). In 
general, we tend to attempt to suppress thoughts which surround personally relevant 
and salient content, such as thoughts of a loved one for the bereaved, or thoughts of 
stimuli we are phobic o f (e.g., spiders, public speaking). The experiments reported in 
Chapter 2 only involved the manipulation of neutral thoughts. However, in the 
thought suppression literature a number of studies have examined the effects of 
suppressing high valence thoughts (see Sections 1.2.5 and 1.2.6). In order to measure 
the impact of suppressing high valence thoughts both behavioural and physiological 
measures have been employed. The results o f this body of research has been mixed, 
some studies have found behavioural effects (McNally & Ricciardi,1996; Muris et 
al, 1998; Wenzel et al, 2003) and some have not (Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Muris et al, 
1997). Some have found behavioural but no physiological effects (Petrie et al, 1998), 
some have found physiological effects but no behavioural effects (Gross & 
Levenson, 1993, 1997; Wegner et el, 1990; Wegner & Gold, 1995). Some have 
found that physiological effects of suppression are not linked to valence but that any
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attempted suppression elicits adverse physical responses (Muris et al, 1991, 1992, 
Cioffi & Hollaway, 1993).
The stimuli chosen in the thought suppression literature to manipulate 
valence stimuli have varied, for example, studies have used past relationships 
(Wegner & Gold, 1995), negative images (Davies & Clark, 1998) and phobic related 
material (Fawzy, Hecker and Clark, 2006). The most widely used clinically related 
stimuli have involved phobic related content. The recruitment of phobic populations 
has been the most popular for a number of reasons; first the incidence rate for 
specific phobias in the general population is between 10 and 11% (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), suggesting that many people are experiencing high 
valence unwanted phobia related thoughts. Second, the valence level across 
participants can be controlled for by employing standardised screening tools related 
to the specific target phobia. And third, research investigating specific phobias has 
suggested that thought suppression may be a causal and maintaining factor of the 
phobia (Wegner, 1989; Salkovskis, 1989). To date, a number of studies have been 
conducted on phobia related thoughts, as a method of studying the effects of 
attempted suppression of high valence unwanted thoughts. However, to date the 
findings are mixed with some of these studies demonstrating an effect o f valence 
(Wenzel, Barth and Holt, 2003; Amtz, Lavy, Van den Berg and Van Rijsoort, 1993), 
and others not doing so (Muris, Merkelbach, Horselenberg, Sijsenaar and Leeuw, 
1997; see Section 1.2.6)
Given the contradictory findings in the literature on thought suppression of
high valence personally relevant thought items, Chapter 3 aims to investigate
whether instructions to suppress an emotionally relevant (spider to spider-fearful)
and neutral (spider to non-spider-fearful) thought item would lead to an immediate
enhancement effect and/or a rebound effect. The first experiment (Experiment 3) in
the current chapter will replicate and extend on the first experiment in the second
chapter (Experiment 1); it will test the effects of self distraction, multiple distraction,
focused distraction and a baseline condition on unwanted thought occurrence, with
the inclusion of a high valence thought (spider) instead of a neutral one (white bear).
Experiment 4 aims to further explore the possible relationship between thought
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suppression and physiological arousal by introducing a physiological dependent 
variable; that is, it will involve exposing participants to the typical white bear 
preparation, while measuring each participant’s Skin Conductance Levels (SCL) for 
the duration of the experiment, in order to ascertain if the suppression of a high 
valence thought causes a different physiological reaction to the suppression of a low 
valence thought.
3.1 Experiment 3
The current experiment is the first to investigate systematic distraction 
techniques under the manipulation of valence. Specifically, it aims to investigate the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects, when a number of distraction 
techniques are employed. However, instead of employing a neutral thought as in 
Experiment 1, the valence of the thought will be manipulated. The manipulation of 
valence will be implemented in order to determine whether higher valence unwanted 
thoughts will cause an increase in the amount of unwanted thought intrusions during 
and after a suppression attempt. As mentioned in Section 1.2.6 o f Chapter 1, in 
general it is unlikely that human beings will engage in the suppression of neutral 
stimuli (Rachman & Hodson, 1980), suggesting that thought suppression studies 
which employ a neutral thought may lack ecological validity. Additionally, if  the 
suppression of high valence material causes an increase in the amount of unwanted 
intrusive thoughts, then such a finding could provide a possible mechanism for how 
unwanted thoughts form the basis for clinical obsessions which manifest themselves 
in various psychological disorders. The general aim of the current experiment is to 
determine whether the suppression of high valence thoughts will cause an increase in 
thought intrusions, when a number of distraction techniques are employed. A 
secondary aim o f the current chapter will be to determine whether the use o f a 
focused distracter, as opposed to self distraction, will reduce the immediate 
enhancement effect with a high valence thought, in the same manner as was 
observed with neutral thoughts.
To that end, the current study will employ the exact experimental paradigm 
to that of Experiment 1, with the addition of valence. Specifically 8 experimental
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groups will be recruited, that is two groups of participants (a spider fearful and non 
spider fearful group) will be exposed to a focused distraction, a multiple distraction, 
a self distraction and a baseline group. The dependent variable in the study will be 
the amount of unwanted thought intrusions each group experiences in both five 
minute periods; suppression and rebound. It is predicted, in accordance with the 
results from Experiment 1, and in accordance with the ECH, that spider fearful and 
non spider fearful participants from the focused distraction group will not 
demonstrate an immediate enhancement effect, i.e. they will not experience more 
intrusions than baseline, whereas the self and multiple distraction groups will. 
Secondly, it is expected that the spider fearful participants will experience 
significantly more unwanted thought intrusions than their non spider fearful 
counterparts across all three distraction techniques.
3.1.1. Method
Participants
128 undergraduates (91 female and 37 male) at Swansea University were 
paid 2 credits for their participation in the experiment (Mean age; 21.2 years, SD; 
5.902). The sample was non clinical. However participants were screened for 
depression, thought suppression tendencies and emotional avoidance, which resulted 
in the data from 8 participants being excluded (see later).
Design
The study involved a 4 (condition; self distraction, multiple distraction, 
focused distraction and baseline) x 2 (valence; spider fearful and non spider fearful) 
x 2 (phase; suppression and think free) mixed design with repeated measures on the 
third factor. The assignment of participants to experimental conditions, in terms of 
distraction technique, was randomized; 30 participants were assigned to the self 
distraction group, 30 were assigned to the multiple distraction group, 30 were 
assigned to the focused distraction group and 30 were assigned to the baseline group. 
However, within each distraction group, 15 participants were spider fearful and 15 
participants were non spider fearful. The dependent variable in this experiment was 
the amount of times the participants from each group would press the space bar in 
each of the two phases.
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Apparatus
The experiment was completed in a laboratory at Swansea University. The 
laboratory was quiet and free from distraction. It contained a desk, a chair, a standard 
computer (Processor) with a 14-inch screen and standard computer mouse. The 
participant’s responses were controlled by the computer program, which was created 
in Visual Basic™ 6.
Materials
In order to avoid confounding the results with high pre-experimental levels of 
emotional avoidance, excessive suppression or depression three screening 
questionnaires were administered. The questionnaires consisted of the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ II; Bond et al., under review), the White Bear 
Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck et al, 1961). See Experiment 1 for further details. The data for 8 
participants was removed due to high scores on the depression inventory (a score of 
10 or more warranted exclusion). The remainder of the participants scored within the 
normal range (overall mean scores: AAQ II = 50.55, SD = 9.21; WBSI = 47.71, SD 
= 7.83; BDI = 7.6, SD = 2.64). One additional measure was administered so that the 
participants could be divided into spider fearful and non spider fearful groups. In the 
current study a score of 50 plus on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; 
Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995, see appendix 5) warranted inclusion in the spider 
fearful group, whereas participants with scores of 40 and under were included in the 
non spider fearful group. (Average FSQ scores -  spider fearful self distraction group 
= 85.29, non spider fearful self distraction group = 31.24, spider fearful multiple 
distraction group = 88.83, non spider fearful multiple distraction = 28.31, spider 
fearful focused distraction group = 90.03, non spider fearful focused distraction 
group = 29.73, spider fearful baseline group = 84.92, non spider fearful baseline 
group = 29.63)
Procedure
On each subject’s arrival at the experimental lab, the participant was greeted
by a male experimenter. Upon completion of the consent form the participants were
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required to complete the FSQ, which resulted in assignment to the spider fearful or 
non spider fearful groups in one of the four experimental conditions (i.e., self 
distraction, multiple distraction, focused distraction or baseline). Before receiving 
experimental instructions each participant was seated in front of the computer screen 
in the laboratory. Loaded onto the computer was the five minute space bar program, 
which recorded the amount of times the participant pressed the space bar in the five 
minute period.
Self distraction group
If assigned to the self distraction group, whether spider fearful or non spider 
fearful, the following procedure occurred; via verbal and written instructions the 
participants were instructed that for the following five minute phase they had to try 
their best to suppress a certain. thought that would be given to them by the 
experimenter (the ‘unwanted thought’) and that if  they did happen to think of the 
‘unwanted thought’ in this five minute phase then they were required to press the 
space bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The instruction was as 
follows; ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a 'spider ’. Every time you  
have ‘spider ’ come to mind, though, please press the space bar in fron t o f  you \
After the initial five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and 
gave the participant the ‘think free’ instruction. Participants were told that for this 
final five minute phase that they could think about anything they liked (including the 
unwanted thought). The participants were again told that if they did happen to think 
of the ‘unwanted thought’ from stage 1 then they should continue to press the space 
bar each time the thought occurred and reoccurred. The instruction was as follows;
‘Now for the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  
however the thought o f  a ‘spider ’ happens to enter your mind, then you should press 
the space bar as before.'1
Multiple distraction group
If assigned to the multiple distraction group, whether spider fearful or non 
spider fearful, the following procedure occurred; participants were instructed, via
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verbal and written instructions, that for the following five minute phase they would 
have to try their best to suppress a certain thought that the experimenter would 
provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However they were told that in order to help them 
in their suppression attempt that 60 words (see appendix 4), which were presented in 
random order and appeared no more than one time each, would appear every five 
seconds on the computer screen in front of them, and that they should think of these 
words instead of the unwanted thought. Most importantly the participants were told 
that if they were to think of the unwanted thought then they must press the space bar 
on the computer keyboard each time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The 
instruction was as follows; ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a 
‘spider ’. Instead think o f  the words that will appear on the screen to distract 
yourself. However i f  you do have ‘spider ’ come to mind, though, please press the 
space bar in front o f  you
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
‘think free’ instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; '‘Now fo r the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a 'spider ’ happens to enter your mind, then you 
should press the space bar as before.’
Focused distraction group
If assigned to the focused distraction group, whether spider fearful or non 
spider fearful, the following procedure occurred; participants were instructed, via 
verbal and written instructions, that for the following five minute phase they would 
have to try their best to suppress a certain thought that the experimenter would 
provide (the ‘unwanted thought’). However they were told that in order to help them 
in their suppression attempt that they should focus on one thought instead, which in 
this case, was the thought o f a ‘red volkswagon’. Then the participants were told that 
if  they were to think of the unwanted thought then they must press the space bar on 
the computer keyboard each time the thoughts occurs and reoccurs. The instruction 
was as follows; ‘In the next five minutes please try not to think o f  a ‘spider ’. Instead
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try to think o f  a red volkswagon. However i f  you do have ‘spider ’ come to mind, 
though, please press the space bar in front o f  you ’.
After the five minute phase the researcher entered the room to administer a 
‘think free’ instruction for the second five minute phase. The instruction read as 
follows; ‘Now for the following five minute phase you are free to think o f  whatever 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘spider’ happens to enter your mind, then you  
should press the space bar as before.’
Baseline group
If assigned to the baseline group the participants received two ‘think free’ 
five minute phases. Before the first five minute phase the researcher, in written and 
verbal form, gave the following instruction, this was identical across both the spider 
fearful and non spider fearful groups; ‘Now for the following five minute phase you 
are free to think o f  whatever you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘spider’ happens to 
enter your mind, then you should press the space bar as before\ Upon completion of 
the first five minute phase the researcher re-entered the room and gave the identical 
‘think free’ instruction for the second time.
Finally, before commencing in the experiment, the importance of signalling 
the presence of each unwanted thought was stressed to each participant in each group 
via the following instruction; ‘i f  you should happen to think o f  ‘spider’ in either 
phase then it is important that you press the space bar each time it comes to m ind’. 
After completing the study, subjects were debriefed and their credit was 
administered.
3,1.2. Results
Questionnaires
In order to ensure that the participants did not differ in pre-experimental 
levels of depression, suppression and emotional avoidance pre-experimental 
screening questionnaires were administered. The average scores (see Table 5) seem 
to suggest little difference between groups. A 3 (Questionnaire) x 8 (Group) mixed
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ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Questionnaire, F (2, 224) = 845.971; 
p < 0.05, however no significant interaction was found between Questionnaire and 
Group, F (14, 224) = 1.111; p > 0.05, suggesting that there was no difference 
between each group in terms of questionnaire score. Subsequent post hoc Tukey tests 
additionally revealed no significant difference between any group on any measure at 
the 0.05 level.
Group AAQ WBSI BDI
Spider fearful self distraction group 50.93 (8.56) 46.46 (8.57) 6.73 (2.67)
Non spider fearful self distraction group 50.26 (6.93) 49.00 (5.86) 7.46 (3.18)
Spider fearful multiple distraction group 52.00 (7.38) 48.6 (5.48) 6.53 (2.69)
Non spider fearful multiple distraction group 50.46 (5.98) 49.66 (7.29) 7.46 (3.1)
Spider fearful focused distraction group 55.4 (8.53) 46.40 (7.72) 9.93 (4.02)
Non spider fearful focused distraction group 52.66 (8.35) 46.26 (6.27) 4.33 (3.87)
Spider fearful baseline group 44.93 (6.91) 48.46 (8.13) 9.5 (4.26)
Non spider fearful baseline group 47.73 (7.83) 46.86 (7.58) 8.86 (4.65)
Table 5. Mean (and standard deviation) scores fo r  each group on the AAQ, WBSI 
and BDI, Experiment 3.
Number o f  intrusions; suppression phase
One dependent variable in the study was the amount of times each participant 
pressed the space bar in the suppression phase. Figure 3 depicts the number o f times 
the spider fearful and non spider fearful participants pressed the spacebar (thus 
indicating the occurrence of the unwanted thought) during this phase, in terms of self 
distraction (spider fearful M = 11.33 SD = 4.98, non spider fearful M = 6.26 SD = 
7.95) multiple distraction (spider fearful M = 16.13 SD = 12.81, non spider fearful M 
= 6.6 SD = 7.34) focused distraction (spider fearful M = 11.86 SD = 10.76, non 
spider fearful M = 7.73 SD = 7.81) and baseline (spider fearful M = 5.46 SD = 3.31, 
non spider fearful M = 3.6 SD = 2.38). On visual inspection it can be seen from the 
figure that, in general, spider fearful participants experienced more unwanted
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thoughts than non spider fearful participants. Additionally the emergent trend 
suggests that the multiple distraction group experienced the most unwanted thought 
intrusions, however the focused distraction group did not experience the predicted 
reduction in unwanted thought intrusions.
Figure 3. Amount o f  unwanted thought intrusions, during the suppression phase, for 
each group in each condition, Experiment 3.
0  spider fearful 
□  non spider fearful
Self multiple focussed baseline
Groups
In order to determine whether any differences between the groups would 
emerge an omnibus mixed ANOVA, which included both the suppression and 
rebound phases was conducted. A 4 (Condition; self distraction, multiple distraction, 
focused distraction and baseline) x 2 (Valence; spider fearful and non spider fearful) 
x 2 (Phase; suppression and think free) revealed a significant main effect for Phase, 
F  (I, 112) = 13.610p  < 0.05, no significant interaction between Phase and Valence, 
F  (3, 112) = 1.443; p  > 0.05, a near to significant interaction between Phase and 
Condition F (1, 112) = 2.812 p  > 0.096, and no interaction across Phase, Valence 
and Condition F (3, 112) = 0.587p  > 0.05.
These results suggested that there were group differences within the
experiment that warranted further analysis. Therefore, a uni-variate between subjects
ANOVA was conducted on the suppression data from the 8 groups, this also
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revealed a significant main effect for Condition, F(7,112) = 4.112; = p  < 0.05, 
suggesting that there was a difference between groups in terms of distraction 
technique and valence.
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were conducted between the eight groups for the 
suppression phase. For the spider fearful groups, the analyses revealed no significant 
main effect between the self distraction group, the multiple distraction group and the 
focused distraction group. However, all three spider fearful groups experienced more 
unwanted thought intrusions than the spider fearful baseline group. This result 
suggests that an immediate enhancement effect exists when utilizing higher valence 
unwanted thoughts, across all distraction techniques. For the non spider fearful 
group, the analyses again revealed no significant main effect between the self 
distraction, multiple distraction and focused distraction groups; however, 
interestingly, there was also no difference between these three groups and the non 
spider fearful baseline group, suggesting that the use of a neutral thought in this 
experiment did not produce the immediate enhancement effect.
Finally, the results revealed a significant main effect for the number of 
unwanted thought intrusions, between the spider fearful and non spider fearful 
groups, in the self and multiple distraction groups. However no such effect was 
found for the focused distraction and baseline groups. This result suggests that when 
using a self or multiple distraction technique on high valence thoughts, that 
suppression is more difficult. However the use of focused distraction might loosen 
these effects of valence. Overall, all distraction techniques were futile in removing 
the immediate enhancement effect, however this was only found across high valence 
stimuli. Additionally, participants in the spider fearful groups tended to experience 
more unwanted thought intrusions than non spider fearful participants.
Number o f  intrusions; rebound/think free phase
The second dependent variable in the study was the amount of times each 
participant pressed the space bar in the think free phase. Figure 4 displays the results 
that the spider fearful and non spider fearful participants recorded during this phase, 
in terms of self distraction (spider fearful M = 9.13 SD = 6.26, non spider fearful M
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= 3.33 SD = 2.38) multiple distraction (spider fearful M = 11.2 SD = 10.16 , non 
spider fearful M = 4.3 SD = 5.87) focused distraction (spider fearful M = 6.73 SD = 
5.27, non spider fearful M = 5.73 SD = 5.99) and baseline (spider fearful M = 3.33 
SD = 2.96, non spider fearful M = 5.4 SD = 4.96). The figure seems to suggest that, 
in general, spider fearful participants will experience more unwanted thoughts than 
non spider fearful participants, in the period following attempted suppression. 
Secondly the figure suggests that the multiple distraction group experienced the most 
unwanted thought intrusions, while the focused distraction group seemed to display a 
minor reduction in unwanted thought intrusions compared to the other experimental 
groups.
Figure 4. Amount o f  unwanted thought intrusions, during the rebound phase, for 
each group in each condition, Experiment 3.
a  spider fearful 
□  non spider fearful
focussed baseline
Groups
The aforementioned omnibus test allowed further statistical analyses to be 
conducted on the groups in the rebound phase. Therefore a uni-variate between 
subjects ANOVA conducted on the rebound data revealed a significant main effect 
for Condition, F(7,112) = 3.346; = p  < 0.05, suggesting that there were differences 
between the groups in terms o f distraction technique and valence in this phase.
88
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests conducted on the spider fearful groups revealed no 
significant main effect between the self distraction group, the multiple distraction 
group and the focused distraction group. However each group recorded significantly 
more unwanted thought intrusions than the spider fearful baseline group, providing 
possible evidence of a rebound effect. In terms of the non spider fearful groups 
however, no such effects were found; no significant difference was found between 
each o f the three experimental groups and the non spider fearful baseline group, 
suggesting that the use o f a neutral thought removed the rebound effect. Finally, in 
the phase that followed attempted suppression spider fearful participants experienced 
more unwanted thought intrusions than non spider fearful participants in the self and 
multiple distraction conditions, however no such effect was found for the focused 
distraction or baseline groups. These results mirror the results found from the 
suppression phase. Specifically, all distraction techniques resulted in a rebound 
effect, but only during the suppression of a high valence thought. And secondly the 
spider fearful participants tended to press the space bar more than their non spider 
fearful counterparts.
Comparison Suppression Phase Rebound Phase
Self spider v self non spider t(28) = 2.090; p  < 0.05 t(28) =3.351;p <  0.05
Focused spider v focused non spider t(28) = 1.204;p >  0.05 ((28) = 0.845; p >  0.05
Multiple spider v multiple non spider t(26) = 2.500; p  < 0.05 t(26) = 2.265;p  < 0.05
Baseline spider v baseline non spider t(28) = 1.771;p  > 0.05 t(2 8 )= -1.383;p >  0.05
Self spider v focused spider t(28) = -0.174; p >  0.05 t(28) = 1.135;p >  0.05
Self spider v multiple spider t(26) = -1.352; p >  0.05 t(26) =-0.670;p >  0.05
Self spider v baseline spider t(28) = 3.798; p  <0.05 t(28) = 3.240; p  < 0.05
Focused spider v multiple spider t(28) = 0.988; p  > 0.05 t(28) = 1.511;p >  0.05
Focused spider v baseline spider t(26)= 2.201; p <  0.05 t(26) =2.177;p <  0.05
Multiple spider v baseline spider t(28) =3.122; p <  0.05 t(28) =2.877;p >  0.05
Self non spider v focused non spider t(28) = -0.509; p >  0.05 t(2 8 )= -1.441; p >  0.05
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Self non spider v multiple non spider t(26) = -0.119; p >  0.05 t(26) = -0 .611;p >  0.05
Self non spider v baseline non spider t(26) = 1.243; p  > 0.05 t(26) = -1.453; p >  0.05
Focused non spider v multiple non spider t(26) —0.409; p  > 0.05 t(2 6 )= -0.646;p >  0.05
Focused non spider v baseline non spider t(28) = 1.959; p >  0.05 t(28)=  0.166;p >  0.05
Multiple non spider v baseline non spider t(26) = 1.504; p >  0.05 t(26) = -0.537; p >  0.05
Table 6. The post hoc Tukey HSD tests fo r  both phases across all conditions, 
Experiment 3.
Finally, paired sample t tests were conducted to determine if  any differences 
emerged, in terms o f thought intrusions, between the suppression and think free
distraction spider fearful group t(14) = 1.551, ; > 0.05, for the self distraction non 
spider fearful group t(14) = 1.387, ; > 0. 05, for the multiple distraction spider 
fearful group t(14) = 1.540, ; > 0.05, for the focused distraction non spider fearful 
group t(14) = 0.915, ; > 0.05 and for the baseline non spider fearful group t(14) = - 
1.704, ; > 0.05. The participants in these groups pressed the space bar a similar 
amount o f times in both the suppression and think free periods; finding no rebound 
effect in the strictest sense of its definition. However participants in the multiple 
distraction non spider fearful group t(14) = 2.527, ; < 0.05, the focused distraction 
spider fearful group t(14) = 2.343, ; < 0.05 and the baseline spider fearful group 
t(14) = 2.849, ; < 0.05 pressed the space bar significantly more in the suppression 
period than the think free period, thereby finding a reversal of a rebound effect.
In summary, all distraction groups, which employed a high valence thought, 
resulted in an immediate enhancement effect and a rebound effect, whereas no such 
effect was found with the neutral thought. Secondly, spider fearful participants 
tended to press the space bar significantly more than non spider fearful participants. 
Thirdly, participants did not experience an inflation in unwanted thought occurrence 
during the think free phase.
phases within each group. The results showed no significant main effect for the self
3.1.3. Discussion
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The results of the current experiment somewhat contradict the experimental 
predictions. It was predicted that all participants in the multiple and self distraction 
groups would experience the immediate enhancement and rebound effects. However 
the effects were only demonstrated for the spider fearful groups, suggesting that the 
immediate enhancement effect and rebound effect only exist for high valence 
stimuli. Second, it was predicted that all focused distraction groups would 
experience no immediate enhancement effect or rebound effect. The non spider 
fearful focused distraction group did not experience either; however the spider 
fearful focused distraction group experienced significantly more unwanted thought 
intrusions in both phases than the spider fearful baseline group, thereby suggesting 
that the use of a high valence unwanted thought makes even focused distraction a 
futile suppression strategy. Finally it was predicted that spider fearful participants 
would press the space bar more than non spider fearful participants. This effect was 
found for the self and multiple distraction groups, suggesting that the suppression of 
a high valence thought is more difficult than that o f a neutral one. However, no such 
effect was found for the spider fearful focused distraction group, who despite scoring 
significantly more than the spider fearful baseline group, did not outscore the non 
spider fearful focused distraction group; suggesting that focused distraction might 
loosen the effects of suppressing a high valence thought.
The findings from the comparison of distraction techniques indicate that none 
of the distraction techniques were successful in suppressing the high valence target 
thought. Additionally, the results demonstrated that when a high valence word was 
the target of suppression, the suppression via these distraction techniques was more 
pronounced than that o f the neutral thought. In the Wegner et al (1987) original 
white bear study participants were required to self distract, that is, they had to 
provide their own distracters to rid themselves of the unwanted thought. Experiment 
3 replicated this effect with the additional manipulation of valence. Specifically, the 
study found that the high valence group had the unwanted thought enter 
consciousness significantly more than the low valence group. Wegner (1989) 
suggested that having distracters that were sufficiently absorbing could remove the 
ironic effects of suppression. However when participants were given distracters
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every 5 seconds, they continued to have the unwanted thought enter consciousness 
an inflated number of times. Finally, Wegner et al (1987) suggested that a focused 
distracter should have been more successful in facilitating attempted suppression. 
However, the current results demonstrated, in direct contrast to the results of 
Experiment 1, that spider fearful participants using focused distraction had the 
unwanted thought enter consciousness a similar amount of times to the multiple and 
self distraction groups, and significantly more than the baseline group, suggesting 
that emotional valence renders even the focused distraction technique futile. One 
explanation for such a finding could be accounted for by the ECH; specifically the 
ECH predicts that the more distracters there are, the more difficult the unwanted 
thought is to suppress due to environmental cues. It is possible within this scenario 
that the meaningful nature of the unwanted thought made all attempts at focused 
distraction futile, causing the participant to engage in other distraction attempts, 
thereby extending the amount of environmental reminders.
The results of the experiment provide support that a personally relevant, high 
Valence thought is more difficult to suppress than a neutral one. The results may be 
of interest to those researching the development and maintenance of phobias, and in 
turn could be of interest to those who treat other psychological disorders to which 
thought suppression has been linked. Specifically the current study shows that 
phobic individuals have the unwanted thought enter consciousness far more than a 
neutral thought, regardless of distraction techniques used; indicating that valence o f 
the to-be-suppressed item has an effect on how much that unwanted thought enters 
the mind. This high thought occurrence could be a maintaining factor in any disorder 
as the more one avoids the unwanted thought the more that thought appears.
Nevertheless, one possible criticism of Experiment 3 might be the self report 
nature of the dependent measure employed (i.e., pressing the spacebar to indicate the 
occurrence of the unwanted thought, see Section 1.2.8). And despite receiving 
elements of support (Rassin, 2005), the need for other methods of measuring the 
effects of thought suppression has gained increasing coverage in the literature 
(Purdon & Clark, 2000). With this in mind Experiment 4 of the thesis aimed to
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employ an additional measure, that is, a physiological measure of the effects of 
attempted thought suppression.
3.2. Experiment 4
Experiment 3 found behavioural differences between spider fearful and non 
spider fearful participants in terms of the number of emergent unwanted thought 
intrusions during and immediately after a suppression attempt. Specifically, spider 
fearful participants have the unwanted thought occur significantly more than non 
spider fearful participants. In terms of a link between thought suppression and 
clinical disorders, these results suggest that attempted suppression of personally 
relevant thoughts may contribute, to and facilitate the maintenance of clinical 
problems such as phobias (Wegner, 1989; Salkovskis, 1989) simply due to the 
inflated number of intrusions experienced when attempting to suppress high valence 
thoughts.
However, as the self report nature of the typical Wegner paradigm has been 
Criticized (Purdon & Clark, 2000), other means of determining the effects of 
attempted thought suppression are important to measure, for this reason the current 
study will measure each participants physiological reactions whilst undertaking the 
typical Wegner paradigm. If suppressing personally relevant thoughts causes an 
increase in physiological arousal then this too would provide further tentative 
evidence of the counterproductive effects of attempted suppression. The 
physiological effects o f thought suppression have been measured in a number of 
ways; heart beat, respiratory functions, lymphocyte count etc (Borkovec, 1974; 
Gross & Levenson, 1997; Petrie, Booth & Pennebaker, 1998; see Section 1.2.7). 
However the primary way in which participant’s physiology has been measured in 
this area is via Skin Conductance Levels (SCL).
The current study aims to add further evidence to a growing body of
literature on thought suppression, valence and physiology. To that end, the
traditional ‘white bear’ procedure as used by Wegner and Gold (1995; see section
1.2.7 for further details), in a study that directly target valence, will be employed,
comprising of three 5 minute phases; 1) the think free phase, 2) the suppression
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phase, and 3) the liberal rebound phase. In order to manipulate valence, the 
behavioural and physiological results of spider fearful participants will be compared 
to that of non spider fearful participants. Such an experimental paradigm using this 
sub clinical population has been previously employed in the thought suppression 
literature (Muris, Merkelbach, Horselenberg, Sijsenaar & Leeuw, 1997; Amtz, Lavy, 
Van den Berg & Van Rijsoort, 1993) and may serve to strengthen/weaken the current 
links between thought suppression and the development of phobias. Despite spider 
fearful populations being studied in a variety of thought suppression based 
experiments, no study to date has employed physiological equipment with this 
group. The study will involve a between group comparison (comprising o f spider 
fearful, non spider fearful and baseline groups) across two dependent measures 
(thought intrusions and skin conductance level). One point worth noting is that each 
of the groups in the current experiment will employ self distraction during the five 
minute suppression period. This distraction method has been chosen for four reasons. 
Firstly, self distraction is the primary way in which we address unwanted thoughts in 
everyday life (Wegner, 1989). Secondly, self distraction is the type of distraction 
technique employed in the majority o f thought suppression related research. In 
addition to this, and perhaps more importantly, the results of Experiment 1 and 3 
revealed that the only distraction technique which provides some alleviation of the 
immediate enhancement effect is focused distraction. However, according to the 
ECH engaging in focused distraction in everyday life is impossible due to continual 
exposure to environmental stimuli that will remind us of the to-be-suppressed target. 
And finally, given that in Experiment 3 no difference was found between each of the 
distraction techniques when valence was manipulated, the most appropriate 
technique for Experiment 4 is self distraction.
3.2.1. Method
Participants
64 students at Swansea University received course credit for their 
participation in the experiment (49 were female and 15 were male, mean age; 19.77 
years, SD; 1.53). The sample was non clinical.
94
Design
The study had a 2 (group: spider-fearful or non spider-fearful) x 3 (phase: 
think free, suppress/liberal rebound and liberal rebound) x 2 (condition; experimental 
or baseline) mixed design with repeated measures on the second factor. This left four 
groups of participants; a spider fearful and a non spider fearful group completing the 
experimental condition, and a spider fearful and non spider fearful group completing 
the baseline condition. There were two dependent variables, 1) amount of spacebar 
presses recorded in the second and third phases and 2) skin conductance level (SCL) 
across each of the three phases. It must be clarified that despite there being three five 
minute phases, all three phases will only be analyzed for the SCL dependent 
variable, whilst the behavioural dependent variable (space bar presses) only involves 
data from the 2nd and 3rd phases. It would have been possible to provide a think free 
instruction in the first phase so that the phase could be included in the behavioural 
analysis; however the aim of this phase was simply to measure a baseline SCL. If a 
think free instruction were included then this may have affected the baseline SCL 
reading as they would have a slightly different task to those who having no contact 
with the unwanted thought in this phase.
Stimuli 
Screening questionnaires
Three screening measures were administered: Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (AAQ II; Bond et al, under review), White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996) to screen for pre-experimental levels o f emotional avoidance, anxiety, 
thought suppression and depression, respectively. Most participants fell within a 
normal range however the data of four participants was excluded due to high scores 
on the depression inventory (a score o f 10+ on the BDI qualified as a high score). 
The overall mean scores were: AAQ II = 51, WBSI = 48.5, BDI = 5.78. As with 
experiment 3, the FSQ was again administered to participants in order to ascertain 
the spider fearful and non spider fearful groups. (Average FSQ scores -  spider
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fearful experimental group = 85.29, spider fearful baseline group = 87.6, non spider 
fearful experimental group = 27.93, non spider fearful baseline group = 25.42)
Skin Conductance Level (SCL) Measurement
Electrodes were attached with Velcro fasteners to the second phalanges of the 
first and third fingers of the participants’ non dominant hand (Fowles, Christie, 
Edelberg, Grings, Lykken & Venables, 1981). The electrodes were connected to an 
ADI instruments ML865 Powerlab 4/25 T System, which continuously monitored 
and recorded SCL during the study. SCL was measured in Volts (V) and recorded 
every second during each phase; these measurements, for each five minute phase, 
were collated to create an overall average SCL. SCL elevation was derived from the 
difference between the participants baseline SCL in the initial think free five minute 
phase in comparison with SCL in the two later phases.
Procedure
On each participant’s arrival at the prescribed room, the participant was 
greeted by a male experimenter. Before commencing the study participants were 
required to complete the consent form, the screening questionnaires and the FSQ. 
Before receiving experimental instructions each participant was seated in front of the 
computer screen in the laboratory. Loaded onto the computer was the five minute 
space bar program, which recorded the amount of times the participant pressed the 
space bar in the five minute period. All participants, regardless o f group, were 
provided with the target word/thought ‘spider’.
Experimental Condition
After having the electrodes attached participants entered a five minute think 
free phase which served as a baseline SCL measure. The instruction for this phase 
was as follows; ‘In the next five minutes, you are free to think o f  what you like. ’ The 
participants then entered the second phase of the study, the suppression phase, for 
which they received the following instructions; Ln the next five minutes, try your
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best not to think o f  a ‘spider Every time you do think o f  a ‘spider ’ please press the 
space bar on the computer in front o f  y o u ’. Finally the participants were cycled into 
a liberal rebound phase and instructed as follows; ‘In the next five minutes, you are 
free to think o f  what you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘spider’ does enter your 
awareness then please press the space bar ju s t as before ’.
Baseline Condition
After having the electrodes attached the participants in the baseline group 
also entered a five minute think free phase which served as a baseline SCL. The 
instruction being ‘In the next five minutes, you are free to think o f  what you like. ’ 
The participants then entered the second five minute phase where they were given 
the liberal rebound instruction ‘In the next five minutes, you are free to think o f  what 
you like. I f  however the thought o f  a ‘spider ’ does enter your awareness then please 
press the space bar ju s t as before ’. Finally participants entered the third five minute 
phase where they again received the liberal rebound instruction.
To summarise, the experimental condition participants completed a think free 
phase, a suppression phase and a liberal rebound phase, whilst the baseline 
participants completed a think free phase, followed by two liberal rebound phases. 
All participants were instructed to keep their non dominant hand as still as possible 
during the course o f the experiment. Upon completion of the study, subjects were 
debriefed and course credit was allocated to them.
3.2.2. Results
Questionnaire Measures
In order to avoid confounding the results participants in each of the four
groups had to score similarly on each of the screening questionnaires. A 4 (Group;
spider fearful experimental, spider fearful baseline, non spider fearful experiment,
non spider fearful baseline) x 3 (Questionnaire; AAQ II, WBSI, BDI) mixed
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for Questionnaire, F(l, 58) = 0.508; p
> 0.05, and no significant interaction between Group and Questionnaire, F  (3, 58) =
0.274 ; p  > 0.05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests (see Table 7) indicated that there were
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no differences on these questionnaires, between the spider fearful experimental 
group (AAQ II = 51.52, WBSI = 48.88, BDI = 6.41), the spider fearful baseline 
group (AAQ II = 49.86, WBSI = 49.83, BDI = 6.46), the non spider fearful 
experimental group (AAQ II = 53.4, WBSI = 46.66, BDI = 5.2) and the non spider 
fearful baseline group (AAQ II = 49.47, WBSI = 51.05, BDI = 5.11).
Comparison AAQ WBSI BDI
Spider exp v non spider exp t(32) =  -0.414 t(32) =  0.268 t(32) = 0.030
Spider exp v spider base t(30) = 1.174 t(30) = -1.914 t(30) = -0.732
Spider exp v non spider base t(29) = -0.573 t(29) =  0.672 t(29) =  -0.762
Non spider exp v spider base t(30) =  0.487 {(30)  =  -1.518 t(30) = -0.578
Non spider exp v non spider base t(29) =  1.444 t(29) = -1.976 t(29) = 0.107
Spider base v non spider base t(2 7 )= -0.140 t(27)= -0.372 t(2 7 )= -1.004
Table 7. The difference between each group on the various questionnaires. All non 
significant at the 0.05 level, Experiment 4.
Behavioral measure: Thought Intrusions
The amount o f times each participant pressed the space bar in the second and 
third five minute phases served as one dependent variable. Figure 5 shows how the 
amount of space bar presses differed between groups; the spider fearful experimental 
group (2nd phase M = 8.58, 3rd phase M = 4.13) appeared to press the space bar more 
than the non spider fearful experimental group (2nd phase M = 3.71, 3rd phase M = 
2.17), the spider fearful baseline group (2nd phase M = 4.06, 3rd phase M = 2.93) and 
the non spider fearful baseline group (2nd phase M = 4, 3rd phase M = 2).
Figure 5. The amount o f  times participants pressed the space bar in the second and 
third five minute phases, Experiment 4.
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A 2 (Phase; experimental or baseline) x 4 (Group; spider fearful 
experimental, spider fearful baseline, non spider fearful experimental, non spider 
fearful baseline) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group, F  (1, 
56) = 18.56, p  < 0.05, and a significant interaction between Phase and Group, F (2, 
56) = 3.729; p  < 0.05 Subsequently post hoc Tukey HSD tests were conducted on 
the data to determine where the differences were.
First, the tests were performed on the data from the 2nd phase. The 
experimental groups in this phase received a suppression instruction, whereas the 
baseline groups received a liberal rebound instruction. The results revealed a 
significant main effect between the spider fearful experimental group and the non 
spider fearful experimental group, t(32) = 2.283, p  < 0.05, the spider fearful baseline 
group, t(30) = 2.017, p  < 0.05, and the non spider fearful baseline group, t(29) = 
2.008, p < 0.05, suggesting that the spider fearful group had the unwanted thought 
‘spider’ occur significantly more often than those in each o f the other groups. 
However, no significant main effect was found, between the non spider fearful
99
Vj IICI^LCI J
experimental group and the spider fearful baseline group, t(30) = -0.308, p  > 0.05 
between the non spider fearful experiential group and the non spider fearful baseline 
group, t(29) = -0.258, p  > 0.05 and between the spider fearful baseline group and the 
non spider fearful baseline group t(27) = 0.059, p  > 0.05. Thus, the non spider 
fearful participants who were required to suppress experienced the same amount of 
thought intrusions as those with no suppression instruction.
Second, a series o f post hoc Tukey HSD tests were conducted on the 3rd 
phase. For this phase each group received liberal rebound instructions. The results 
revealed a significant main effect between the spider fearful experimental group and 
the non spider fearful experimental group, t(32) = 2.062, p  < 0.05, and between the 
spider fearful experimental group and the non spider fearful baseline group, t(29) = 
2.462, p  < 0.05, suggesting that, in the phase following attempted suppression, the 
spider fearful experimental group had the thought come to mind significantly more 
than the experimental and baseline non spider fearful groups. However importantly, 
no significant main effect was discovered between the spider fearful experimental 
group and the spider fearful baseline group t(29) = 1.047, p  > 0.05, suggesting that 
in the liberal rebound phase, spider fearful participants without any prior suppression 
instruction will indicate just as many thought intrusions as those with who have 
undergone a 5 minute suppression phase beforehand. Finally no significant 
differences were found between the non spider fearful experimental group and the 
spider fearful baseline group, t(30) = -0.695, p  > 0.05 between the non spider fearful 
experiential group and the non spider fearful baseline group, t(29) = -0.216, p >  0.05 
and between the spider fearful baseline group and the non spider fearful baseline 
group t(27) = 899, p  > 0.05, suggesting that non spider fearful participants who had 
previously undergone a suppression phase, did not experience any greater intrusion 
rebound than those who had not undergone a suppression phase.
In summary, the spider fearful group experienced an immediate enhancement
eifeefceffect; they had the unwanted thought intrude significantly more than baseline
and the non spider fearful groups. However the non spider fearful group did not
experience such an increase; suggesting that only under the high valence condition
did an immediate enhancement effect occur. The liberal rebound analysis revealed
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that those participants in the two spider fearful groups experienced a significantly 
greater thought intrusion in comparison to the other groups, regardless o f whether 
they had received a suppression or baseline instruction; questioning the validity o f 
any rebound effect.
Physiological measure; Skin Conductance Levels (SCL)
Each group o f participants had their SCL measured for each o f the three five 
minute phases. Figure 6 displays the differences between each phase and each group. 
The figure appears to show little difference between the spider fearful experimental 
group ( l sl phase = 2.056, 2nd phase = 5.408, 3rd phase = 6.899), the non spider fearful 
experimental group (1st phase = 3.299, 2nd phase = 6.419, 3rd phase = 7.918), the 
spider fearful baseline group (1st phase = 1.31, 2nd phase = 5.69, 3rd phase = 8.31) 
and the non spider fearful baseline group (1st phase = 2.27, 2nd phase = 5.69, 3rd 
phase = 8.27).
Figure 6. The average SCL fo r  each group in each five minute phase, Experiment 4.
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fearful baseline, non spider fearful suppression and non spider fearful baseline) 
mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect for phase, F  (2, 120) = 121.72; p  < 
0.05, however no interaction was found between phase and group, F  (6,120) = 
1.270; p  > 0.05, suggesting that significant differences were emerging between each 
phase, but not between each group.
In terms of phase, paired sample t tests revealed, regardless of group, a 
significant main effect between the first five minute phase and the second, t(63) = - 
10.007; p  < 0.05, between the first five minute phase and the third t(63) = -12.336;p  
< 0.05, and between the second five minute phase and the third, t(63) = -7.329; p  < 
0.05. This result suggests that all groups, whether they had received a suppression 
instruction or not, experienced a significant increase in their physiological arousal 
from the first to the second to the third five minute phase. In terms of group, 
however, post hoc Tukey tests revealed no significant main effect between each of 
the four groups for any of the three phases (see Table 8). This suggests that all 
groups, regardless of whether they had received a suppression instruction or not, 
experienced the same increase in physiological arousal.
Comparison 1st phase 2nd phase 3rd phase
Spider exp v non spider exp t(32) = -0.909 t(32) = -0.531 t(32) = -0.526
Spider exp v spider base t(30) = 0.646 t(30) = -0.368 t(30) = -0.768
Spider exp v non spider base t(29) = -0.258 t(29) = -0.201 t(29) = -0.767
Non spider exp v spider base t(30) = 1.155 t(30) = 0.149 t(30) = -0.177
Non spider exp v non spider base t(29) = 0.633 t(29) = 0.343 t(29) = -0.162
Spider base v non spider base t(27) = -0.722 t(27) = -0.185 t(27) = 0.019
Table 8. The difference between SCL each group across all phases. All non 
significant at the 0.05 level, Experiment 4.
In summary, all participants experienced a significant increase in 
physiological arousal from the first to the second to the third five minute phase, 
however no group differences emerged. The implications of this are twofold; not
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only does a high valence thought not cause an increase in physiological arousal 
compared to a low valence thought, but additionally the act of engaging in 
suppression may not cause any physiological effects, when compared to a baseline 
group.
3.2.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 revealed that a spider fearful participant 
suppressing thoughts of spider will think of that thought significantly more than a 
non spider fearful suppression participant, and a baseline group participant. 
Therefore, demonstrating an immediate enhancement effect and suggesting that the 
suppression of a high valence thought is more difficult than that of a low valence 
thought. In addition to this, the non spider fearful participants, who had to suppress 
thoughts o f spider, did not have the unwanted thought come to mind any more than a 
non spider fearful baseline group with no suppression instruction, suggesting that 
suppression of a neutral thought does not result in an immediate enhancement effect. 
This replicates the results of Experiment 3, whilst contradicting the results of 
Experiment 1, which found an immediate enhancement effect whilst employing 
neutral thought. The finding has important implications as it suggests that the ironic 
effects associated with thought suppression may only be evident when the target 
thought is o f a high valence nature to the participants. In terms of the liberal rebound 
phase, the result showed that those in the spider fearful groups experienced a greater 
amount o f thought intrusions, in comparison to the non spider fearful groups, 
regardless of whether they had received a suppression instruction, thereby casting 
doubt on the idea of a ‘rebound effect’. In terms o f the physiological measure, the 
results of the study seemed to show that general suppression, whether the target 
thought is a high valence one or not, does not have any effect on SCL.
O f the studies which only measured thought suppression behaviourally, Kelly 
and Kahn (1994) and Muris et al (1997) found that suppression of a personally 
relevant thought did not cause an increase in intrusion rate. The current results 
however concur with the results of McNally and Ricciardi (1996), Muris et al (1998) 
and Wenzel et al (2003) who found that a high valence thought produced an increase
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in reported intrusions. All o f the studies that combined both behavioural and 
physiological measures, Wegner et al (1990), Wegner and Gold (1995) and Gross 
and Levenson (1993; 1997) found that participants did not differ behaviourally. 
There was no difference in reported intrusions between the high valence and low 
valence groups. However, these researchers did find a physiological effect, that is, 
participants in the high valence groups experienced higher physiological arousal than 
those in the low valence group. The results of the current study are the reverse. It 
was found that the high valence group reported more thought intrusions, however a 
difference between groups in terms of SCL did not emerge.
Muris et al (1991; 1992) found that the neutral group reported significantly 
more thought intrusions than the high valence group. However, in the current results 
the opposite pattern emerged, that is, the spider fearful participants reported more 
thought intrusions than the low valence groups. Muris et al (1991; 1992) did, 
however, show minor SCL effects for suppression and did not report any SCL 
effects for valence. The results of the current study are in contrast to these findings in 
that all participants, regardless o f condition, experienced the same physiological 
effects. Finally, Cioffi and Hollaway (1993) found both elevated thought intrusion 
and SCL in the high valence group. The results partly support this in terms of the 
number of thought intrusions, however, the current SCL data do not support this 
finding. One potential reason for the contradictory results reported herein and 
previous experimental work might be the sub clinical nature of the population 
involved. Despite previous work employing similar experimental paradigms to 
Experiment 4, none of these studies recruited sub clinical populations and nor did 
they measure SCL in phobic populations, instead they manipulated valence by 
employing high emotional unwanted thoughts in a typical population (Muris et al., 
1991; 1992; Gross & Levenson, 1993; 1997; Wegner & Gold, 1995),
Despite providing tentative support that engaging in the suppression of high 
valence material may produce an increased number of thought intrusions compared 
to the suppression of a neutral thought, the physiological results found are somewhat 
disappointing and warrant further discussion. First, with a lack of research studying 
thought suppression, SCL and spider fear, it is impossible to know the normal SCL
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response that a spider fearful participant might have. And given that the spider 
fearful group was sub clinical, it is possible that being instructed to not think of a 
‘spider’ was not high valence enough to cause a significant physiological response.
Second, the physiological data does show a distinct increase from baseline, to 
the second period and then to the third period, with no apparent difference between 
groups. Without the inclusion of the baseline study groups, the result would suggest 
that merely engaging in suppression of any type, whether high valence or not, causes 
an increase in physiological arousal. Interestingly, however, the baseline group 
experienced similar increases in SCL across each of the five minute periods. On 
visual inspection, the result would seem to suggest that no physiological effect was 
found. However, this of course raises the following question. Why then did the 
participants experience an increase in physiological arousal across phases? Although 
purely tentative, one potential explanation for this anomaly might be post 
experimental debriefing sessions with the baseline participants. A number of 
baseline participants informed the experimenter that after the liberal rebound 
instruction they immediately engaged in a suppression attempt. If this were the case 
then this would explain how the experimental and baseline groups experienced 
similar physiological responses. Of course, in order to support this assumption 
another ‘baseline’ group would need to be recruited in which no instruction was 
provided during three consecutive five minute periods.
Overall, the results of the study suggest that trying to suppress a high valence 
thought is more difficult than suppressing a low valence thought. The physiological 
results suggest that suppression, regardless of valence, has no effect on SCL. 
However, it is possible that participants in the baseline group engaged in suppression 
attempts naturally despite receiving the baseline instruction. This not only casts new 
light on the results o f the current study, but it also casts doubt on the validity of any 
baseline condition included in thought suppression research. Further research is 
needed in order to fully explore this possibility, for example a baseline condition 
could be compared to a suppression condition on an implicit measure.
3,3. Concluding comments
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The results of the current chapter seem to suggest that the suppression of high 
valence thoughts cause an immediate enhancement and rebound effects, whereas the 
suppression of neutral stimuli does not. This result is directly contradictory to the 
results of Experiment 1, which found that the suppression of neutral stimuli resulted 
in both effects. Although these results might, at first glance, appear disappointing, 
assuming that individuals do not generally engage in the suppression of neutral 
stimuli, the results o f Chapter 3 provide strong evidence that an immediate 
enhancement effect and a rebound effect does exist with the most critical type of 
thought in this area, that is a high valence unwanted thought. This finding may have 
applied relevance. Specifically, it is possible that the increased intrusions rate of a 
high valence unwanted thought might play some part in the aetiology and 
maintenance of some psychopathologies.
Overall, the results of Experiments 1 -4 broadly suggest that mental control 
via thought suppression, which has been explored via a number of distraction 
techniques, and over both short and longer periods of time, is futile. Chapter 4 of the 
current thesis aims to explore why thought suppression is so difficult by employing a 
novel paradigm in order to extend on Wegner’s (1989) Environmental Cueing 
Hypothesis.
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Chapter 4
A behavioural account of thought suppression
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4. Introduction
Despite the prevalence of suppression as a coping strategy for unwanted 
thoughts, the literature suggests that it is frequently unsuccessful and indeed can be 
highly counterproductive (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes & Scott, 1999). In order to 
account for the counterproductive effects of thought suppression, Wegner (1989) has 
proposed the ‘Environmental Cueing Hypothesis’ (ECH). According to ECH, 
suppression involves two cognitive control processes (Wegner & Erber, 1992). One 
process, which is not under conscious control, and is known as the automatic target 
search, automatically searches through consciousness for evidence of the unwanted 
thought. A second, intentional or consciously controlled process, referred to as the 
controlled distracter search, searches through memory and the environment looking 
for distracting information. As the automatic process does not require continuous 
monitoring it can detect evidence of the unwanted thought more rapidly than an 
individual can consciously generate distracters. As a result, the unwanted thought re- 
emerges into consciousness and becomes associated with the intended distracter so 
that henceforward the distracter may be more likely to cue the unwanted thought. 
Once the first distracter has thus effectively failed to divert attention from the 
unwanted thought other distracting thoughts are generated. However, the same 
process occurs and eventually a number of (intended distracter) stimuli within 
memory and the environment have become associated with the unwanted thought 
and exposure to these previously encountered distracters prompts the re-emergence 
of the unwanted thought into consciousness to an even greater extent. The end result 
is hyper-accessibility o f the unwanted thought during a suppression episode, and 
rebound of the thought following the attempt to suppress.
To date, three principal empirical studies have examined the validity o f the 
ECH (Wegner, Schneider, Knutson & McMahon, 1991; Wegner & Erber, 1992; 
Najmi & Wegner, 2008). In the first o f these studies participants were exposed to 
three five minute periods (Wegner et al., 1991). 1) Participants were instructed to 
suppress a target thought (i.e., thoughts of a white bear) whilst a slideshow of neutral 
images was shown in the background (Slideshow A). 2) Participants were required to 
express thoughts of the target (i.e., white bear) whilst the second slideshow, of 
neutral but different content was shown in the background (i.e., Slideshow B). 3)
Participants had to express thoughts of the target whilst slideshow A was replayed in 
the background. The dependent measure in the study was the self reported ringing of 
a bell that was placed on a table in front of the participant to indicate any occurrence 
of the target thought. The findings from this study supported the ECH in that the 
thought rebounded significantly more in an expression period during which the 
slideshow was repeated (i.e., Slideshow A), demonstrating that the suppressed 
thought was triggered by cues in the environment.
In the second study, after an initial five minute suppression period, 
participants were instructed to continue to suppress the target word (i.e., white bear) 
whilst completing a concurrent task. The concurrent task involved presenting 
participants with one word at a time and them responding to each word by generating 
(i.e., by naming the word out loud) an associated word. For example, while 
suppressing the target item ‘white bear’ the participant may have been presented 
with the word ‘dog’ (i.e., word presented by experimenter) and they may have 
responded with the word ‘cat’ (i.e., associated word) Again the findings from this 
study provided support for the ECH. Specifically, when participants were presented 
with a word closely associated with the target word, they would often say the target 
word that they were meant to be suppressing. For example, when presented with 
‘dog’ (i.e., word presented by experimenter) saying ‘bear’ (i.e., target word). 
According to Wegner and Erber (1992) this pattern of emergent responding occurred 
as the target word was being directly cued by the associated words. Najmi and 
Wegner (2008) replicated these effects using a lexical decision paradigm. 
Participants in their study were instructed to either suppress or concentrate on a 
target word for a five minute period. After the five minute period they were 
instructed to continue to suppress/concentrate on the target word whilst completing 
an associative priming lexical decision task. An associative priming lexical task 
involves the sequential presentation of word pairs, in order to determine whether the 
presentation of a related word will interfere with the speed at which the second item 
is processed. If two words closely related are presented (e.g., nurse and doctor) 
responding to the first item is generally faster than if two unrelated items are 
presented (e.g., nurse, lion). In Najmi and Wegner’s (2008) study the participants 
were required to press the spacebar if  the second word was written in English while 
response times were recorded. The results indicated that participants demonstrated
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significantly faster response times when the first word presented in the pair (i.e., the 
prime) was a word closely associated with the target word. Again these findings, 
supported the ECH, that is, the suppressed word was cued by the closely linked 
(directly associated/related) words.
Together these findings lend support to Wegner’s postulate that stimuli in the 
environment that are intentionally (directly) related to target will cue the target thus 
rendering suppression attempts difficult. Thus thought suppression may not work as 
a result o f relations with intentionally sought out distracters. A behavioral paradigm 
known as stimulus equivalence (SE), however, suggests that if  there is intentional 
relating o f stimuli in the environment then unintentional relations may also emerge 
(Dymond & Roche, 2008) and these relations may make the attempt to suppress even 
less likely to succeed. SE is an empirically demonstrable effect in which training 
certain relations between arbitrary stimuli (e.g., nonsense words) leads to the 
derivation of several further untrained (derived) relations between those stimuli. It 
typically involves training a number o f unidirectional relations between stimuli and 
testing for the emergence of derived relations. For example, a participant might be 
trained to choose B1 in the presence of A1 and Cl in the presence of B l. In 
subsequent testing (without feedback), she may reverse the taught relations by 
choosing A1 in presence of B l, and B l in presence of Cl (‘derived symmetry’) and 
might also combine taught relations by choosing A1 in presence of C l and vice versa 
(‘derived transitivity’). The overarching response pattern is labelled ‘stimulus 
equivalence’ because it effectively represents treating the stimuli as ‘equivalent’ or 
mutually substitutable (e.g., Sidman, 1994).
Stimulus equivalence also involves a related phenomenon known as transfer 
of function (TOF) whereby if one member of the post-training group of ‘equivalent’ 
stimuli acquires a ‘psychological function’ (e.g., is established as being aversive) 
then other stimuli in that group acquire the same function. Transfer o f function 
through derived equivalence may produce unintentional relational generalization of 
thought suppression. For example, using the example given in the introduction, 
imagine a child who fears spiders. At some point, she might learn that spiders (A) 
lay eggs (B). She might also learn that eggs are one of the ingredients of cake (C). 
These learned relations may allow her to derive a relation between spiders and cake 
without any direct association of these stimuli being necessary (see, e.g., Barnes-
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Holmes, Cochrane, Bames-Holmes, Stewart, & McHugh, 2004). The child’s fear 
may lead to attempts to suppress thoughts of spiders. However, there might also be a 
transfer of functions through equivalence from spiders to cake such that being 
reminded of the stimulus ‘cake’ might also be something that cues ‘spider’. Thus the 
unintentionally related stimulus ‘cake’ becomes something to be suppressed also. If 
two apparently unconnected stimuli such as these may be thus related then a vast 
array of other stimuli may be similarly implicated, making thought suppression even 
more futile than even the ECH might predict.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the possible role that derived 
stimulus relations may have in aetiology and maintenance of thought suppression. 
Experiment 5 aims to show how directly and indirectly trained items can serve to 
hamper thought suppression attempts. Experiment 6(a) and 6(b) aim to show how 
participants may change their natural behaviour in order to avoid all contact with, not 
only the unwanted thought, but also directly trained and derived items.
4.1 Experiment 5
To demonstrate transfer of thought suppression / interference functions 
participants were first trained using a standard conditional discrimination paradigm 
to relate real words and non-words to one another so as to result in three emergent 
stimulus equivalence relations. To generate these relations, participants were trained 
to choose particular A stimuli (which were real words) in the presence of particular 
B stimuli (nonsense words) and to choose each o f the B stimuli in the presence of a 
particular C stimuli (nonsense words). Participants were then tested, as per the 
typical equivalence paradigm, for derivation of predicted derived AC and CA 
relations. In the critical phase of the experiment, participants were then instructed to 
suppress one of the three (real word) A stimuli (i.e., ‘Bear’), and were told that they 
could use the space bar to remove any o f a number o f words that appeared on a 
computer screen in front of them. Removal of the target word ‘Bear’ which they had 
been told to suppress would provide an analogue of direct thought suppression, while 
suppressing the nonsense word in derived relations with ‘Bear’ would show derived 
thought suppression.
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Experiment 5 also examines the importance of context for the effect under 
consideration. One important finding from the empirical literature is that derived 
relational responding, including the precise pattern of derived relations themselves as 
well as the subsequent pattern of transfer of function, is context dependent. 
W ulfertand Hayes (1988), for example, used the contextual features o f colour and 
tone as cues to determine both the content of particular equivalence relations as well 
as the transfer o f sequential functions based on those relations. In order to begin to 
analyze the contextual conditions affecting thought suppression, the current 
experiment also included a manipulation of context. This initial manipulation was 
directed at demonstrating that context can determine whether or not the phenomenon 
actually appears. The manipulation of context involved a control group of 
participants who were exposed to an identical preparation and who were given no 
suppression instructions but were told simply to remove the word ‘Bear’ from the 
screen. If they subsequently removed the target but did not remove related words 
then this would constitute evidence for the context dependent nature o f the transfer 
of suppression / interference functions.
The aim of Experiment 5 is to model the unintentional generalisation of 
thought suppression through equivalence class formation. Previous research has 
suggested that thought suppression is difficult due to the intentional distracters that 
the thought becomes associated with. The current experiment aims to show the 
extended futility o f thought suppression by demonstrating that, not only words that 
have been intentionally associated with the target thought, but words that have never 
been trained (or have been derived) can also become associated with the target 
thought and hamper the suppression attempt.
4.1.1. Method
Participants and design
Thirty undergraduates (18 female) participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. A 2 (group: suppression versus instruction) x 4 (word type: target, 
trained, derived and unrelated) mixed design was employed with repeated measures 
on the latter factor.
Screening questionnaires
112
Three screening measures were administered: the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire II  (AAQ II, Bond et al, under review) the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and the Beck Depression Inventory II  (Beck, 
Steer & Brown, 1996). The purpose of these measures was to screen for pre- 
experimental levels of emotional avoidance, thought suppression and depression, 
respectively. The sample was non-clinical with all participants falling within a 
normal range (overall mean questionnaire scores: AAQ II = 52 (sd +/- 6.71, WBSI = 
45.6 (sd +/- 8.26, BDI = 4.7 (sd +/- 2.93).
Procedure
All participants were exposed to the first four stages of the procedure: (1) 
relational training; (2) relational testing; (3) suppression induction; (4) cognitive 
load. The fifth stage of the procedure examined a between-subjects factor 
(suppression versus instruction), for which the participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two groups.
(11 Relational Training
The participant was shown into the experimental room and was seated in 
front of the computer. Relational training commenced with the following instructions 
across the middle of the computer screen:
“Look at the Box Above and then Click on the Box Below that GOES WITH
the one at the Top. Try Your Best NO T to Make Any Mistakes
This stage provided participants with match-to-sample conditional discrimination 
training designed to provide the basis for the following three equivalence relations: 
A l (Bear)-Bl (Boceem)-Cl (Gedeer); A2 (Door)-B2 (Murben)-C2 (Remond); A3 
(Shoe)-B3 (Surtel)-C3 (Sipher). Each predicted relation thus included one real word 
(the A stimulus) and two nonsense words (the B and C stimuli).
Training involved both A-B and B-C trial-types. In AB trial-types, 
participants were presented with A l, A2, or A3 as the sample stimulus and then had 
to choose from among the three comparison stimuli B l, B2, and B3. A correct 
response was B l given A l, B2 given A2, and B3 given A3. For the three BC trial- 
types, participants were presented with B l, B2 or B3 as the sample stimulus and had
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to choose from the three comparison stimuli C l, C2, and C3. A correct response was 
Cl given B l, C2 given B2, and C3 given C3. In all trials, the spatial positioning of 
the comparison stimuli and the correct comparison stimulus (left, middle or right) 
was counterbalanced. There was no time limit for responding to individual trials. If 
the participant responded correctly, the stimulus display cleared and the word 
“Correct” appeared on the screen for 3000 ms. If the participant responded 
incorrectly, the stimulus display cleared and the word “Wrong” appeared on the 
screen for 3000 ms. The 6 trial-types (3 AB and 3 BC) were presented in a repeating 
quasi-random cycle and the criterion for proceeding to the testing phase was 12 
consecutively correct. Once the criterion had been reached, the computer 
automatically cycled the participant into the next phase.
(2) Relational Testing
The relational testing stage was designed to probe for derived C-A relations. 
For example, in the training phase participants were trained to choose B l (i.e., 
boceem) in the presence of A l (i.e., bear), and to choose C l (i.e., gedeer) in the 
presence of B l (i.e., boceem). Hence, in the testing phase, they were tested to see 
whether they would show derived AC relations by choosing A l in the presence of 
C l.
On the first test trial, the following instructions were shown across the middle 
o f the computer screen:
“Look at the Box Above and then Click on the Box Below that GOES WITH the 
one at the Top. Try Your Best NOT to Make Any Mistakes. DURING THESE 
TRIALS THE COMPUTER WILL NOT GIVE YOU AN Y FEEDBACK”
This stage involved three CA trial-types. Participants were presented with either C l, 
C2, or C3 as the sample stimulus and then had to choose from among the three 
comparison stimuli A l, A2, and A3. A correct (equivalence) response was A l given 
C l, A2 given C2, and A3 given C3. No feedback was provided on any trials. Twelve 
trials were presented involving four presentations o f each of the three trial types. The 
participant was required to achieve a mastery criterion of 11/12 on this testing phase 
in order to be cycled into the next phase o f the experiment; otherwise he or she was
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recycled back through training and testing once again. All participants reached 
criterion after a maximum of two cycles of training and testing.
(3) Suppression Induction
For the suppression induction, participants were instructed to suppress all 
thoughts of the word ‘bear’ for a five-minute period. Each time participants had a 
thought of the word ‘bear’ they were required to press the space bar on the keyboard. 
The purpose of this phase, which was adopted from Wegner and Erber (1992), was 
to familiarise the participants with the suppression task.
(4) Cognitive Load
High cognitive load in the thought suppression literature has been 
demonstrated to increase the rebound effects of attempted thought suppression 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992). The purpose of this stage was to provide participants with a 
high cognitive load task in order to increase the likelihood of this effect. Immediately 
after the suppression stage ended, the participant was given a sheet of paper with a 
six-digit number on it. She was told that she had 25 seconds to commit the number to 
memory, and that she would have to write this number down after the experiment 
had finished.
(5) The Suppression versus Instruction Phase
The final stage of the experiment was the suppression versus instruction stage 
in which participants were randomly assigned to either the suppression or instruction 
condition/group. This stage was designed to (i) probe for the generalisation o f 
thought suppression (or transfer o f thought suppression functions) via derived 
equivalence relations in the suppression condition; and (ii) demonstrate that transfer 
of thought suppression functions is contextually controlled, by comparing results for 
the suppression condition with results for the instruction condition.
In this stage, participants in both conditions were presented with 18 words (1 
target, 2 target related, 6 trained but non related and 9 novel words) 5 times each 
(i.e., a total of 90 word presentations) for ten seconds in a random order (see Table 9 
for a list of the words and non words employed in the current experiment). 
Participants were required to focus on the computer screen as the words appeared.
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The words on the screen could be removed by the participant at any time by pressing 
the spacebar. If the participant pressed the spacebar the screen would remain blank 
for the remainder of that ten second time slot.
Target word Trained Derived Other Control
Word Word equivalence words
words
Bear Boceem Gedeer Shoe Wollof
Surtel Sinald
Cipher Drager
Door Matser
Murben Desund
Remond Casors
Table 
Bird 
Chair
Table 9. The Target, Trained, Derived, Other equivalence and control stimuli 
employed in, Experiment 5
In terms of experimenter manipulation, the critical difference between the 
suppression and instruction groups was with regard to the instructions provided at 
the beginning of the stage. Participants in the suppression group had the following 
instruction appear on the computer screen and subsequently read aloud to them by 
the experimenter:
“For this part o f  the experiment you are asked to suppress the unwanted 
thought whilst attending to a computer program in front o f  you. It is 
important that you continue to suppress the unwanted thought as you did in 
the previous part o f  the study. Once the program has started words will
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appear every ten seconds in the centre o f  the screen in front o f  you. However 
you are in control o f  the program, in that i f  you not happy with a word being 
on the screen then you can remove it by pressing the space bar. I f  you choose 
to remove a word the screen will remain white fo r  the remainder o f  the 10 
seconds at which point the next word will appear. This task will last about 5 
minutes. Remember that it is vitally important that you attend to the screen 
but continue to suppress the unwanted thought that the researcher will 
provide you with. ”
It was predicted that these participants would remove not just the word that 
they had been instructed to suppress, but that, as a result o f transfer of functions 
through derived relations, they might also remove words in derived relations with the 
to-be-suppressed word.
Participants in the instruction condition had the following instruction appear 
on the computer screen and subsequently read aloud to them by the experimenter:
"For this part o f  the experiment you are asked to attend to a computer 
program in fron t o f  you. Once the program has started a variety o f  words 
will appear every ten seconds in the centre o f  the screen in front o f  you. 
However you are in control o f  the program, in that i f  you not happy with a 
word being on the screen then you can remove it by pressing the space bar. 
Your task during this phase it to remove the word 'bear ’ every time that it 
appears on the screen. When you do remove the word ‘bear ’ the screen will 
remain white fo r  the remainder o f  the 10 seconds at which point the next 
word will appear. This task will last about 5 minutes ”.
It was predicted that these participants would remove the word they had been 
instructed to remove and no other word. This was intended to demonstrate that 
transfer of functions is a contextually determined phenomenon.
At the end o f this stage, participants were required to write down the number 
they had been given during the previous phase (4) on a piece of paper. They were 
then thanked and debriefed.
4.1.2. Results
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All participants passed relational training and reached the criterion of 11/12 
correct responses within three cycles of the testing phase. All went on to show at 
least some unwanted thought intrusions (with a range of 4-11) during the 5 minutes 
of the suppression induction stage, thus providing evidence of the efficacy of the 
manipulation. In addition, all participants correctly wrote out the six digit number 
that they had been required to remember on a piece of paper provided by the 
experimenter at the end of the experimental session, thus providing evidence that the 
cognitive load manipulation was also effective as intended.
Suppression versus Instruction Phase: Number of Words Removed
The critical stage was the final ‘suppression versus instruction’ stage. On 
average, participants in the suppression group removed the target word (M =  5, sd = 
0), the trained word (M = 4.2 sd = 1.32) and the derived word (M=4, sd = 1.73) more 
often than unrelated words (M  = 1.03 sd = 1.05, see Table 10). Meanwhile, 
participants in the instruction group always removed the target word (M =  5, sd = 0), 
but never or seldom removed the trained word (M=0, sd = 0), the derived word 
(M=0.06, sd = 0.25) or unrelated words (M =  0.55, sd = 0.09).
In order to determine any significant differences a 2(group: suppression or 
instruction) x 4 (word type: target, trained, derived, and unrelated) mixed design 
ANOVA was conducted. This analysis revealed a significant effect for word type, 
F(3, 84) = 163.543, p  <. 0001; and a significant interaction between word type and 
group, F(3, 84) = 52.699, p<.0001, suggesting that the number of times target, 
trained, derived and unrelated words were removed from the screen differed 
depending on whether participants were in the suppression or instruction group.
A series of paired sample t-tests were conducted in order to determine where 
the significant differences between each word type emerged within each group (see 
Table 11). As may be seen from Table 11, participants in the suppression group 
removed the target word significantly more often than the trained word, the derived 
word and the unrelated words. In addition, they removed the trained and derived 
words significantly more often than the unrelated words. For the instruction group, 
participants were also significantly more likely to remove the target word than the 
trained word, the derived word and the unrelated words. However, there was no
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significant difference between numbers of trained or derived words removed and 
unrelated words removed.
Simple effects analyses were also conducted on the data, in order to compare 
the groups with respect to the number of times they removed particular words. In the 
case of the target word, the results revealed no significant difference between the 
groups. In the case o f the trained word, a significant difference was found between 
the two groups (F (1, 29) = 151.82, suggesting that participants in the suppression 
group removed the trained word significantly more often than participants in the 
instruction group. A similar pattern emerged in the case o f the derived word also (F 
(1, 29) = 75.67). There was also a significant difference between the two groups 
with respect to the removal of unrelated words (F (1, 29 = 12.06)), with participants 
in the suppression group removing unrelated words significantly more than 
participants in the instruction group. As may be seen from Table 10, however, the 
rate of removal of unrelated words was very low for both groups.
Target Trained Derived Unrelated
Suppression 5 (100%) 4.2 (84%) 4 (80%) 1.03 (20.6%)
Instruction 5(100% ) 0(0% ) 0.06(1.2% ) 0.554(11.08% )
Table 10. Mean and percentage number o f  stimuli removed from  the screen fo r  the 
suppression and instruction groups, Experiment 5.
Suppression versus Instruction Phase: Latencies
From Figure 7 it can be seen that participants in the suppression group 
consistently removed the target word (M  = 1.59 secs, sd = 1.03), the trained word 
(M=3.38 secs, sd = 2.51) and the derived word (M=3.07 secs, sd = 2.75) more 
quickly than the unrelated words (M =  8.63 secs, sd = 2.39). Meanwhile, participants 
in the instruction group often removed the target word (M  = 1.11 secs, sd = 0.47) 
while rarely removing the trained word (M=10 secs, sd = 0), the derived word 
(M=9.92 secs, sd = 0.32) or the unrelated words (M = 9.88 secs, sd = 0.43).
Figure 7. Mean latencies to removal o f  stimuli fo r  the suppression and instruction 
groups, Experiment 5.
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In order to determine if the difference in mean lapsed time between the four 
within subjects levels - target word, trained word, derived word, and unrelated words 
- across the instruction and suppression groups was significant, a 2 (group: 
suppression versus instruction) x 4 (word type: target, trained, derived, and 
unrelated) mixed design ANOVA was conducted. The results revealed a significant 
main effect for word type F (3,84) = 204.283, p  <0.0001, and a significant 
interaction between word type and group, F(3,84) = 68.845, p<0.0001, suggesting 
that the amount o f lapsed time for each word type was affected by the type of group 
(suppression or instruction) that the participant had been assigned to.
A series o f paired sample t-tests were conducted in order to determine where 
the significant differences between each word type emerged within each group (see 
Table 11 for a summary o f the inferential results). As may be seen from Table 11, 
participants in the suppression group removed the target word significantly more 
quickly than the trained word, the derived word and the unrelated words. In addition, 
they removed the trained and derived words significantly more quickly than the 
unrelated words. For the instruction group, participants removed the target word
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significantly more quickly than the trained word, the derived word and the unrelated 
words. However, for this group there was no significant difference in the latency to 
word removal between the trained, derived and unrelated words.
Latency
Suppress Control
Target v trained t(14) = -3.113; p = 0.008 t(14) -  -73.402; p = 0.000
Target v derived t(14) = -2.543; p = 0.023 t(14) = -50.66; p = 0.000
Target v unrelated t(14) = -12.117; p = 0.000 t(14) =  -75.321; p = 0.000
Trained v derived t(14) = -0.793; p = 0.441 t(14) = -1.000; p = 0.334
Trained v unrelated t(14) = -6.777; p = 0.000 t(14) = 3.3034; p = 0.009
Derived v unrelated t(14) = -6.420; p =  0.000 t(14) = 0.322; p = 0.753
Tim es Removed
Suppress Control
Target v trained t( 14) =  2.347 ; p = 0.034 No  SD*
Target v derived t(14) = 2.236 ;p =  0.042 t( l4 )  = 74.000 ; p =  0.000
Target v unrelated t(14) = 14.633 ; p =  0.000 t(14) = 208.144 ;p  =  0.000
Trained v derived t(14) = 0.544; p =  0.595 t(14) =  -1.000 ; p  =  0.334
Trained v unrelated t(14) = 6.527 ; p =  0.000 \ 4^ II ■ u> u> oo 4^ T3 II O O O 4^
Derived v unrelated t(14) =  6.076 ; p  =  0.000 t(14) =  -0.176 ; p  =  0.863
* All participants in the control group removed the target word 5 times and the trained word 0 times, 
therefore, no standard deviation could be computed, and a t test could not be conducted.
Table 11. Significance values fo r  the suppression versus control groups fo r  number 
o f times stimuli were removed and latency to stimulus removal, Experiment 5.
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Simple effects analyses were also conducted on the data, in order to compare 
the groups with respect to latency. In the case of the target word, the results revealed 
no significant difference between the groups. In the case of the trained word, a 
significant difference was found between the two groups (F (1, 29) = 104.06)), 
suggesting that participants in the suppression group removed the trained word 
significantly more quickly than participants in the instruction group. A similar 
pattern emerged in the case of the derived word also (F (1, 29) = 91.460). Finally, 
there was also a significant difference between the two groups with respect to the 
removal of unrelated words (F (1, 29) = 11.15)), with participants in the suppression 
group removing unrelated words significantly more quickly than participants in the 
instruction group. Again, as may be seen from Table 10, however, the number of 
unrelated words removed was low across both groups.
To summarise, whereas both groups removed the target / to-be-suppressed 
word from the screen, participants in the suppression group removed the trained and 
derived words from the screen as well, whereas participants in the instruction group 
did not. The suppression group also removed trained and derived words from the 
screen to a significantly greater extent as well as significantly faster than unrelated 
words, suggesting that the presence of words directly or indirectly trained as related 
to the target interfered with the suppression attempt and thus themselves became 
targets for removal.
4.1.3. Discussion
Previous research has indicated that an attempt to suppress a thought leads to 
increased later intrusions o f that item into consciousness (Wegner et al, 1987). 
Experiment 5 aimed to model unintentional relational thought suppression / 
interference in which attempting to suppress a target word necessitates the additional 
suppression of words related to the target. Previous research (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 
1992; Wegner et al, 1991; Najmi & Wegner, 2008) had demonstrated intentional 
relational suppression / interference in which the target of a suppression attempt 
becomes linked to, or ‘asymmetrically primed’ by environmental cues when 
attempting to suppress. The current experiment provides an extension of previous 
work by demonstrating that the suppression target can also become related to words
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that were never intentionally related to the target and that people will also attempt to 
suppress these unintentionally related words.
One issue which may be of relevance to the current study is that participants 
were required to press the space bar both during the suppression phase and word 
removal phase. Functionally this is a different response, however formally the 
response is similar, which may have caused ambiguity in participant response. It 
must be added, however, that each participant was clearly instructed as the 
significance of their response in each phase. Nevertheless the current experiment 
demonstrated, consistent with predictions from the equivalence literature, that 
participants’ suppression attempts of a target word generalised not alone to other 
words that were directly trained to this word, but also to words that were not directly 
trained to it but that were in equivalence relations derived by the participant. For 
example, in this study, a direct relation was trained between the word ‘bear’ 
(stimulus ‘A ’ - the target word) and ‘Boceem’ (stimulus ‘B ’ - non target word 1) and 
between the latter stimulus and ‘Gedeer’ (stimulus ‘C’ -  non target word 2) but no 
direct training of a relation between the A and C stimuli was provided. However, as 
predicted, participants derived a relation between A and C, thus showing equivalence 
formation, and furthermore, they not only removed the to-be-suppressed A stimulus 
from a computer screen when given the opportunity, thus showing direct suppression 
/ interference, they also removed the derived relational C stimulus from the screen, 
thus showing transformation of function and indirect relational thought suppression / 
interference. This empirically demonstrated phenomenon which can be referred to as 
transfer of suppression functions via equivalence, provides a model for 
generalization of thought suppression / interference via unintentional (derived) 
relations. The demonstration of this process supplements earlier work on thought 
suppression and suggests a further reason for why individuals find it difficult to 
suppress their thoughts and often fail to do so.
This study also supplements the literature on contextual control by 
demonstrating that transfer of thought suppression / interference functions occurs 
under contextual control. Previous studies (e.g., Auguston & Dougher, 1997) have 
shown the importance of contextual control in transfer of function. The current study 
supplemented these studies with respect to thought suppression / interference. It 
employed an instruction condition in which participants were not required to
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suppress thoughts o f the word ‘bear’ but were simply told to remove the same target 
word (i.e., ‘bear’) from the computer screen as the participants in the experimental 
group were asked to suppress. Whereas the experimental participants removed the 
target word as well as words related to the target word, the ‘instruction’ group 
participants only removed the target word. This showed that transfer of functions 
leading to removal o f equivalent stimuli only occurs in particular contexts such as 
thought suppression and not simply in any context in which a response to a target 
stimulus is required. This is important not only for basic understanding of the 
phenomenon but also for applied interests such as psychotherapy because it shows 
that the phenomenon of transfer of thought suppression is not inevitable. This study 
thus promotes basic as well as applied understanding of thought suppression and 
provides additional explanation of the reasons why it is so often unsuccessful. If 
attempting to suppress a thought necessitates suppression of all thoughts related 
directly and indirectly to that thought, then this may indeed render suppression 
attempts virtually impossible. Nevertheless, the fact that this phenomenon is under 
contextual control suggests that there are circumstances in which transfer of thought 
suppression need not occur.
In conclusion, Experiment 5 demonstrated that one possible explanation for 
unsuccessful thought suppression could lie in derived stimulus relations. 
Specifically, the results suggest that when attempting to suppress an unwanted 
thought, that attempt can be interrupted by both direct and derived relations that have 
been established. Experiment 6 in this chapter will seek to further explore the 
possible connection between derived stimulus relations and thought suppression by 
studying avoidance behaviour.
4.2. Experiment 6(a)
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that experiential avoidance is 
a key process underlying psychopathology. Thought suppression is an example of 
experiential avoidance. Recent third wave cognitive and behaviour therapies promote 
the importance of valued living and suggest the primary determinant moving people 
away from valued living is in fact experiential avoidance (Plumb et al., 2009). The 
social verbal community has established the idea that successful living will come 
when bad experiences are removed. Unfortunately, we cannot control our internal
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events as evidenced throughout the current thesis. In the context of making choices 
automatic reactions (negative or positive) will occur. If we attempt to avoid these 
reactions (e.g. thoughts) we must also avoid certain choices. One way to model this 
process experimentally is to present participants with a choice that interferes with a 
suppression attempt. The counterproductive nature of thought suppression will 
become more apparent if  certain choices are altered in the service of a suppression 
attempt. If experiential avoidance has a significant impact on an extensive range of 
behaviours, it is essential that the processes that are involved in the generalisation of 
this avoidance are understood in order to help explain and predict behaviour. The 
generalization of thought suppression has been modeled in Experiment 5 above and 
Hooper et al (in press).
The current experiment aims to extend on Hooper et al (in press) to provide 
an empirical model of the direct and indirect effects of thought suppression on 
behavioral choice. Experiment 6(a) will aim to get a basic (non equivalence related) 
change in a pre suppression induction choice. Participants will first be required to 
make a preference on a dichotomous selection task. After making their preference 
they will be instructed to repeat the selection task while suppressing all thoughts of a 
target word which will be programmed to appear each time participants select their 
originally preferred stimulus. It is predicted that participants will change their 
original choice to avoid coming into contact with the target unwanted thought.
4.2.1. Method
Participants
Thirty participants were recruited from the Swansea University subject pool 
system where credits were granted for participation in the study. Participants ranged 
in age from 18 to 35 years old (mean age = 24.5; SD = 4.12). The sample was non 
clinical with all participants falling within a normal range on a number of 
psychometric indices (see below) including the AAQ (m = 53.04 SD = 6.92) WBSI, 
(m = 45.52 SD = 5.24) and BDI (m = 3.38 SD = 3.27). The data of five participants 
was excluded as a result of no selection preference being made in the first part o f the 
choice selection task.
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Design
The study involved a within subjects experimental design in that all of the 
participants completed the same procedure, a 1 factor (preferred selection) 6 level 
(each ten trial phase from parts 1 and 2 of the choice selection task). The dependent 
variable was preferred selection (door chosen) in each of the ten trial phases. 
Specifically; it was aimed to see if  preferred selection in the last five phases changed 
in comparison to the selection made in the ten trial phase from the first part of the 
choice selection task.
Measures
Participants completed the same measures as in the previous experiment (See 
Experiment 5).
Procedure
On arrival to the room, each participant was greeted by the researcher and 
was asked to complete a consent form and the aforementioned three questionnaires 
(AAQ-2, WBSI, BDI). The general procedure, which followed, consisted of 3 stages: 
(1) Suppression phase; (2) Cognitive load; (3) Choice selection task.
(1) Suppression Induction
Participants completed the same suppression induction as described in 
Experiment 5.
(2) Cognitive Load
Participants completed the same cognitive load as described in Experiment 5.
f3) The Choice Selection Task
The participants completed a colour choice task that consisted of two parts. In 
both parts the participant was instructed to choose one of two colour doors via a 
choice selection program created in E-Prime 2.0. A red door (approximately 14cm 
by 18 cm), which was situated in the centre of the left hand side of the screen 
(approximately half centre metre from the left hand side of the screen and 
approximately 1cm from the bottom, the top and the centre of the screen), had the
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letter ‘Q’ written above it. A blue door with the exact same dimensions except in the 
centre of the right hand side o f the screen had the letter ‘P ’ above it. Participants 
throughout this phase of the experiment were required to press either the ‘Q’ or the 
‘P ’ buttons on the keyboard to signal that they were choosing either the red door of 
the blue door respectively (See illustration 1). Once they had chosen either door, that 
door would appear to open, under which a blank black screen would appear. 
Subsequently a new trial began in which both doors were again closed, so that the 
participant was again required to choose. During the first part of the choice selection 
task the participants would be presented with 10 trials, during the second part the 
participants would be presented with 50 trials.
Before the first part began the following instructions were displayed on the 
computer screen:
“This segment o f  the experiment will consist o f  two parts. You will receive the 
instructions fo r  the 2nd part after you have completed the 1st part o f  the experiment. 
Over the next few  minutes you will see on the screen two doors. One o f  these doors 
will be a red door and one o f  these doors will be a blue door. You can open either 
door by clicking it. Your task is simply to pick a door to open in each case. You will 
repeat this task several times during the first part, it will take only a couple o f  
minutes. Bear in mind there is no wrong or right answer fo r  this study; simply click 
on whichever door you wish. ”
During the second part o f the experiment the participant was again required to 
choose one of two doors. However, part 2 differed from part 1 in a two key ways. 
First, the participant was instructed to suppress the target thought for the duration of 
the second part. In this case the word ‘bear’ was the target. Second, when the 
participant opened either door, a word (in white writing against a black background 
approximately 2 cm high in the middle of the door), appeared behind it. Specifically, 
whenever participants chose the stimulus (coloured door) for which they had shown 
an initial preference for in part 1, the target word, or one of two control words, 
appeared behind that door (these words appeared quasi randomly behind the door 
each time it opened). For example, if, in the first part they chose the blue door 
predominantly, then in the second part if  they chose the blue door again the word 
‘bear’ appeared quasi randomly with the control words. Further, control non words
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were displayed behind the door that was not chosen in the first part. The instructions 
displayed on the screen for the participants in the second part were as follows:
‘ The 2nd part o f  this segment is very similar to the 1st part. You will have to 
continue to click on whichever door you wish. However, instead o f  a blank space 
appearing, when the door opens now, a word will appear behind the door. In 
addition to choosing doors during the experiment, you are also required to suppress 
(try your best not to think about) the word/thought ‘bear'. Please try your best not to 
think about this unwanted thought. This phase will last around five minutes. ’
Illustration 1. A screenshot o f  the choice selection task, Experiment 6.
Once this final stage o f the experiment was complete, the participant was 
thanked and debriefed.
4.2.2. Results and Discussion
The number o f times participants selected a stimulus (i.e. door) in each ten 
trial phase across both parts was collated. In part 1 participants were instructed to 
make ten selections (i.e., choose a door ten times). In part 2 selections (doors chosen)
were recorded across 50 trials while participants were suppressing a target item. 
Figure 8 below depicts the mean number o f times a door was chosen in each ten trial 
phase Initial door selection was divided relatively equally between red and blue 
preferences; of the participants included in the analysis 14 participants chose blue 
initially and 11 participants chose red initially. Therefore compiling the data from 
both into one data set was valid. This applies to both Experiments 6a and 6b. The 
first phase was pre-suppression induction, or part 1, whereas the following 50 trials 
from part 2 are broken into five 10 selection phases each in order to illustrate change 
in selections over time. The figure indicates that participants gradually change their 
initial choice from the first phase, to the last phase in part 2. Therefore, the 
participants by the end o f the experiment are choosing their initially non preferred 
door.
Figure 8. Mean number o f  choice responses made by participants in Stage 3, Parts 1 
and 2, Experiment 6a.
first phase 1st 10 2nd 10 3rd 10 4th 10 5th 10
Statistical analysis was conducted on the data to determine if there were 
significant differences between the number o f preferred selections (doors chosen) in 
each o f the 6, ten trial phases o f Stage 3 in the experiment. A one way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect F (5, 105) = 26.237; p  < 0.05, suggesting that 
further analysis was warranted to explore the data in greater detail. Paired sample t-
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tests were therefore carried out between each of the 6 ten trial phases in Stage 3 of 
the study in order to determine if there was a behavioural shift in choice.
The first batch of t tests found a significant main effect between the initial 
selection from the first phase in part 1, compared with the selection made in each of 
the subsequent five phases in part 2 (see Table 12). Participants changed their choice 
almost immediately after having come into contact with the unwanted thought. 
Additionally the t values seem to get stronger as we progress thought each of the 
phases suggesting that participants continued to change their initial selection more as 
they progressed through the program. Further t tests were conducted to determine if 
there were significant differences between each set of ten trials in the second part. 
The results showed that participants would significantly reduce the amount of times 
that they chose their original preferred door until the second set of ten trials at which 
point the participants reached a ceiling effect.
Finally, in order to ensure that the participants were not merely responding at 
chance level, paired sample t tests against chance were conducted. The results 
revealed that participants responded significantly different to chance in the first 
phase t(21) = 8.056; p < 0.05. By the first part of the second phase, however, 
participants began to respond at chance level as they began to change their 
preference, t(21) = -0.339; p > 0.05. For the remainder study participants again made 
a definite choice significantly different from chance level; second part t(21) = - 
3.466; p < 0.05, third part t(21) = -3.467; p < 0.05, fourth part t(21) = -4.997; p < 
0.05, and fifth part t(21) = -7.355; p < 0.05.
In conclusion, the results show that the presence of the target word behind 
the initially preferred selection resulted in each participant gradually changing their 
selection so that by the end of the experiment they rarely choose their initially 
preferred stimulus. In terms of the current experiment the results suggested that 
people will often avoid doing things that they would choose to do in order to avoid 
the unwanted thought.
Comparison Statistic
1st phase vs. first ten t(21) = 5.721, p  < 0.05
1st phase vs. second ten t(21) = 6.049, p  <0.05
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1st phase vs. third ten t(21) = 6.067, p  <0.05
1st phase vs. fourth ten t(21) = 7.604, p  <0.05
1st phase vs. fifth ten t(21) =  8.880, p  <0.05
First ten vs. second ten t(21) =  2.321, p  <0.05
Second ten vs. third ten t(21) = -0.826, p  >0.05
Third ten vs. fourth ten t(21) = 2.190, p  <0.05
Fourth ten vs. fifth ten t(21) = 1.641, p  >0.05
Table 12. The t-tests conducted on the data from  each ten trial phase, Experiment 
6a.
The results of Experiment 6(a) demonstrated that participants changed their 
initial preferred selection in order to avoid contact with an unwanted thought. This 
result models how thought suppression may cause constriction in one’s life, as one 
may stop acting in a preferred manner in order to avoid unwanted thoughts. 
According to Hooper et al (in press), however, people may also avoid coming into 
Contact with thoughts that are related to an unwanted thought. With this in mind 
Experiment 6(b) will aim to determine whether words trained as related, by both 
direct and indirect/derived learning, can also cause a shift in behavioural choice. If 
this were the case then one could assume that a transformation of suppression 
functions had occurred, and it would provide evidence that not only a target thought, 
but stimuli related to the target thought can affect the choices we make.
4.3. Experiment 6(b)
Experiment 6(b) aims to extend on Experiment 6(a) in order to determine 
whether the change in preference selection observed would occur not only to avoid 
the unwanted target thought but also to avoid stimuli related to the target. 
Experiment 6(b) will be identical to Experiment 6(a) with the exception that 
participants will be exposed to pre-selection task relational training and testing, and 
one stimulus from the relational training will be the designated target word. During 
the second part o f thought suppression choice selection task only the related words 
and not the actual target unwanted thought will appear behind the preferred stimulus.
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It is predicted that the participants will change their initially preferred selection, this 
time to avoid items in trained/derived relations with the target unwanted thought.
4.3.1. Method
Participants
Twenty seven participants were recruited from the Swansea University 
subject pool system where credits were granted for participation in the study. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 years old (mean age = 21.11; SD = 1.5). 
The sample was non clinical with all participants falling within a normal range on a 
number of psychometric indices (see below) including the AAQ (m = 51.25 SD = 
9.64) WBSI, (m = 43.07 SD = 7.55) and BDI (m = 5.4 SD = 3.62). The data of seven 
participants was excluded as a result o f no selection being made in the first part of 
the choice selection task.
Procedure
The procedure for experiment two was identical to that o f experiment 6(a), 
bar the exception of equivalence training and testing. As such the general procedure 
consisted of five phases; (1) Relational training, (2) Relational testing, (3) 
Suppression Induction, (4) Cognitive Load, (5) Choice Selection Task.
Phases 1 -  4 in Experiment 6(b) were identical to that of Experiment 5 (see Section
4.1.1.)
f5i The Choice Selection Task
Two manipulations were made to the choice selection task. First, the target 
word was removed from the second part o f the task and replaced with the trained and 
derived words; this was done to determine whether participants would change their 
initially preference just on the basis of words in direct/derived relations with the 
target word. Second, in Experiment 6(a) two control words were included with the 
target behind the door of original choice. However, as two words in Experiment 6(b) 
could now serve to remind the participant of the unwanted thought, 4 control words 
were included in the second part with the trained and derived word, behind the door 
chosen in the first part of the choice selection task. Additionally 2 control words 
were added to the door that was not originally chosen in the first part. This left 6
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possible words appearing quasi randomly behind each door. This was done to make 
the participant response less obvious.
4.3.2. Results
The dependent variable was again the amount o f times participants selected 
the pre-chosen stimulus in each ten trial phase. Figure 9 below depicts the mean 
number o f times a selection was made in each ten trial phase, in parts 1 and 2. This 
figure appears to show that participants again changed their initial preferred selection 
from the first part, so that by the end o f the second part (the 5th ten trial phase) they 
were choosing the door opposite to that of their initial preferred selection the 
majority o f trials.
Figure 9. Mean number o f choice responses made by participants in Stage 5, Parts 1 
and 2, Experiment 6b.
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Statistical analysis was conducted on the data in order to determine whether 
there were significant differences with respect to selection across the experimental 
phases. A one way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect F  (5, 95) = 16.041; p  
< 0.05, suggesting that further analysis was warranted to determine where 
differences in the number o f initially preferred selections emerged. Paired sample t- 
tests were conducted between each o f the ten trial phases.
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A series of paired samples t tests (see Table 13) revealed a significant main 
effect between the selection made in the first phase of ten trials (part 1), compared 
with the selection made in each of the ten trial phases in the second part. This result 
suggests that participants changed their initially preferred selection immediately after 
coming into contact with the items related to the unwanted thought. The increase in t 
values again suggests that this change in selection became stronger as the study 
progressed. Further t tests were conducted in order to determine if there were 
significant differences between each set o f ten trial phases in the second part of the 
choice selection task. These results suggested that participants made a significant 
drop in the number of times they chose their pre chosen stimulus from the first ten 
trial phase of the second part to the second, before reaching a ceiling effect in the 
remainder of the ten trial phases.
Again, in order to ensure that the participants were not merely responding at 
chance level, paired sample t tests against chance were conducted. The results 
revealed that participants responded significantly different to chance in the first 
phase t(21) = 6.396; p < 0.05. Similarly to Experiment 6a, however, participants 
began to respond at chance level in the first part o f the second phase as they began to 
change their preference, t(21) = -0.902; p > 0.05. For the remainder study 
participants again made a definite choice significantly different from chance level; 
second part t(21) = -2.596; p < 0.05, third part t(21) = -2.222; p < 0.05, fourth part 
t(21) = -2.228; p < 0.05, and fifth part t(21) = -3.939; p < 0.05.
Comparison
1st phase vs. first ten 
1st phase vs. second ten 
1st phase vs. third ten 
1st phase vs. fourth ten 
1st phase vs. fifth ten 
First ten vs. second ten 
Second ten vs. third ten
Statistic
t(19) -  4.433, p  < 0 .05  
t(19)=  5.105, p <  0.05 
t(19) = 4.513, p <  0.05 
t(19) = 4.613, p <  0.05 
t(19) = 5.796, p  < 0.05 
t(19) = 2.596, p <  0.05 
t(19) = -0.924, p >  0.05
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Third ten vs. fourth ten t(19) = 0.535, p >  0.05 
Fourth ten vs. fifth ten t(19) = 1.201, p >  0.05
Table IS. The t-tests conducted on the data from  each ten trial phase, Experiment 
6b.
The results o f Experiment 6(b) replicate and extend on Experiment 6(a). 
Specifically, participants in Experiment 6(a) and 6(b) significantly changed their 
initially preferred selection from the first part of the experiment by the first phase of 
the second part, participants in both experiments then continued in a significant 
decline in the amount o f pre-chosen stimuli, before reaching a ceiling effect which 
lasted from the second ten trial phase to the fifth ten trial phase. In short, as in
Experiment 6(a), participants in Experiment 6(b) also changed their selection to
avoid coming into contact with the unwanted thought.
4.3.3. Discussion
Previous research has indicated that attempting to suppress a target word 
necessitates the additional suppression of words in derived relations with the target 
(Hooper et al, in press). The results of this study concur on this point. However, the 
current study extends on from the previous work, demonstrating that attempted 
suppression can alter pre- suppression behavioural choices in order to avoid the 
target item (Experiment 6a) and items related to the target (Experiment 6b). 
Consistent with predictions from the equivalence literature participants’ suppression 
attempts of a target word generalised to other words that were experimentally trained 
as related to this word. This transfer of suppression functions across an equivalence 
class suggests that the equivalence phenomenon might further explain why 
individuals find it difficult to suppress their thoughts and how this attempted 
suppression can have constricting behavioural consequences.
However, both Experiments 6a and 6b could be improved. The inclusion of a 
control group where neutral words appear behind the door that was chosen from the 
1st part would control for the appearance o f words as something that might trigger 
change, as opposed to it being as a result o f suppression of the target word per se. 
Such a control group would also determine whether the results, which see a gradual 
decline in varied responses, are due to habituation (See Chapter 2). However as the
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statistical analysis found that the responses were significantly different to chance, the 
likelihood that habituation occurred is reduced. Finally, Experiment 6b included both 
trained and derived words behind the door that was previously chosen. In future 
these would have to be separated in order to see the effect of each word.
Nevertheless, in addition to promoting basic understanding of thought 
suppression in a new paradigm, the behavioural shift in choice demonstrated in the 
present study is of importance to understanding applied contexts, such as 
psychotherapy. These results inform us about problems that can occur without direct 
experience (e.g., a fear o f flying without ever being on a plane). As is shown in this 
study, if  suppression functions can transfer to stimuli related to the to-be-suppressed 
item then these items could cause a negative cascade of behavioural avoidance that 
would aggravate disorders such as depression or anxiety (Walther et al., 2005).
4.4. Concluding Comments
As suggested earlier, the current results may be important in terms of aiding 
our understanding o f clinical disorders. These results inform us about the problems 
experienced by people that can occur without direct experience (e.g., a fear of snakes 
without ever being in contact with one). If  thought suppression / interference can 
transfer to stimuli that are closely or not so closely related to the targeted stimulus, 
such generalization could cause a negative cascade that would aggravate disorders 
such as depression (Walther, Nagengast & Trasselli, 2005). In the current chapter 
suppression attempts were shown to generalize to related stimuli through 
equivalence relations, which could model processes in disorders such as obsessive 
compulsive disorder in which attempted suppression of certain initial thoughts 
eventually leads to a situation in which further thoughts indirectly related to the 
initial thoughts must also be suppressed. Such spreading may promote avoidance 
behaviors. In the current chapter participants consistently avoided stimuli related to 
the to-be-suppressed target as such stimuli rendered the suppression attempt more 
difficult. In everyday terms, avoiding thoughts o f “not being good enough” could 
promote avoiding going for an interview as thoughts o f “not being good enough” are 
likely to emerge if  one does not get the job.
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These findings may be of particular interest to researchers working in clinical 
areas that are linked to high levels of attempted thought suppression such as anxiety 
disorders, obsessive compulsive disorder and phobias (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1990; 
Schell, Dawson & Marinkovic, 1991). Many researchers have argued for 
explanations of thought suppression that rely on cognitive processes, such as 
rebound and ironic thought processes (e.g., Mineka & Tomarken, 1989; Reiss, 
1980). From a behaviour-analytic perspective, however, such explanations are 
incomplete because they leave the rebound and ironic thought processes, which are 
also behaviours, unexplained (Barnes, 1989; Hayes & Brownstien, 1986). If 
equivalence provides an adequate behavioral account of human language and 
cognition (e.g., Hayes, Bames-Holmes & Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1994), then the 
current paradigm provides a potentially useful empirical avenue for the exploration 
of this phenomenon and research into thought suppression in clinically relevant 
populations using this paradigm might provide new insight into the role of transfer of 
suppression functions in the acquisition and manipulation of maladaptive behaviour. 
Indeed, the success of earlier programs of research that have explored human 
behaviour using the derived relational paradigm (e.g., Markham, Dougher, & 
Augustson, 2002; Roche & Barnes, 1997; Roche, Bames-Holmes, Smeets, Bames- 
Holmes, & McGeady, 2000) attest to the viability of this suggestion.
137
V j i i a p u
Chapter 5
Mindfulness and defusion as alternatives to thought
suppression
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5. Introduction
The previous chapters have demonstrated the counterproductive nature of 
thought suppression as a strategy in coping with unwanted neutral (Chapter 2) and 
high valence (Chapter 3) thoughts, whilst Chapter 4 presented a behavioural account 
of why thought suppression fails in terms of derived stimulus relations. One 
advantage of this behavioural model of thought suppression is the direct link 
between derived stimulus relations and emergent third wave behaviour therapies, 
particularly Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson,
1999).
In fact, possibly the most important feature of the third wave therapies is that 
they are grounded in basic behavioural science and the modem contextual 
behavioural scientific approach to language and cognition, known as Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT: Hayes, Bames-Holmes & Roche, 2001). This grounding in 
basic theory, not only ensures that third wave therapies are coherent and evidence 
based, but also allows for the continued refinement of therapy at the process level 
thus facilitating their ongoing evolution and development. According to Relational 
Frame Theory (Hayes, et al., 2001) the way in which we verbally relate stimuli, and 
any subsequent transformation of stimulus functions (see Chapter 1 for a detailed 
account o f this phenomenon) that occur, may be at the source of psychological 
suffering. RFT suggests that, via arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
(AARR; a process of both directly trained and derived learning), vast relational 
networks are established that could cause virtually any two stimuli to be related to 
one another. However, when two stimuli are related in such a way, a transformation 
of stimulus functions is possible; whereby, the functions that one stimulus has for a 
person, can then ‘transform’, or be present, in any related stimuli. However, 
problematic psychological issues may arise as a result o f this transformation of 
stimulus function, for example, the functions of negative and unwanted thoughts can 
transform to related stimuli (Hooper, Saunders & McHugh, in press). For illustrative 
purposes imagine an individual who engages in experiential avoidance of one 
negative stimulus (i.e., an unwanted thought o f a spider), avoidance of all related 
stimuli would have to be achieved in order to fully eradicate the unwanted thought
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(i.e., thoughts o f webs, insects, legs etc). In so attempting to avoid the unwanted 
negative thought, it is likely that previously valued behaviors will be stopped (e.g., 
not going into a room you have heard previously had spiders in it), causing a 
restriction of the person’s behavioural repertoire.
In summary, RFT (Hayes et al, 2001) suggests that psychological distress 
arises because of the way in which we address unwanted thoughts and feelings. In 
particular it provides an empirical model of why attempts to experientially avoid do 
not work (Dvmond etPvmond et al., 2008; Hooper et al., in press). Two third wave 
techniques that are directly opposing to experiential avoidance are mindfulness and 
defusion. Experiments 8, 9 and 10 of this chapter aim to directly compare thought 
suppression with mindfulness/defusion based strategies in the management of 
unwanted thoughts.
5.1. Experiment 7
One of the third wave techniques that is receiving increasing attention in the 
clinical literature, and is of particular relevance to the current thesis due to its appeal 
as an alternative for dealing with unwanted thoughts, is mindfulness (Najmi, 
Riemann & Wegner, 2009). Mindfulness has been described as “the awareness that 
emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non- 
judgementally to the unfolding of experience, moment to moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 
2003, p. 145). It involves continuous, clear-sighted attention to ongoing subjective 
experience together with an attitude of acceptance towards that experience (Ortner, 
Kilner & Zelazo, 2007). Knowledge o f mindfulness meditation has grown 
exponentially over the past thirty years, resulting in scientifically-backed support for 
mindfulness by researchers in diverse fields, including psychology, neuroscience, 
and philosophy, amongst others (Fletcher & Hayes, 2005). The recent development 
of therapies such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) 
and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Teasdale, Segal & Williams,
2000) has resulted in medical practitioners increasingly encouraging their patients to 
explore mindfulness meditation practices to alleviate a variety o f physical and 
mental ailments.
140
However, research directly comparing the effectiveness of mindfulness 
versus thought suppression (i.e., the most widely employed coping strategy for 
negative psychological content), is scarce. Marcks & Woods (2005) compared 
mindful acceptance based techniques with suppression in the management of 
personally relevant unwanted thoughts. These researchers supplied three groups 
(thought suppression, acceptance and monitor only) with technique appropriate 
instructions. The instructions (i.e., a paragraph of text) were presented to the 
participants prior to a 5 minute suppression period, during which the occurrence of 
each unwanted thought was recorded by the participant pressing a button in front of 
them. Finally, upon completion of the 5 minute period the discomfort associated 
with the experience o f personally relevant unwanted thoughts was measured via a 
self appraisal form. The findings indicated that no difference emerged in terms of 
unwanted thought intrusions during the five minute suppression period. However the 
results did find that those who were instructed to suppress their intrusive thoughts 
reported an increased level of discomfort after adhering to the suppression 
instruction. In comparison, those in the acceptance condition reported a decrease in 
discomfort. The monitor only group experienced lower frequency of thoughts and 
lower discomfort than the other two groups. Marcks and Woods (2005) concluded 
that their data provided initial evidence that acceptance may be a more effective 
strategy for managing personally relevant unwanted thoughts than suppression, 
although it must be added that the results of the monitor only group did not concur 
with pre experimental predictions..
In a subsequent study Najmi, Riemann and Wegner (2009) compared mindful 
acceptance and thought suppression in dealing with unwanted thoughts in a group of 
participants diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and a non 
clinical sample. Across three separate sessions the participants in each group were 
exposed to one of three instructions (mindful acceptance, focused distraction or 
thought suppression). Again the dependent measures were identical to those used by 
Marcks and Woods (2005), that is, (1) the number of unwanted thoughts post 
instruction during a five minute period and (2) discomfort level in coping with 
unwanted thoughts. The results indicated there was no difference between the 
thought suppression and the mindfulness groups in terms of unwanted thought 
intrusions during the five minute period. However a post experiment treatment
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adherence measure indicated that across both the OCD and control groups, the effort 
involved in coping with unwanted thoughts was greatest when applying the thought 
suppression instruction. Additionally, after the mindful acceptance instruction 
participants reported significantly less discomfort than during the suppression 
intervention. The focused distraction group reported no difference in discomfort 
either during or post measure while the thought suppression group indicated a higher 
level of discomfort post intervention compared to during. Taken together, these 
studies provide evidence that mindful acceptance based techniques may be more 
useful than thought suppression in dealing with unwanted thoughts.
However, it is hard to draw basic conclusions on the impact of mindful 
acceptance versus thought suppression from these studies. Firstly, Marcks and 
Woods (2005) employed sub clinical populations instructed to suppress high valence 
material. It is possible that the sub clinical nature o f the group confounded the effect 
of the intervention techniques. Secondly, it should also be noted that neither study 
included an actual technique (e.g. thought suppression or acceptance) induction. 
Specifically, participants were simply required to read a brief paragraph before 
entering the suppression period.
Typically, mindfulness training is implemented over a number of sessions 
(Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998). However, even a 15-minute focused attention 
instruction has been shown to produce mindfulness consistent behavior on a 
subsequent task. For example, Arch and Craske (2006) tested the immediate effects 
of a 15-minute focused attention induction involving ‘mindfulness’ of breath 
instructions, which provided a short experimental analogue of mindfulness. The 
findings indicated that participants in the focused attention induction demonstrated 
more positive responses to external stimuli after the induction than an unfocused 
attention group. McHugh, Simpson and Reed (2010) employed a 10 minute version 
o f the Arch and Craske (2006) focused attention induction to reduce decision making 
deficits in an older population. The focused attention induction in their study reduced 
decision making deficits on a card selection task relative to an unfocused attention 
control induction. The current paper will utilize a nine minute focused attention 
(mindfulness) induction, adapted from that used by Arch and Craske (2006) that 
targets focusing attention on the present moment.
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The current study aims to extend on the work of Marcks and Woods (2005) 
and Najmi, et al., (2009) in the comparison of mindfulness (mindfulness can be 
operationalised in a number of ways, in the current study this was done via a focused 
attention exercise) versus thought suppression strategies. The two principal 
dependent measures are similar to those used in the aforementioned research; firstly 
the amount of thought intrusions will be measured during a 9 minute period, and 
secondly each participants’ emotional state (this can be seen as a parallel to the 
‘discomfort’ levels measured in Marcks & Woods, 2005, and Najmi et al, 2009) will 
be measured pre and post induction. However it also differs from those studies in a 
number of ways. First, the personally relevant unwanted thought will be identical 
across participants. Specifically, a negatively valenced picture from the International 
Affective Picture System will be employed. Second, the previous studies read a 
paragraph of technique appropriate instructions to their participants whereas the 
current study will expose participants to a 9 minute focused attention/thought 
suppression induction (adapted from Arch & Craske, 2006), during which they will 
be asked to signal the presence of the ‘target thought’. Third, pre experimental 
general health will be measured using the general health questionnaire, and pre and 
post induction measures of psychological flexibility, anxiety and emotional state will 
be completed by each participant. This is an important addition to a study which 
compares the impact of a short induction because not only do each of those measures 
serve as screening measures pre induction (for example, it is important that one 
group is not significantly more mindful pre induction), but a post induction 
comparison is possible, which could display the impact of the two inductions on the 
self report measures.
It is predicted, in accordance with previous literature (Marcks & Woods, 
2005; Najmi, et al., 2009), that participants in the focused attention group will signal 
the presence of the unwanted thought a similar amount of times to the thought 
suppression group. Additionally, the focused attention group will demonstrate a 
significant improvement in emotional state, when compared to the thought 
suppression group.
5.1.1. Method
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Participants and Design
50 undergraduates (31 female, 19 male) at Swansea University were paid 4 
credits for their participation in the experiment (Mean age; 22.9 years, SD; 5.98). 
The sample was non clinical. The study was a mixed design with induction 
(suppression vs. focused attention) as the between subject factor and measure (pre 
and post screening and emotional state questionnaires) as the within subjects factor. 
The number of intrusions in the 9 minute period, the difference between pre and post 
induction emotional state, and the difference between pre and post induction 
questionnaire scores will serve as the dependent measures.
Apparatus
The experiment was completed in a laboratory at the Swansea University. 
The laboratory was quiet and free from distraction. It contained a desk, a chair, a 
standard computer (Processor) with a 14-inch screen and standard computer mouse. 
The participant’s responses were controlled by the computer program, which was 
created in Visual Basic TM 6.0. Participants listened to a recorded intervention 
(adapted from McHugh et al, in press) via the use of a Dictaphone (Olympus, digital 
voice recorder).
Materials
Four pre and post measures of anxiety, psychological flexibility, mindfulness 
and emotional state were used, using the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire II, the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale and an 
emotional rating affect scale, respectively. Finally post induction, a treatment 
adherence measure was administered to participants.
1). The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STA II and II, Spielberger, Gorsuch & 
Lushene, 1970, see appendix 6). The STAI was administered to provide a measure of 
participants’ pre and post experimental trait and state anxiety level. The STAI is 
comprised of two scales, made up of 20 items each, which measure trait anxiety and 
state anxiety. Respondents rate each item on a scale ranging from 1 to 4, which 
yields an overall range 20-80 points on each subscale. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of trait or state anxiety. Test-retest reliability ranges from .73 to .86 on the 
STAI-Trait and .16 to .54 on the STAI-State. The internal consistency of the 
subscales has been found to be acceptable.
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2). Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II  (Bond et al, under review). The 
AAQ II was employed to provide a pre and post experimental measure of 
psychological flexibility. The AAQ II is a 10-item revision of the original nine-item 
AAQ (Hayes et al., 2007) and has been shown to have good psychometric properties 
and good convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity. Factor analytic findings 
suggest the AAQ II-II is a uni-dimensional measure. Higher scores on the AAQ II 
indicate greater psychological flexibility.
3). Mindful attention awareness scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003, see appendix 
7). The MAAS was administered to provide a pre and post experimental measure of 
mindfulness. The MAAS is a 15-item scale designed to assess a core characteristic of 
dispositional mindfulness, namely, open or receptive awareness of and attention to 
what is taking place in the present. The scale shows strong psychometric properties 
and has been validated.
4). Emotional rating affect scale (see appendix 8). The affect scale was 
administered to the participants both pre and post induction in order to measure the 
participants emotional state. The scale included one question, which measured from - 
50 to + 50; ‘please rate how the picture made you feel on the following scale, where 
-50 represents a very negative emotional state, and +50 represents a very positive 
emotional state. ’
5). Treatment adherence measure (see appendix 9). The treatment adherence 
measure was included, post induction, to ensure that the participants understood the 
instructions included in the induction and also to provide a self report o f the extent to 
which participants employed the induction when managing any unwanted intrusive 
thoughts that may have arisen. The first statement 'Was it easy to follow the 
instructions provided on the audio tape? ’ was measured on a likert scale ranging 
from 1-7 where 1 represented ‘yes’ and 7 represented ‘no’. The second statement ‘To 
what extent did you implement the instructions provided on the audio tape when 
having thoughts about the picture you previously saw?' was also measured on a 
likert scale of 1-7 where 1 was equal to ‘very much so’ and 7 was equal to ‘not at 
all’.
Procedure
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On each subject’s arrival at the prescribed room, the participant was greeted 
by a male experimenter. Upon completion o f the consent form the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions; the thought 
suppression group or the focused attention group. The procedure for both groups was 
identical except that the thought suppression group received a suppression induction, 
where as the focused attention group received a focused attention induction. For sake 
of clarity, the procedure has been split into the following sections; (1) Initial 
questionnaires (2) Picture rating (3) Intervention and space bar program (4) Follow 
up ratings/questionnaires (5) Final questionnaires.
Initial Questionnaires
The participants were firstly required to complete the initial questionnaires; 
AAQ II, STAI (state and trait) and MAAS. The questionnaires were dependent 
measures in the study, in that the same questionnaires were also completed in the 
final phase of the study to notice any differences within and between groups that 
may have occurred due to the respective inductions.
Picture Rating
After the questionnaires were completed the participants were required to 
look at the IAP image on the computer screen in front of them for ‘as long as they 
felt comfortable for’, (the picture came from the International Affective Picture 
Scale; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999). Participants received the following 
instructions; fo r  this phase o f  the study you are required to look at an aversive 
picture. You should try to look at this picture fo r  as long as you can up to 20 
seconds, however as soon as you want the picture removed from  the screen then 
indicate so and the picture will be removed’. The latency until the participants 
removed the picture from the screen was recorded. After looking at the picture the 
participant was required to fill out a single question Affect Scale (Wolpe, 1990), 
which asked the participants to rate their emotional state (see Appendix 8).
Intervention and Space Bar Press
Next the participants underwent the 9 minute intervention. If the participant 
was in the thought suppression group they would receive the following instruction 
before moving onto the induction;
'The picture you have ju s t seen may have evoked in you some unwanted 
thoughts and feelings. Unwanted thoughts and feelings can be dealt with in different 
ways. Some o f  these strategies are helpful and some o f  them are not. Recently 
research has suggested that suppressing all negative thoughts and feelings is the 
best way to deal with them. Over the next 9 minute period you will undertake a 
popular thought suppression training task. During this task, you will be asked to 
suppress all unwanted thoughts and bad feelings, please when doing this apply the 
unwanted thoughts and feelings that were evoked in you when you looked at the 
picture from  before. Finally, i f  during the 9 minute period you happen to have 
thoughts o f  the aversive picture enter your mind, then please press the space bar on 
the computer in front o f  y o u ’
The participant received an audio technique reminder roughly every 30 
seconds;
‘Much o f  the emotional distress people experience is the result o f  thinking 
about upsetting things that have already happened or anticipating negative events 
that have yet to occur. Distressing emotions such as anger, anxiety, guilt and 
sadness are much easier to bear i f  you try your best not to think about them. This is 
an exercise to increase your ability to suppress upsetting thoughts so that you can 
clear away any thoughts about past and future events. Start by allowing your mind to 
roam. When an unwanted thought comes to mind, simply try to remove it. There is no 
need to focus on anything in particular. But each time any unwanted thought enters 
your mind continue to remove it. Try not to focus on any one thing. Just let your 
mind wander. Openly let your thoughts flow. Continue to let yourself think freely. 
But i f  the unwanted thought enters your mind try to pu t it away from  your conscious 
awareness. Just let your mind wander. Think about whatever comes to mind, except 
the unwanted thought. Let your thoughts drift. Continue your flow  o f  thoughts. But 
be wary o f  the upsetting thought, removing it each time it appears. Continue to 
suppress that thought until you hear the sound o f  the bell. ’
If the participant was in the focused attention group they would receive the 
following instruction before moving onto the induction;
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‘The picture you have ju st seen may have evoked in you some unwanted 
thoughts and feelings. Unwanted thoughts and feelings can be dealt with in different 
ways.. Some o f  these strategies are helpful and some o f them are not. Recently 
research has suggested that being aware and being present with negative thoughts 
and feelings is the best way to deal with them. Over the next 9 minute period you will 
undertake a popular mindfulness training task. During this task, you will be asked to 
become present with all unwanted thoughts and bad feelings, please when doing this 
apply the unwanted thoughts and feelings that were evoked in you when you looked 
at the picture from before. Finally, i f  during the 9 minute period you happen to have 
thoughts o f  the aversive picture enter your mind, then please press the space bar on 
the computer in front o f  you ’
After listening to the instruction the participant received the following 
induction via the dictaphone. The participant received a technique reminder roughly 
every 30 seconds;
lMuch o f  the emotional distress people experience is the result o f  thinking 
about upsetting things that have already happened or anticipating negative events 
that have yet to occur. Distressing emotions such as anger, anxiety, guilt and 
sadneiss are much easier to bear i f  you only focus on the present -  on each moment 
one a t a time. This is an exercise to increase your mindfulness o f  the present moment 
so that you can clear away any thoughts about past and future events. Start by 
focusing on your breathing. D on’t try to change anything about your breathing, ju st 
notice the air moving in and out o f  your body. Try to focus all your attention on your 
breathing. Notice the sensation o f  breathing air in. Notice the sensation o f  breathing 
air out. As you breathe air into your body, f i l l  your mind with the thought ‘‘ju st this 
one breath ”. As you breathe air out o f  your body, fill your mind with the thought 
‘‘just this one exhale ”. Focus on the actual sensation o f  breath entering and leaving 
your body. Just this one breath in. Just this one exhale out. I f  you notice that your 
awareness is no longer on your breath gently bring your awareness back. Just this 
one breath. Just this one exhale. Continue focusing only on each breath in and each 
breath out, do not anticipate anything -  even your next breath. Only focus on one 
breath at a time. I f  anything else pops into your mind, push it aside and refocus your 
attention to each breath. Continue focusing on each breath in and each exhale out 
until y(Ou hear the sound o f the bell. ’
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In summary, both groups of participants received a matched length 
instruction before receiving a matched length induction. Both groups were required 
to press the space bar each time that any thoughts of the aversive image entered their 
minds. This served as a dependent measure.
Follow up ratings and questionnaires
Following completion o f the induction participants had to complete the 
treatment adherence measure (see Appendix 9) to indicate to what degree they had 
employed the technique from the induction phase in dealing with the negative image. 
Then they again had to complete the emotional state affect scale. The difference 
between the pre and post induction rating on this scale served as a dependent 
measure.
Final Questionnaires
To complete the study participants were required to fill out the post 
experimental measures, that is, the AAQ II, STAI (state and trait) and the MAAS. 
Both within and between group differences on these measures served as dependent 
variables..
5.1.2. Results
Treatment Adherence Measure and Seconds on the Screen
In order to avoid confounding the results the participants from the thought 
suppression group and the focused attention group had to perform similarly on two 
measures; the treatment adherence measure and the amount of time they spent 
looking at the aversive picture. If differences were found between these measures 
then it could be argued that the results of the study were due to differences on these 
measures and not the independent variables manipulated. Table 14 displays the mean 
scores of each group on these measures, and appears to show little difference 
between them. Indeed, independent sample t tests were conducted on the data and 
found no significant difference between either group on the treatment adherence 
rating 1, t (48) = 0.000; p > 0.05, treatment adherence rating 2, t (48) = 0.213; p > 
0.05, and the amount of time the picture was looked at, t (48) = -0.961; p > 0.05.
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Questionnaires
Participants from both groups (thought suppression and focused attention) 
had to complete three o f the questionnaires on two occasions; once before the 
presentation of the IAP and subsequent intervention and once afterwards. These 
questionnaires were the AAQ II, STAI (state and trait) and the MAAS. Table 14 
shows how the scores on these questionnaires differed not only between groups, but 
also within each group from the first time participants completed the questionnaires 
to the second time.
A higher score on the AAQ II indicates a higher level of psychological 
flexibility. The results displayed in Table 14 below indicate that both groups 
experienced a slight increase in acceptance from completion stage one to completion 
stage two. Independent sample t tests found that there was no difference between 
each group in either completion stage 1, t(48) = 0.311; p>0.05, or completion stage 
2, t(48) = 0.799; p>0.05, suggesting that the intervention did not cause a significant 
difference between groups in terms of emotional acceptance. Paired sample t tests 
were also conducted. For the thought suppression group no significant main effect 
was found, t(24) = -2.039; p > 0.05, suggesting that participants in the suppression 
group did not become more emotionally accepting after the suppression intervention. 
However a significant main effect was found for the focused attention group, t (14) = 
-3.294; p < 0.05, suggesting that participants became more accepting after having 
received the focused attention intervention
A higher score on STAI I and II indicate higher levels of anxiety. The means 
displayed in Table 14 show how participants in both groups experienced little change 
in their levels of anxiety. Independent sample t tests revealed no significant 
difference between either group, for the STAI I, either at completion stage one t(48) 
= -0.221; p > 0.05 or completion stage two t(48) = 0.833; p > 0.05. Similar results 
were found for the STAI II; completion stage one t(48) = -0.348; p > 0.05, 
completion stage two t(48) = -0.687; p > 0.05. Additionally paired sample t tests 
also revealed no significant difference between either completion stage in the 
thought suppression group (STAI 11(24) = -0.565; p > 0.05, STAI II t(24) = 1.141; p 
> 0.05) and the focused attention group (STAI I t(24) = 1.059; p > 0.05, STAI II
150
t(24) = 1.451; p > 0.05). These results suggest that the induction made no difference 
to anxiety levels both between and within groups.
Finally, a higher score on the MAAS indicates higher levels of mindfulness. 
Table 14 again shows that there were little differences between each group across 
both completion stages. Independent sample t tests revealed no significant difference 
between the groups at either completion stage one, t(48) = 0.088; p > 0.05 or 
completion stage two t(48) = -0.843 ; p > o  .05. Within subject t tests also revealed no 
significant difference between completion stage one and two for the thought 
suppression group, t(24) = 0.666; p > 0.05 or the focused attention group t(24) = - 
1.291; p > 0.05. These results suggest that neither group experienced any changes in 
levels o f mindfulness from pre to post induction.
Rating o f  Emotional State
Participants had to rate their emotional state, on a scale of -50 to +50, on two 
occasions; firstly after just having seen the aversive picture, and secondly after 
having completed the interventions. Table 14 shows how the participant’s emotional 
state changed from rating one to rating two.
Table 14 displays that all participants regardless of group, tended to 
experience a negative emotional state after just having seen the picture. Additionally 
both groups experienced an improvement in emotional state after having completed 
the intervention. However the table does show that the focused attention induction 
produced a larger improvement in emotional state when compared to the thought 
suppression induction. Paired sample t tests were conducted to determine if  the 
improvements from rating one to rating two were significant. The results revealed a 
significant main effect for the thought suppression group, t(24) = -7.228; p< 0.05, 
and the focused attention group, t (24) = -9.229; p < 0.05. Suggesting that both 
groups experienced significantly improved emotional states after having completed 
the induction.
Independent sample t tests were then conducted to determine any between 
group differences. The results revealed no significant main effect between groups for 
rating one, t(48)= -0.403; p > 0.05, this suggests that before receiving the inductions, 
participants from both groups reacted similarly to the aversive picture. The results
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did reveal a significant main effect between both groups for rating 2, t(48) = -3.146; 
p < 0.05. The results suggest that, although both groups experienced improvements, 
the emotional state of the focused attention group improved significantly more than 
that o f the thought suppression group.
Suppression Group M indfulness Group
Treatm ent Adherence R1 1.96(1.05) 1 .96(1 .39)
Treatm ent Adherence R2 2.88 (1.26) 2 .8 (1 .38 )
Seconds on screen 11.6 (7.01) 11.8(7 .77)
AAQ I I 1 52.92 (10.64) 52.04 (9.34)
AAQ I I 2 54.2 (9.08) 54.8 (9.92)
S T A I 1 1 33.04(11.44) 33 .72(10 .23)
S T A I 1 2 34.5 (12) 32 (9.24)
STAI I I 1 36.72(11.67) 37.76 (9.31)
STAI I I 2 34 .9(11 .4) 36.9 (8.64)
M AAS 1 3.99 (0.91) 3.93 (0.58)
M AAS 2 4 .04(1 .06) 4 .15 (0 .72 )
Em otional State 1st Rating -29 (17.99) -27.2 (14.84)
Em otional State 2nd Rating -0.68 (20.1) 15.8(16.7)
Table 14. Pre and post induction means and standard deviations 
Thought intrusions, Experiment 7.
Whilst undertaking the 9 minute induction participants from both groups 
were asked to signal the presence of all thoughts and feelings associated with the 
aversive picture by pressing the space bar on the computer. Figure 10 shows the 
difference in space bar presses between both groups.
Figure 10 displays that those participants asked to engage in an induction 
which encouraged them not to think of the aversive picture (thought suppression 
group) indicated the presence of that thought 15.84 (SD = 7.92) times during the 9 
minute period. The focused attention group had the thought come to mind 8.4 (SD =
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6.46) times. This difference is statistically significant, t(48) = 3.637; p < 0.05. This 
result displays that those in the focused attention group experienced unwanted 
intrusive thoughts o f the aversive picture significantly less than those who were 
encouraged to suppress all thought associated with it.
Figure 10. The mean amount o f  space bar presses recorded by each group, 
Experiment 7.
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Summary
Participants in the focused attention group experienced a significant 
improvement in their emotional state compared to the thought suppression group. 
They also had unwanted thoughts o f the aversive pictures come to mind significantly 
less during the induction period. Finally the various self report measures employed 
revealed no significant changes from pre to post induction in levels o f anxiety and 
mindfulness. However the results did show that participants in the focused attention 
group experienced a small but significant improvement in psychological flexibility.
5.1.3. Discussion
1 5 3
It has been theorised that mindfulness could serve as an appropriate 
alternative to thought suppression in coping with unwanted thoughts (Marcks & 
Woods, 2005; Najmi et al, 2009). The aim of this present study was to assess the 
effectiveness of a focused attention (mindfulness) induction in coping with thoughts 
of high valence negative content. In accordance with previous research (Marcks & 
Woods, 2005; Najmi et al, 2009) two predictions were made. First, it was predicted 
that participants in the focused attention group would experience a similar number of 
thought intrusions during the induction phase when compared to the thought 
suppression group. The current study contradicts this prediction. It was found that 
participants in the thought suppression group had thoughts of the aversive picture 
come to mind significantly more than the focused attention group. Second, it was 
predicted that the focused attention group would experience a significant 
improvement in their emotional state (i.e., anxiety level) from pre to post induction 
in comparison to the thought suppression group. This prediction was confirmed by 
the results, participants in the focused attention group did experience a significantly 
greater improvement in emotional state when compared to the thought suppression 
group.
Marcks and Woods (2005) and Najmi et al (2009) found that participants in 
both the mindful acceptance and thought suppression groups experienced a similar 
amount of unwanted thought intrusions during a five minute period. This was a 
surprising finding when one considers that the majority of thought suppression 
studies have demonstrated that attempting not to think of a target causes the target to 
re-enter consciousness an escalated amount of times during a five minute period (see 
Chapter 2 and 3). However, these researchers reported that being mindful of a target 
produced a similar amount of unwanted intrusions. In fact their results could support 
later literature, which via the use of a baseline condition, suggests that the ironic 
results associated with attempted suppression may be due to the paradigm and not to 
thought suppression in itself (Abramowitz, Tolin & Street, 2001;Clark, Ball & Pape, 
1991). Despite this, the current study concurs with studies which do find a thought 
suppression effect (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987; Lavy & Van den 
Hout, 1990). Specifically, participants in the thought suppression group thought of 
the aversive picture far more than the comparable focused attention group. One 
potential reason for this finding might be due to subtle procedural differences, in the
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current study, a 9 minute induction was used as opposed to the typical five minute 
suppression period. Nevertheless, the result suggests that being mindful, as opposed 
to attempting suppression, results in significantly less intrusions.
The results also indicated that participants in the focused attention group 
experienced a significantly greater improvement in emotional state when compared 
to the thought suppression group. This result is similar to that o f Marcks and Woods 
(2005) and Najmi et al (2009), who found that distress levels were greater for the 
thought suppression group post five minute period. However, contrary to their 
findings it could be argued that level of emotional improvement, in the current study, 
is directly inverse to the amount of intrusions. This suggests a possible link between 
thought suppression and psychopathology, that is, more intrusions lead to more 
distress, which may in turn contribute to the development of psychopathologies. This 
finding is in line with suggestions by Purdon and Clark (2000) who suggested that 
the discomfort associated with suppression should be the target of inquiry rather than 
the frequency of thoughts per se. In fact these researchers have found that people 
who suppress personally relevant thoughts are more distressed and have higher 
levels of discomfort after doing so (Purdon & Clark 2000; Trinder & Salkovskis, 
1994).
Finally the results of the questionnaires warrant discussion. Mindfulness is a 
strategy which aims at increasing psychological flexibility. The current study 
showed that even a minor 9 minute induction can increase psychological flexibility. 
Participants in the focused attention group scored significantly higher on the AAQ II 
post induction compared to pre induction, in comparison to the thought suppression 
group. However, despite finding a behavioural effect o f mindfulness and despite 
increasing psychological flexibility, scores on the mindfulness measure (MAAS) did 
not change from pre to post induction. This suggests that participants did not become 
more mindful after having received the induction. This result could be explained by 
the nature of the measure, in that the MAAS is a trait measure of mindfulness, 
therefore it would be expected that scores would remain relatively stable across time. 
Perhaps in future a state measure of mindfulness would be more appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the main aim of mindfulness, from an ACT perspective is to increase 
psychological flexibility, and the increased scores on the AAQ display a slight 
increase in psychological flexibility. These findings therefore have large
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implications as they suggest that short inductions, which are both cost and time 
efficient, improve psychological flexibility, which has been shown to be linked to 
improved psychological well being (Bond et al, under review).
In summary the results of Experiment 7 provide evidence to suggest that 
mindfulness is a viable alternative to thought suppression in the management of 
unwanted intrusive thoughts. Despite providing evidence for this advantage of 
mindfulness over thought suppression, the behavioural measure (i.e. the typical 
thought suppression paradigm), due its self report nature, may come into question. 
Specifically, there is no way to ensure that participants are engaging with the 
experiment or accurately signalling presence of the unwanted thought each time that 
it occurs. For this reason Experiment 8 in the thesis will provide a clear behavioural 
measure of the effects of both interventions.
5.2. Experiment 8
Experiment 8 will again compare the effectiveness of a thought suppression 
versus mindfulness intervention, however it will employ an additional behavioural 
measure which aims to ascertain the effectiveness of each intervention. Additionally 
Experiment 8 aims to extend the research conducted in Chapter 3 on the link 
between thought suppression and phobias, by aiming to provide an alternative 
dependent measure of the potential contribution thought suppression has in the 
maintenance of phobias. Specifically 2 groups of spider fearful individuals will 
receive one of the two interventions, before having to approach a real life spider. A 
common form of anxiety disorder is a specific phobia, with spider phobia 
documented as the most prevalent specific phobia in western culture (Bourdon, 
Boyd, Rae, Bums, Thompson & Locke, 1988). In fact, spider phobia has a 
prevalence rate of 3.5% amongst the general population (Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer, 
& Wik, 1996). When these individuals (physically or mentally) encounter a spider 
they often experience intense fear and consequently develop avoidance behaviours 
that can interfere with normal everyday functioning.
The use of spider fear, and phobias in general, in thought suppression 
related research is not a novel approach (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on
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this issue). Indeed research that has directly examined the role of thought 
suppression in phobias has concluded that thought suppression may play a role in 
their aetiology and maintenance (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Behavioural accounts 
of phobias have implicated the role of escape/ avoidance behaviours in the 
maintenance of phobias (Purdin, 1999). One such account is offered by the theory of 
general anxiety (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997). According to this theory, although 
phobic individuals are hyper-vigilant to threat cues, in the presence of a threat they 
will suppress or avoid particular aspects of the threatening stimulus. For example, 
phobic participants tend to report only a vague description of the stimulus that they 
fear, as they often avoid all contact with it. Avoidance of the stimulus is believed to 
be controlled by a need to reduce any anxiety that may arise from having direct 
contact with the stimulus thus prohibiting complete activation of fear structures and 
in turn habituation to the fear stimulus. Becker, Rinck, Roth and Margraf (1998) 
examined the effects of thought suppression in individuals suffering from 
G eneralised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and typical controls. Their findings suggested 
that GAD participants did not differ in their ability to suppress thoughts of neutral 
material (e.g. white bear) but were less able to suppress thoughts about emotional 
material (recent worries) than controls. Furthermore, GAD participants displayed an 
immediate enhancement effect o f the unwanted thought whereas the control group 
did not. This led the authors to conclude that people with GAD have a higher 
tendency to suppress thoughts about their fears.
With research suggesting that the suppression of spider fear may serve to 
enhance the amount of unwanted spider related thoughts (see Chapter 3), research 
which shows the behavioral effects o f such suppression, as well as the effects of a 
viable alternative, becomes necessary. The current study aims to determine whether 
a mindfulness (i.e., focused attention) induction compared to thought suppression 
and an unfocused attention control induction would reduce spider avoidance in those 
scoring high on a spider fearful questionnaire. To that end, participants will complete 
an induction procedure (either focused attention, unfocused attention or thought 
suppression), followed by the Behavioral Approach Test (BAT; Kindt & Brosschot, 
1999). The BAT measures how close participants moved towards a real life spider. It 
is predicted that the focused attention (mindfulness) group will move through 
significantly more steps of the BAT than either the unfocused attention or thought
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suppression groups. Additionally, participants’ pre and post BAT anxiety levels were 
measured in order to determine whether the assigned induction increased or 
decreased anxiety level. It is predicted that those in the thought suppression group 
will experience an inflation in post BAT anxiety levels, in comparison to the focused 
attention group.
5.2.1. Method
Participants and Design
Thirty spider fearful participants (5 male, 25 female) were recruited from the 
Psychology Department’s subject pool at Swansea University. Their mean age was 
twenty five years and six months (SD= 11.54, Range = 18-57 years). The selection 
of participants was based upon scores achieved on the Fear of Spider Questionnaire 
(Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). Participants had to score 50 or over in order to be 
considered spider fearful. A single factor between subjects design was employed 
where the scores of each group (focused attention, thought suppression and 
unfocussed attention) on the BAT and the S T A I1 served as the dependent measures.
Stimuli
Firstly the participants had to complete the Fear o f  Spider Questionnaire 
(FSQ, Szymanski & O ’Donohue, 1995). The FSQ was employed to assess 
participants’ pre-experimental level of spider fear. Participants scoring > 50 are 
deemed spider fearful and thus eligible to participate in the current study. Identically, 
to Experiment 7 then, the participants were also required to complete State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI I and II, Spielberger et al) the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire //(B ond  et al, under review) and the Treatment adherence.
The Inductions 
Focused Attention (Mindfulness)
The focused attention induction was a nine minute dictaphone recorded 
message. It was based on the induction used by Arch and Craske (2005). It included 
a sentence approximately every 30 seconds. The induction involved participants
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being exposed to an in vivo short experiential focused attention exercise (see 
Experiment 7)
Thought Suppression
The thought suppression induction was a nine minute audio recording that 
was designed to mirror the focused attention induction in terms of sentence length 
and the timings at which the technique reminders occurred (every 30 seconds). This 
induction walked participants through the stages of thought suppression, 
encouraging them to remove unwanted spider related thoughts from their minds (see 
Experiment 7).
Unfocused Attention
The unfocused attention induction was a nine minute recording, matched in 
terms of sentence length and the timings at which the technique reminders occurred 
(every 30 seconds). The induction encouraged participants to allow their minds to 
wander freely through thoughts of past and future events without focusing on any 
one thought;
*Much o f  the emotional distress people experience is the result o f  thinking 
about upsetting things that have already happened or anticipating negative events 
that have yet to occur. Distressing emotions such as anger, anxiety, guilt and 
sadness are often brought to mind. With this exercise let your mind wander freely 
amongst thoughts about past and future events. Start by allowing your mind to roam. 
D on’t  try to focus on your thoughts, ju s t let them drift without hesitation. There is no 
need to focus on anything in particular. Allow yourself to think freely. Try not to 
focus on any one thing. Just let your mind wander. Openly let your thoughts flow. 
Continue to let yourself think freely. There is no need to think o f  anything in 
particular. Just let your mind wander. Think about whatever comes to mind. Let your 
thoughts drift. Continue your flow  o f  thoughts. Continue to let your thoughts flow  
until you hear the sound o f  the bell. ’
The Behavioral Approach Test (BAT; Kindt & Brosschot, 1999)
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Spider fearful behaviour was measured using the Behavioral Approach Test 
(BAT). Participants stood three metres away from a table with a glass jar on it. 
Inside the glass jar was a living spider which was roughly two centimetres in 
diameter. A lid was securely fastened on top of the jar so the spider could not escape. 
In this test participants are instructed to ‘move through as many steps of the test as 
they felt comfortable doing so’.
Participants could score between 1 and 10 on the BAT. The task began with 
the participant positioned 3 metres from the table on which the spider was placed in 
a container. BAT points are earned as follows: BAT score 1: move one metre closer 
to the spider. BAT score 2: move another metre towards the spider. BAT score 3: 
move another metre towards the spider (i.e., next to the table). BAT score 4: touch 
the jar for ten seconds. BAT score 5: lift the jar. BAT score 6: open the lid of the jar. 
BAT score 7: touch the spider with a pencil for more than ten seconds. BAT score 8: 
remove the spider from the jar. BAT score 9: touch the spider for more than ten 
seconds with their finger. BAT score 10: place the spider onto their hand. 
Participants were allowed to terminate the test at any stage during the BAT and their 
last completed step was the experimental dependent measure.
Procedure
Participants were taken into a psychology laboratory and seated at a table. 
Before beginning the study they firstly had to complete the FSQ, the STAI Y -l, the 
STAI Y-2 and the AAQ II.
Participants were then required to listen to one o f the three inductions 
(thought suppression, focused attention, unfocused attention). Subsequently, they 
were directed to a separate room and brought to a marker three metres away from the 
table, in order to begin the BAT. After the BAT, participants completed the 
treatment adherence measure. The session ended with participants returning to the 
previous room and completing the STAI Y-l again to determine if  any changes in 
levels of anxiety had occurred pre and post completion of the BAT.
5.2.2. Results
The current study screened participants for pre-experimental levels of spider 
fear (FSQ), anxiety (STAI I and II) and emotional flexibility (AAQ II). It also
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compared participant compliance (treatment adherence) between each group with 
regards to how much the participant used their induction whilst completing the BAT. 
In order to retain validity the participants in each group would have to score 
similarly on each of these measures in order to confirm that any results obtained 
were due to the independent variables manipulated and not due to any individual 
differences between the groups (See Table 15). A series of independent sample t 
tests revealed that there were no significant differences between the groups at the 
0.05 level, in each of the aforementioned measures.
Anxiety Measure
Participants completed the STAI I, a measure o f state anxiety, pre and post 
BAT. The mean scores are represented in Table 15. As can be seen from the mean 
scores the participants in the thought suppression group (pre M = 40, post M = 58.2) 
reported a higher level o f anxiety than those in the focused attention (mindfulness) 
(pre M = 38.9, post M = 45.7) and unfocussed attention groups (pre M = 43, post M 
= 50.3).
Measure Thought Suppression Focused Attention Unfocused
Attention
FSQ 95.8 (17.8) 87 .8(18.18) 91.8 (20.55)
STAI Trait 43.2 (7.43) 37.1 (9.58) 40.5 (13.38)
STAI State I 40 (1 0 .8 4 ) 38.9 (12.04) 43 (17.43)
STAI State II 58.2 (8.25) 45 .7(11 .13) 50.3 (15.1)
AAQ 50.4 (10 .58) 50.7 (9.27) 53.3 (21.9)
Treatment Adherence 5.4 (2.45) 5 (2.9) 6.3 (3.52)
Table 15. The Means and Standard Deviations fo r  the 3 groups on the FSQ, STAI 
State and Trait (pre and post), AAQ and treatment adherence measure, Experiment 
8.
A 3 (group; focused attention, thought suppression and unfocussed attention) 
x 2 (time of completion; before BAT and after BAT) mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the data. The results revealed a significant main effect for STAI I score, F(l,27) =
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23.086; p < 0.05, and a near to significant interaction between STAI I score and 
Group, F(l,27) = 2.755; p = 0.081, suggesting that further analysis was needed.
In order to determine whether there were any differences between the three 
groups in pre experimental levels o f anxiety (STAI I) post hoc Tukey HSD tests 
were conducted. Results from the tests revealed no significant difference between the 
thought suppression group and the focused attention group, between the focused 
attention group and the unfocussed attention group, or between the thought 
suppression group and the unfocussed attention group at the p < 0.05 level.. These 
results suggest that the groups had similar pre experimental levels of state anxiety.
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were also conducted in order to determine whether 
there were any post experimental differences in anxiety from the second time the 
STAI I was completed. They revealed a significant main effect between the thought 
suppression and the focused attention groups, however, no significant differences 
were found between the thought suppression and the unfocussed attention group or 
the focused attention group and the unfocussed attention group at the p < 0.05 level.. 
This result suggests that those in the focused attention were significantly less 
anxious than those in the thought suppression group after having completed the 
BAT.
Within subject t tests were also conducted on the data, which aimed to 
determine if there were any significant differences within groups from the first time 
they completed the STAI I to the second. For the thought suppression group a 
significant main effect was found, t (9) = -5.355; p  < 0.05, suggesting that 
participants in the thought suppression group became significantly more anxious. 
However no significant differences were found for the focused attention group, t (9) 
= -2.067; p  > 0.05 and the unfocussed attention group, t (9) = -1.528; p  > 0.05, 
suggesting that the participants from these two groups experienced similar levels of 
anxiety from before to after the completion of the BAT.
Behavioral Approach Test (BAT)
The average number of steps completed on the BAT by spider fearful 
participants with no induction is 6.1 (Kindt & Brosschot, 1999). Participants who are 
not spider fearful typically score 9.4. The mean point at which each participant from
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each group terminated their participation in the BAT is represented in Figure 11. 
Figure 1 shows that the focused attention group moved through the most steps o f the 
BAT (M = 7.4). The thought suppression group moved thought the least (M = 4.2) 
and the unfocussed attention scored somewhere in between (M = 5.5).
Figure 11. Mean scores on the BAT for participants in the thought suppression, 
focused attention and unfocused attention groups, Experiment 8.
Thought Suppression Unfocussed AttentionFocussed Attention
A single factor (Group; focused attention, thought suppression and 
unfocussed attention) one way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect, F  (2, 27) 
= 4.526; p  <.05, suggesting that there were significant differences between the 
groups.
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests were additionally conducted. They revealed a 
significant difference between the thought suppression group and the focused 
attention group,, indicating that the focussed attention group moved through 
significantly more steps o f the BAT than the thought suppression group. The results 
also revealed a significant difference between the focused attention group and the 
unfocussed attention group, suggesting that the focused attention group also
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performed better than the unfocussed attention group. Finally, the results did not 
show a significant difference between the unfocussed attention group and the 
thought suppression group indicating that the thought suppression group performed 
similarly to the unfocussed attention group on the BAT.
Summary
Participants in the focused attention group moved through significantly more 
steps of the BAT than did the participants from the two other groups. In terms of 
anxiety levels, those participants in the focused attention and unfocussed attention 
groups did not experience a significant inflation in anxiety levels despite coming into 
closer contact with their specific fear. Those in the thought suppression group, 
however, despite only moving through 4.2 steps of the BAT, experienced a 
significant inflation in anxiety levels.
5.2.3. Discussion
It was predicted that participants in the focused attention group would display 
a behavioural advantage over those participants in the thought suppression group 
whilst also maintaining lower levels of anxiety. The results o f the current study 
support both of these predictions, in that those in the focused attention group moved 
through significantly more steps of the behavioral measure than the other two groups 
whilst also scoring significantly lower on the state anxiety questionnaire. These 
results support those attained by Marcks and Woods (2005) and Najmi et al (2009) 
and provide further tentative support that mindfulness could be a preferred technique 
for dealing with unwanted thoughts. Moreover, the results also provide further 
evidence that thought suppression is an ineffective strategy in coping with unwanted 
thoughts. In summary, the results from Experiment 8 demonstrated that spider 
fearful participants were more likely to approach a spider, and demonstrate a 
reduction in post experimental anxiety after exposure to a focused attention 
induction relative to a thought suppression or unfocused attention group.
One notable feature of the current results is that spider fearful behavior was 
reduced after a relatively brief induction. This result replicates findings from Arch 
and Craske (2006) and McHugh, et al. (2010), that is, even a short induction phase in 
focused compared to unfocused attention alters post induction performance on a
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subsequent task. Additionally, these results extend on previous findings with the 
inclusion of a brief thought suppression induction directly comparing and 
demonstrating the utility o f focused attention over attempted suppression when 
coping with unwanted thoughts.
Importantly, the current findings indicated that thought suppression was 
ineffective as a strategy for coping with unwanted thoughts, despite its widespread 
adoption. The inflated behavioral avoidance in the thought suppression condition 
when compared to the mindfulness (focused attention) condition supports behavioral 
accounts of phobias which suggest that avoidance behaviors promote phobia 
maintenance (Purdin, 1999). Inducing a mindfulness state in participants may have 
circumvented attempted suppression or avoidance of the feared stimulus (Purdon, 
1999). Ironically, confronting these stimuli rather than avoiding them reduced 
participants’ anxiety levels, despite the fact that phobic individuals typically avoid 
their feared stimulus in order to reduce any anxiety that may arise from having direct 
contact with it. The current data support the behavioral theory that prohibiting 
complete activation of fear structures stops habituation to the fear stimulus.
Of course, there were some methodological limitations with the study. A pre 
induction measure of mindfulness (e.g. Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills; 
Baer et al., 2004; Toronto Mindfulness Scale, Anderson et al., 2007) could have 
assessed the two groups’ pre experimental differences in mindfulness, which would 
rule out the possibility that results in the BAT were due to the pre experimental 
levels of mindfulness and not due to the induction. In this study there was no pre 
induction measure of mindfulness, there was, however, a pre experimental measure 
o f psychological flexibility, a related construct, as measured by the AAQ II. Given 
the strong relationship between mindfulness and psychological flexibility it is 
unlikely that group differences in pre experimental mindfulness were responsible for 
the distinction in participants’ behavioral performance (see Baer, Smith, et al., 2006). 
Additionally, the difference in approach towards the spider between the three groups 
suggests that the participants did adhere to the induction procedures they were 
assigned to. It may be useful to replicate this study using a within subjects design, 
which allows for the comparison of pre and post induction differences on an 
individual level or to provide more extensive training in mindfulness practice, rather 
than a short focused breathing induction, in order to determine whether participants
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increase in spider approach could be maintained over time. Finally, it is possible that 
the thought suppression intervention served to increase the occurrence of unwanted 
thoughts, thereby circumventing the suppression attempt. Specifically, the reminder 
cues provided during the mindfulness and thought suppression inductions aimed to 
promote the use of the respective coping strategy. In the case of the mindfulness 
induction the reminder cues were likely to have facilitated the target induction. 
However, the reminder cues for the thought suppression induction may have served 
as a reminder of the unwanted thought thus rendering the induction futile.
Nevertheless, the fact that the current study demonstrates a significant result 
is exciting as this work has the potential to facilitate the expansion of the treatment 
literature for phobias in a valuable direction. Specifically, demonstrating that a short 
focused attention exercise can ameliorate spider fearful individuals subsequent 
behavior towards a spider, suggests the utility of a larger scale mindfulness based 
treatment package to aid remediation of phobias. This is the first study to attempt to 
compare mindfulness versus thought suppression as a coping strategy for spider 
phobia. The results are particularly noteworthy given that the study demonstrated 
significant effects after a short focused breathing induction with a sample that had no 
previous experience with mindfulness practice. In summary, the findings reported 
herein suggest that mindfulness may be a useful treatment for overcoming spider 
phobia.
5.3. Experiment 9
One potential weakness in Experiments 7 and 8 was that the reminder cues in 
the thought suppression induction may have hampered the suppression attempt. For 
this reason the current study will involve a strategy instruction as opposed to an 
induction with reminder cues. The aim o f this methodological change is to 
demonstrate that it is not the reminders that caused the behavioural change in 
Experiments 7 and 8 but the actual suppression attempt per se. However, as 
mindfulness cannot be administered in instruction form, an alternative component of 
the ACT model which can be administered via an instruction is needed. Previous 
research has demonstrated the utility of another component of the ACT model that
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may provide a useful alternative coping strategy for unwanted thoughts, namely, 
defusion (see Masuda et al, 2004; Masuda et al, 2009).
Cognitive defusion is a technique that aims to disrupt the transformation of 
functions that occur with negative unwanted stimuli (Blackledge, 2007). Specifically 
it aims to enable the individual to come into contact with unwanted negative 
thoughts, without attempting to alter the content or frequency of the thought. In 
clinical terms, clients are described as being ‘fused’ with their thoughts, meaning 
that they fully believe or buy into their thoughts, and thus respond to them in a 
relatively rigid or inflexible way. For example, if  a client believes the thought: ‘I am 
depressed’, this thought, via AARR, can lead to: ‘I am worthless’, ‘I do not deserve 
happiness’, and this could affect behavior through thoughts such as: ‘what is the 
point of applying for that job, everyone knows I am inept’. Believing such thoughts 
as ontologically true is not functional and can cause, via experiential avoidance of 
environmental reminders, a constriction in the way in which a life is lived. ACT 
clinicians aid clients to ‘defuse’ from their thoughts by drawing on an array of 
defusion techniques. It is important to note that defusion involves changing the 
context in which a thought occurs rather than attempting to alter (restructure) the 
actual content of the thought. Specifically, the defusion process involves noticing all 
thoughts as thoughts rather than ontologically true.
Research in the area o f defusion has employed Titchener’s (1910) word 
repetition exercise. This exercise involves repeating a word until it loses its semantic 
meaning (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett & Twohig, 2004). Undergraduate students were 
instructed to generate two self-relevant negative thoughts, and reduce them to one 
word. For example, the thought of: ‘I am a bad person’, was reduced simply to: 
‘bad’. Subsequently, participants had to repeat that word a number of times over a 
40s period. When compared to a distraction group, and a thought control group, it 
was found that the defusion instruction caused a significant reduction in both the 
believability of the thought, and the distress levels associated with the thought. 
Following on from this work, Masuda, Hayes, Twohig, Drossel, Lillis and Washio 
(2009) investigated exactly how long the exercise needed to be completed for in 
order to demonstrate distress and believability reduction. Their findings indicated 
that distress levels were reduced after between just 3-10 seconds, and believability 
was reduced after between 20-30 seconds. Healy, Bames-Holmes, Barnes Holmes,
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Keogh, Luciano and Wilson (2009) investigated the impact of an alternative defusion 
technique on self-negative statements. Rather than employing Titchener’s word 
repetition exercise, these researchers instructed participants to rate the believability 
of: “I am a bad person”, compared to: “I am having the thought that I am a bad 
person”, a strategy often used in third wave clinical settings. Findings from this 
study demonstrated that the defusion statements were rated as lower in believability, 
and in the level of distress associated with that thought, in comparison to non­
defusion statements. This provides further evidence that defusion may be useful in 
the management of unwanted negative thoughts. While reduction in believability is 
an interesting dependent measure, perhaps a more interesting finding would be to 
demonstrate a subsequent overt behavioral change after a defusion exercise in the 
face o f  adverse conditions.
An experimental method of inducing a depressed-like state, and negative 
psychological content, involves exposing participants to an unsolvable task, or an 
uncontrollable relationship between an action and its outcome (Teasdale & Fogarty, 
1979). Prior experience with uncontrollable events has been demonstrated to retard 
the acquisition of subsequent new responses (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; 
Seligman, 1975), such as response times to completion on a maze task (Reed, 
Frasquillo, Colkin, Liemann & Colbert, 2001), performance on discrimination 
(Hiroto & Seligman, 1975), and judgment of control tasks (Maldonado, Martos, & 
Ramirez, 1991). This effect has been termed Teamed helplessness’ (Seligman, 
1975). Attribution-style accounts of learned helplessness have directly linked 
negative self evaluations to subsequent hampered performance, thus providing 
theoretical support that language processes contribute to the after effects of learned 
helplessness in humans (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).
The aims of Experiment 9 are twofold. First, the study aims to model the 
effect of the ACT technique defusion in dealing with psychological content by 
providing a behavioural measure of the effectiveness of this technique. Second, the 
study aims to provide the first comparison of defusion (the third wave therapeutic 
technique), with the most commonly employed mainstream technique, that is, 
thought suppression in coping with a learned helplessness preparation. It is predicted 
that (1) participants who receive the brief defusion instmction will perform 
significantly faster on the maze task than those receiving the thought suppression
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instruction. Specifically, the defusion process will circumvent fusion with negative 
content (i.e., thoughts) that would otherwise hinder maze task performance and (2) 
that participants who receive the thought suppression instruction will perform 
significantly worse than their defusion and control counterparts on the subsequent 
maze task as they will experience a negative thought rebound during this task.
5.3.1. Method
Participants
Forty-five students from Swansea University volunteered to participate in the 
study, for which they received course credit. Participants (29 female and 16 male) 
ranged in age from 18 to 27 years old (mean age = 20.9; SD = 2.72). The sample 
was non-clinical. Due to the links between learned helplessness and depression, 
participants were screened for depressive tendencies. Subsequently the maze scores 
of two participants were excluded from the study due to high scores on the 
depression inventory (a score o f 10 or more warranted exclusion, see later).
The assignment of participants to experimental conditions was randomized. 
15 participants were assigned to the defusion instruction group, 15 were assigned to 
the thought suppression instruction group and 15 were assigned to the control group.
Design
The study involved a between subject experimental design, with technique 
instruction (i.e., thought suppression, defusion, or control) as the between-subject 
independent variable, and time to complete the maze task as the dependent measure.
Measures and Materials
Each participant first completed three self-report questionnaires; the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II, Bond et al, under review) was in 
place to measure levels of emotional avoidance, the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (WBSI, Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) measures levels of thought 
suppression, and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck et al, 1996) measures 
depressive tendencies.
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The three measures were included to determine any pre-experimental 
differences between the three groups that may have served to confound the results. 
The stop watch used to measure the maze performance was a grey RS event timer. 
Model 235-5065. A paper and pencil maze task was employed as the dependent 
measure (See Illustration 2 for a schematic plan o f the maze, which measured 8cm 
by 12 cm).
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Illustration 2. Schematic representation o f  the maze (originally printed in Boakes, 
1984, copied with permission ) Experiment 9.
Procedure
On commencing the study each participant was given an information sheet 
outlining the broad purpose o f the research. They were asked to read through it, and 
to sign the consent form if they were willing to proceed. All participants were then 
given a copy o f the self report measures to complete. Upon completion o f the 
measures each participant was assigned at random to one o f the three groups (i.e., 
thought suppression, defusion or control).
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Instruction: Participants assigned to the thought suppression group received a 
copy of the following instructions; ‘The next task will last between 2 and 10 minutes 
depending on your performance. I t ’s a simple task. Your job  during this task is to 
notice your thoughts as they show up. As you do this do not let those thoughts affect 
you, simply suppress all thoughts and stay focused on the task. The exercise below 
will help you to do this: Think o f  a good thought. Keep that thought in mind. Anytime 
bad thoughts come into your mind immediately replace them with the good thought. 
Suppress all thoughts except the good thought ’.
Participants assigned to the defusion group received a copy of the following 
instructions; ‘The next task will last between 2 and 10 minutes depending on your 
performance. I t ’s a simple task. Your job  during this task is to notice your thoughts 
as they show up. As you do this try not to get caught in believing any one o f  these 
thoughts, but ju s t see them as thoughts and not reality. The exercise below will help 
you to do this: Notice each o f  your thoughts as they pop into your head. This thought 
maybe ‘this is too easy’, ‘this is silly’ or T d o n ’t know what I ’m thinking’! One by 
one, notice each thought that you have and let them ju st pass by your consciousness. 
Don t  try to suppress any thoughts ju s t let them occur ’.
Participants assigned to the control group were given no instruction and 
proceeded directly to the next step in the experiment. After reading the instructions 
each participant was then instructed to complete the learned helplessness computer 
task whilst incorporating their respective instruction.
Learned Helplessness: Once assigned to a group the participant read through 
the instructions on the computer screen corresponding with the learned helplessness 
preparation (the preparation was a direct replication of that employed by Maldonado, 
Martos, & Ramirez, 1991). Only the unsolvable version of the task was employed.
The instructions were as follows: ‘In this experiment you will be looking at a 
series o f  computer presented images. Each image will involve two stimulus patterns 
on it. One to the left and another to the right. The stimulus patterns are composed o f  
four different dimensions, with two values associated with each dimension. For each 
group o f  the ten images I  have chosen one o f  the eight values as being correct. For 
each image I  want you to choose which side contains this value. To do this, you must 
click on one o f the buttons presented underneath the image (left or right). I f  your
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choice is incorrect, a noise comes on through the speakers, but i f  you choose the 
correct side there will be no noise. Your task is to learn the predetermined value by 
your response according to whether or not the noise is heard. The current 
experiment is adapted from a standard intelligence test. Most people learn to 
respond appropriately to the task with relative ease ’.
Each participant completed four sets o f ten trials, where there were 8 possible 
values to choose from (i.e., square, circle, red, green, the letter ‘G’, the letter ‘D). 
For each set of ten trials, a new value was said to be designated as the ‘correct’ 
stimulus. Therefore, each participant had to attempt to work out, via trial and error, 
the ‘correct’ value for each block of ten trials. If they chose the ‘correct’ value then 
no noise occurred, however upon choosing an ‘incorrect’ value, a noise was played 
through the speakers of the computer. Unbeknownst to the participants, however, 
was that they had no control over the preparation; so that in order to induce learned 
helplessness the ‘incorrect’ noise was presented on 50% of the trials regardless of the 
buttons they pressed.
Prior to beginning the preparation, all participants were asked if the 
instructions were understood, and were given time to ask questions and receive 
further explanation of what was necessary to conduct the task.
Maze Task (A Sm all’s Hampton Court Maze, originally printed in Boakes, 
1984): Upon completion of the learned helplessness preparation a page with a maze 
task was placed on the desk in front of the participant. Each participant was 
instructed to complete the maze and told that their completion time would be 
recorded. They were instructed to do so, by going from the outside entrance of the 
maze into the centre. The instructions were read as follows ‘Please complete the 
maze on the table in front o f  you in the quickest time possible, your time will be 
recorded. In order to complete the maze task you have to begin at the X  marked on 
the perimeter o f  the maze and work your way to the centre. As soon as you begin I  
will start the stop watch
The time it took each participant to complete the maze was recorded by a 
hand held stop watch. The maze task was directly observed by the researcher to 
provide a precise and accurate response time. Participants were finally fully 
debriefed and their credit was administered.
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5.3.2. Results
Questionnaires
Two participants scored highly on the BDI (A score of 10 and over warranted 
exclusion). The remainder o f the participants fell within a normal range of the BDI. 
The overall mean questionnaire scores: AAQ II =51.9 (5.6), WBSI = 39.9 (5.2), BDI 
= 4.17 (3.1). Table 16 indicates that there were no significant differences between 
each o f  the three groups in terms of emotional flexibility as measured by the AAQ II 
(Defusion group M = 54.91, Thought suppression group M = 50.07, Control group 
M = 50.71), thought suppression tendencies as measured by the WBSI (Defusion 
group M = 2.46, Thought suppression group M = 4, Control group M = 6.14) and 
levels of depression as measured by the BDI (Defusion group M = 37.66, Thought 
suppression group M = 42, Control group M = 40.21).
Defusion vs. Suppression vs. Defusion vs.
Suppression Control Control
AAQ II t (2 7 )=  1.094; p >  0.05 t (27) --0 .1 9 7 ;  p > 0.05 t (27) = 1.264; p > 0.05
WBSI t (2 7 )=  1.029; p >  0.05 t (27) -  0.349; p > 0.05 t (27) = -0.507; p > 0.05
BDI t (2 7 )=  1.237; p >  0.05 t (27) = 1.397; p > 0.05 t (27) = 1.631; p > 0.05
Table 16. The t and p  values from  the independent t tests comparing each o f  three 
groups, defusion, suppression and control, Experiment 9.
Maze Task
The amount of time taken to complete the maze task across the three groups 
was collated and are presented in Figure 12. From Figure 12 it can be seen that the 
defusion group (M = 39.33 seconds) took less time to complete the maze than both 
the thought suppression (M = 54.78 seconds) and the control groups (M = 45.85 
seconds). These results suggest that the subsequent behaviour (i.e., maze completion) 
for participants who received the defusion instruction was least affected by the 
learned helplessness preparation.
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Figure 12. The amount o f  time each group took to complete the maze task, 
Experiment 9.
Statistical analyses were conducted in order to determine any differences 
between the three groups in maze completion time. A one-way between-subjects 
analysis o f variance (ANOVA) revealed a statistically significant main effect for 
completion time, F (2,40) = 3.78, p  < 0.05, suggesting that completion time differed 
across instruction groups. A series o f Tukey post hoc tests were conducted in order 
to determine where these differences emerged. Results from the thought suppression 
versus defusion analysis revealed a significant difference (p<0.05) in completion 
time, suggesting that those in the thought suppression group completed the maze 
significantly slower than those in the defusion group. However no significant 
difference emerged between the defusion group and the control group (p > 0.05), 
suggesting that those in the defusion group completed the task no faster than those in 
the control group. Additionally, the thought suppression group and control group 
were compared, this analysis also revealed no significant difference between the two 
groups completion times (p < 0.05), again suggesting that there was no difference in 
maze tim es between the thought suppression and control groups.
These results suggest that neither o f the experimental groups (thought 
suppression or defusion) scored significantly better or significantly worse than a 
control group who received no instruction. However, when directly comparing the 
thought suppression and the defusion groups, results reveal that the thought
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suppression group provided significantly worse task performance (i.e., maze times) 
than those in the defusion group.
5.3.3. Discussion
Experiment 9 aimed to compare the effectiveness o f defusion versus thought 
suppression in dealing with the negative psychological content associated with 
attempting to complete an unsolvable task (i.e., a learned helplessness induction). 
The effects of learned helplessness are demonstrated in the literature by impaired 
performance on a subsequent task. For example, previous research by Reed et al 
(2001) demonstrated significantly slower response times to completion on a post 
learned helplessness maze task. The results of the current study showed that 
participants who received a brief defusion instruction performed significantly better 
on the maze task, after having completed a learned helplessness preparation, when 
compared to those in the thought suppression group. This finding suggested that the 
typical effects of completing an unsolvable task on subsequent task performance 
were reduced by the defusion instruction, suggesting that defusion may be a valid 
technique for dealing with unwanted psychological content. The result also reflects 
previous work on defusion, which also display the possible positive effects of 
engaging in defusion based strategies (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett & Twohig, 2004; 
Masuda, Hayes, Twohig, Drossel, Lillis & Washio, 2009; Healy, Bames-Holmes, 
Barnes Holmes, Keogh, Luciano & Wilson, 2009). .
Thought suppression is the most common technique used for dealing with 
unwanted thoughts (Rachman & Da Silva, 1978), and research within the clinical 
domain suggests that thought suppression plays an important role in the development 
and maintenance of various psychological disorders ranging from Anxiety Disorders 
(Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997) to Depression (Wegner, 1994; Beevers, Wenzlaff, 
Hayes & Scott, 1999). The results of Experiment 9 provided further support that 
engaging in thought suppression is a maladaptive coping strategy for dealing with 
unwanted negative content, as evidenced by slower maze completion latencies after 
the thought suppression induction when compared to defusion group.
Defusion directly challenges the believability o f private events; hence, 
previous studies involving defusion instructions have employed thought believability 
measures pre and post experimentally in order to gauge the efficacy of defusion.
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Furthermore, many such studies have shown predicted reductions in believability 
(e.g., Masuda et al. 2004; 2009). One recent example of such a study did not see 
such a reduction after a defusion instruction (Healy et al., 2008). In the case of the 
latter, however, the authors suggest that it is possible that participants may have 
reported high believability due to a misunderstanding of the question being asked. 
For example, when presenting participants with statements such as “I am having the 
thought that I am a bad person”, a participant could report high believability, 
indicating that they view this as just a thought as opposed to indicating they believe 
that they really are a bad person.
The current study was not concerned with self reported believability of the 
thoughts but rather the subsequent impact of defusion on behavior. This study, 
therefore, did not include a believability measure o f negative statements. No 
particular negative thought was targeted in the current study rendering a thought 
believability measure difficult to employ. Specifically, the design of the study aimed 
to target the entire class of negative content that may have shown up during the 
unsolvable task as opposed to individual target statements, which have previously 
been the target of defusion based studies.
Despite providing tentative evidence in favour of defusion the current study 
does have some limitations which would need to be addressed in future research. 
Firstly, a different dependent variable could be used to measure task performance. A 
task such as a maze is susceptible to individual differences that were not screened for 
in the current study. Prior experience of maze tasks (i.e., practice effects) may have 
played a role in participants’ performance. Additionally, participants pre- 
experimental IQ was not screened for and could relate to faster maze completion 
times. Secondly, no treatment adherence measure on the thought suppression or 
defusion instructions was recorded. Future research could include a self report likert 
rating of how much the instruction technique was applied during the unsolvable task 
across participants. In fact it might be argued that the target process of defusion did 
not actually occur herein. Indeed, it may have been the negative effects o f thought 
suppression rather than the beneficial nature of defusion that was reflected in the 
current findings. However, the intermediate mean score o f the control group suggests 
that this is not the case. Thirdly, Experiment 9 included no control for learned 
helplessness i.e. there was no condition in which the maze time was recorded of a
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participant who did have control over the learned helplessness program. Such a 
manipulation would have allowed us to ascertain whether any difference would 
emerge in the subsequent response (i.e., the maze task) between those with and 
without control of the learned helplessness program. However such a manipulation 
was not included as the development of learned helplessness via the Maldonado 
program had already been shown to retard subsequent responses in comparison to 
those who did have control over the program (Maldonado et al, 1991). This 
combined with limited participant resources diminished the need for this control 
group.
Finally, the first two Experiments in this Chapter use mindfulness as a 
technique for managing unwanted thoughts, whilst Experiment 9 compares defusion 
with thought suppression. The change from mindfulness to defusion occurred 
because only defusion and not mindfulness could be administered in the form of an 
instruction. However, perhaps if this study were to be repeated, then it could involve 
four conditions; thought suppression, control, defusion and mindfulness. The 
inclusion of the mindfulness condition would allow a comparison of each of the 
techniques described in this chapter, and would provide further knowledge of the 
efficacy of each technique.
5.4. Concluding Comments
Together the results of Experiments 7, 8 and 9 in the current thesis are 
remarkable in their own right. Even a brief instruction/ induction in mindfulness or 
defusion impacts on participants performance and/or distress levels. Considering the 
lack o f  research conducted on mindfulness or defusion interventions, the current 
results have important implications for the clinical application o f third wave 
therapeutic techniques as alternatives to thought suppression in dealing with 
unwanted negative psychological content.
s
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6. General Discussion
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to provide a brief summary of the empirical work 
presented in Chapters 2-5. After each chapter summary the broader theoretical issues 
of the respective chapters will be discussed in detail. Once the theoretical issues from 
the empirical work have been addressed suggestions for future directions will be 
proposed. The current chapter will close with a concluding commentary on the nine 
empirical studies that comprised the thesis.
6.1. Chapter 2; Summary
In a seminal thought suppression paper Daniel Wegner coined two processes 
which he suggested were central to thought suppression (Wegner et al, 1987). The 
first, the immediate enhancement effect, refers to the inflation of unwanted thoughts 
that one experiences during a suppression episode, whilst the second, the rebound 
effect, refers to the inflation of unwanted thoughts that one will experience 
immediately after the suppression episode. Together, these processes are referred to 
as the ‘ironic effects of thought suppression’. Chapter 2 of the current thesis aimed to 
investigate the immediate enhancement and rebound effects in greater detail, 
specifically aiming to determine the effects of different distraction techniques 
(Experiment 1), and the effect of multiple thought suppression attempts (Experiment 
2).
According to Wegner et al (1987) the default method of suppression is self 
distraction. Self distraction involves the unfocused manner in which one uses any 
number of stimuli in the environment to aid a suppression attempt. However, in 
consonance with the ECH, engaging in self distraction can result in environmental 
distracters becoming associated with the unwanted thought, which subsequently 
serve as reminder cues for the unwanted thought. To test this prediction Wegner et al 
(1987) compared self distraction to an alternative form of distraction. Focused 
distraction involves participants focusing their attention on one experimenter 
provided distracter. It was predicted that one focused distracter would limit the 
number of environmental cues that could remind the participant o f the unwanted 
thought; the results reflected this prediction in that the focused distracter reduced the 
ironic effects of thought suppression. Experiment 1 of the current thesis aimed to test 
the immediate enhancement and rebound effects under the distraction techniques of
179
self distraction (the distraction technique that people are likely to use in everyday 
life), focused distraction (the distraction technique that Wegner et al, 1987, 
suggested would reduce the normal effects of suppression) and multiple distraction. 
Multiple distraction, which may be viewed as the direct opposite to focused 
distraction, provides the participant with a number of distracters in an attempt to 
divert attention away from the unwanted thought. In order compare the three 
distraction techniques the participants in Experiment 1 were cycled into the 
traditional thought suppression procedure. That is, participants had to engage in two 
five minute phases. In the first of these phases they were required to suppress (via 
whichever distraction technique was proposed to them). In the second five minute 
phase they were free to think of whatever they liked. In both phases the participants 
had to signal the presence o f the unwanted thought (‘white bear’) by pressing the 
space bar. In accordance with previous literature it was predicted that self and 
multiple distraction techniques would cause an immediate enhancement and rebound 
effect, whilst focused distraction would not (Lin & Wicker, 2007; Salkovskis & 
Campbell, 1994) In line with these predictions those participants in the focused 
distraction group indicated the intrusion of the unwanted thought no more than the 
baseline group in either phase, thereby showing no immediate enhancement or 
rebound effects, whilst the multiple and self distraction group did demonstrate an 
inflation in unwanted thoughts, providing evidence for both.
Wegner (1989) also suggested that people do not interact with an unwanted 
thought once but will cycle through phases of suppression and non suppression, a 
process he referred to as ‘an indulgence cycle’. Wegner (1989) suggested, in 
accordance with the ECH, that the more indulgence cycles one entered, the more 
pronounced /immediate enhancement and rebound effects would become due to 
increased environmental distracters. In order to test this prediction previous research 
(Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Williams & Mould, 2007) required participants to complete 
two suppression and non suppression phases. Experiment 2 o f the Chapter 1 extends 
on this research by asking the participants to complete multiple indulgence cycles. 
Specifically Experiment 2 required two groups of participants to complete 6 five 
minute phases. Those in the first group (repeated suppression group) completed three 
indulgence cycles (a suppress phase, followed by a think free phase, repeated 3 
times) whilst those in the second group (suppress think free group) completed one
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suppress phase, followed by five think free phases. The aim of this study was to 
determine the effect of engaging in multiple indulgence cycles on the immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects. It was predicted, in line with the ECH, that 
participants would experience inflations in unwanted thought occurrence in both 
phases, due to the increased amount of distracters that could cue the unwanted 
thought. The results of Experiment 2 showed no such increase, specifically, the 
participants in the repeated suppression group, despite experiencing significantly 
more unwanted thought intmsions than those who only had to suppress once, only 
experienced a maintenance effect where the unwanted thought neither increased nor 
decreased over time. This result indicates that the immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects did not become more pronounced over multiple suppression 
attempts, suggesting that suppression does not become more difficult when repeated 
over time.
6.1.1. Theoretical issues
The experiments reported in Chapter 2 provided some interesting results that 
contribute to contemporary understanding of the immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects. However, a number of broader theoretical issues have arisen as a 
result of the research that warrants further discussion. First, problems with the 
definition of the rebound effect have arisen. Wegner et al (1987) suggested that if 
participants experienced an inflation in unwanted thought occurrence in the rebound 
phase, when compared to the suppression phase, then such an increase would be 
referred to as the rebound effect. However, as outlined in the introduction (see 
Section 1.2.8.) the rebound effect was defined when the concentration instruction 
was in place. Since then a number of researchers (Lavy & Van Den Hout, 1990; 
Rassin et al, 2005) have suggested that such an instruction lacks ecological validity, 
proposing the think free instruction instead. Despite the introduction of a new 
instruction during the rebound phase, no re-definition of rebound has been proposed. 
With this in mind, the results of Experiment 1, strictly speaking, do not find a 
rebound effect, as has been the case with many published thought suppression 
studies (Liberman & Forster, 2000; Merkelback et al, 1991; Rutledge et al, 1993 and 
Nixon, Flood & Jackson, 2006) which employed the think free instruction. In light of 
this procedural change this result is not surprising, participants receiving a think free 
instruction are unlikely to indicate the presence of an unwanted thought the same
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amount of times as participants actively instructed to concentrate on it. Given that 
the rebound effect refers to the re-emergence of the unwanted thought after a 
suppression attempt, it seems prudent, to redefine the rebound effect in line with the 
procedural change in the literature. Specifically, perhaps, as with the immediate 
enhancement effect, a rebound effect could be defined as a significant difference in 
unwanted thought intrusions between a suppression group and a baseline group. 
Experiment 2 found that those participants in the think free phase had the unwanted 
thought intrude significantly more than the baseline participants did in the same 
phase, thus, demonstrating a ‘rebound effect’ according to the new definition.
Furthermore, Experiment 2 of the current thesis raised a novel and interesting 
issue in relation to the ecological validity of the rebound phase more generally. 
Specifically, in everyday life, it is unlikely that people will go through specific 
phases where they ‘think free’. Instead it is more likely that as soon as the unwanted 
thought rebounds once in a think free phase, that people will immediately make 
further attempts to suppress. Such logic suggests that the first time the thought 
rebounds is the only intrusion of interest. The novel analysis of Experiment 2 found 
that participants who repeatedly suppressed experienced the first intrusion 
significantly more quickly in the rebound phases than those in the suppress think free 
group. Such a result could reflect how thought suppression occurs in everyday life; 
the more one engages in thought suppression, the more quickly the unwanted 
thought subsequently intrudes. This result questions both the original definition of 
the rebound effect and the definition proposed above. Both definitions define 
rebound as multiple intrusions during the phase after suppression. However, it is 
likely that in everyday life, no such phase exists. Instead participants only need the 
unwanted thought to rebound once before they again make a suppression attempt. In 
short, this suggests that a new definition o f the rebound effect may be more 
appropriate; where only one intrusion of the unwanted thought is needed for the 
effect to exist.
The second issue which warrants discussion is the inclusion of the baseline 
condition. The baseline condition aims to determine the amount of times a target will 
enter one’s mind when no suppression instruction is in place, specifically aiming to 
determine if the results of the typical thought suppression study are due to the 
experimental paradigm rather than as a result o f attempted suppression per se. Two
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issues can be raised which question the validity o f the inclusion of a baseline 
condition. First, if a participant indicates the occurrence of the unwanted thought a 
similar amount of times in a baseline condition as they do during a suppression 
condition, then it has been broadly suggested that such a result demonstrates that 
thought suppression is possible (Muris et al, 1993; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). 
However, no experiment to date that has employed a five minute 5 minute phase 
reported that participants did not report the occurrence o f the unwanted thought. If 
such a finding existed then this would provide evidence that suppression can work. 
However, showing that a baseline condition experienced a similar amount of thought 
intrusions to a suppression group does not show that participants suppressed their 
thoughts, it shows that the experimental paradigm is promoting participant reactivity 
(Purdon & Clark 2000). Incidentally the results of Experiment 1 found that those in a 
suppression condition experienced more unwanted thought intrusions than those in 
the baseline condition. Second, during post experiment debriefing sessions with 
participants in the baseline condition they suggested that the baseline instruction 
cued a suppression attempt, i.e. participants said that after having received a baseline 
think free instruction, they attempted to suppress the target thought anyway. This 
indicates that the number o f thought intrusions during the baseline condition could 
be directly reflective of the amount of intrusions experienced in a suppression 
condition. In all, despite being prevalent within thought suppression literature, the 
validity of the baseline condition seems questionable, and discounting the ironic 
effects of thought suppression on the basis of this condition may be a mistake. 
Unfortunately, finding an experimental paradigm which accurately measures the 
participant’s thoughts will always be an issue, perhaps the development of implicit 
measures could by-pass the problems associated with the self report paradigm. 
However as the current thesis was interested in modelling why suppression does not 
work and providing an alternative, the need to provide an alternative to the baseline 
condition was circumvented by measuring the post suppression behavioural impact 
of a suppression attempt (see Chapter 5)
Third, the ecological validity o f the distraction techniques employed in 
Experiment 1 is questionable. Wegner et al (1987) suggested that the use of a 
focused distracter would by-pass the effects of suppression. And indeed, in 
accordance with the ECH, the results of Experiment 1 found that participants in the
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focused distraction condition pressed the space bar less than those in the other 
distraction conditions. However, despite providing evidence which supports the 
predictions of the ECH, the usefulness of the focused distraction technique as a 
strategy for dealing with unwanted thought in everyday life can be brought into 
question. In a laboratory setting the use of focused distraction may reduce the 
immediate enhancement and rebound effects, however in everyday life, due to the 
amount of environmental stimuli which surround us, it is unlikely that engaging in 
focused distraction will provide an effective alternative.
Fourth, Experiment 2 did not find results which were consistent with the 
experimental predictions or with the ECH, such a finding could bring into question 
the validity o f the ECH, which suggests that thought suppression might be 
ineffective due to the environmental reminders. According to these theories the more 
one engages in thought suppression, the more pronounced the emergent immediate 
enhancement and rebound effects should be due to the increased amount of 
distracters that the participant will draw upon. However, the results of Experiment 2 
only found a maintenance effect and not the expected increase in unwanted thought 
intrusions. One potential reason for such a finding may be the experimental setting in 
which the study was conducted. Specifically, a laboratory setting lacks possible 
distracters and thus limits the amount of environmental cues available to the 
participant. As such, it is likely that a ceiling effect emerged, in terms of unwanted 
thoughts experienced by the participants, that is, with a limited amount of possible 
distracters it is likely that only a certain number of unwanted thought intrusions are 
achievable within the five minute phase. Additionally, it must be added that 
participants’ motivation levels in Experiment 2 may have been low. It is likely that 
the 30 minute thought monitoring phase, that participant levels o f fatigue and 
boredom gradually grew. It is therefore possible, by the end o f experiment, that 
participants were not engaging in the study with the same intensity that that they 
were at the beginning. This effect might have been more pronounced in the think 
free phases when there were less specific requirements on the participants. Finally, 
the effects in Experiment 2 might have been stronger with more participants. With 
only 15 participants in each condition the trends are in place and the effects are 
existent, but perhaps more participants would have produced more pronounced 
results.
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6.1.2, Future Research
Future research to test the utility of focused distraction in a real life setting 
would address whether this could be effectively used as a coping strategy for 
unwanted thoughts. Specifically, although theoretically it seems that such a 
technique would be continually undermined by multiple cues in the environment this 
hypothesis could be directly tested. Another fruitful avenue of future research might 
involve the type of distracter employed; previous research has suggested that 
distracters which are absorbing (distracters that are subjectively and successfully 
engaging to the person) may make thought suppression more possible (Brucato, 
1978; Corah et al, 1979; McCaul & Mallot, 1984; see Section 1.2.4.). It would be 
interesting to conduct research which tests the assertion; perhaps by employing a 
post suppression measure which measures how ‘absorbing’ each participant found 
the distracter, a relationship between the amount of unwanted thought intrusions and 
the absorption of the distraction could be found. Furthermore a study which 
investigates the effects of engaging in more, but possibly shorter, indulgence cycles 
could be of use, specifically aiming to determine whether the occurrence of the 
unwanted thought can be put into extinction, or whether the repeated suppression 
attempt would maintain its intrusion rate.
6.2. Chapter 3: Summary
Thought suppression research involving neutral target thoughts is important 
as it provides a model of the basic suppression effect. However, during the course of 
everyday life it is unlikely that people will engage in the suppression of neutral 
thouglits (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). A more ecologically valid way to study 
thought suppression might incorporate high valence personally relevant thought 
items. Indeed a number o f studies have employed high valence thought items, 
providing mixed evidence in terms of their impact on immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects (Davies & Clark, 1998; Harvey & Bryant, 1998; Roemer & 
Borkevec, 1994, see Section 1.2.6.). Chapter 3 o f the current thesis aimed to 
determine the effect of valence on the immediate enhancement and rebound effects 
across different distraction techniques (Experiment 3), and subsequently to
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determine the effect of valence on a participant’s physiology during and after 
attempted suppression (Experiment 4).
Experiment 3 employed a similar experimental design to that of Experiment 
1. The study aimed to determine the effect of different distraction techniques (self 
distraction, focused distraction and multiple distraction) on unwanted thought 
occurrence in both the suppression and think free phases, for both spider fearful 
(high valence) and non spider fearful (low valence) participants. To this end, all 
participants were cycled through two five minute phases. During the first phase they 
were required to suppress via a distraction technique, and during the second phase 
they were free to think of whatever they liked. In both phases the participants had to 
signal the presence of the unwanted thought by pressing the space bar, this served as 
the dependent variable in the study. All participants, in both the spider fearful and 
non spider fearful groups, had to suppress the unwanted thought ‘spider’, for those 
that were spider fearful, this unwanted thought was seen as high valence, whereas for 
the non spider fearful participants, the unwanted thought was low valence. Eight 
experimental groups participated; a self distraction spider fearful and non spider 
fearful group, a multiple distraction spider fearful and non spider fearful group, a 
focused distraction spider fearful and non spider fearful group, and a baseline spider 
fearful and non spider fearful group. Two experimental predictions were made 1). 
that the spider fearful groups would experience an increased inflation of unwanted 
thoughts compared to non spider fearful groups and 2). that both focused distraction 
groups would experience less unwanted thought intrusions. As predicted, in both the 
suppression and think free phases, spider fearful participants tended to press the 
space bar more than non spider fearful participants. Second, contradicting the pre 
experimental predictions, the focused distraction group experienced a similar amount 
o f unwanted thoughts as the other distraction groups. Finally, in contradiction to the 
results; of Experiment 1 which found immediate enhancement and rebound effects 
with a  low valence neutral thought, only participants in the high valence groups 
experienced both effects in Experiment 3. These results broadly suggest three 
things, high valence thought items cause stronger immediate enhancement and 
rebound effects, focused distraction is also futile when high valence thoughts are 
used, and immediate enhancement and rebound effects only exist under high valence 
conditions.
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One possible criticism of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 is that the dependent 
variable in each study involves self report. The explicit nature of the task renders it 
easy to administer, however, the direct self reporting style of the task renders it prone 
to weaknesses that are inherent with all explicit measures (Roche, Ruiz, O’Riordan 
& Hand, 2005; Tierney & McCabe, 2001; Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 
1995). For example, it has been found that self-report measures are affected by 
factors such as the immediate mood of the respondent and their physical 
surroundings (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991). In order to 
overcome this difficulty, some researchers have begun to employ physiological 
measures of thought suppression. A number of studies (Petrie et al, 1998; Gross and 
Levenson, 1993; Wegner et al, 1990, see Section 1.2.7.) have aimed to determine the 
physiological effects of engaging in the thought suppression of both low and high 
valence thoughts. The rationale for employing such dependent measures arose from 
existent links between thought suppression, physiology and psychological 
dysfunction (Rassin, 2005). For these reasons Experiment 4 aimed to determine the 
physiological effects of thought suppression, when both high valence and low 
valence thoughts were employed. Skin Conductance Levels (SCL), a technique 
which has found strong suppression related effects in previous thought suppression 
related research (Wegner & Gold, 1995; Muris et al, 1991; 1992) was measured 
throughout the experiment. To that end, four groups o f participants were attached to 
SCL electrodes before completing three five minute phases. Two groups, the spider 
fearful experimental group and non spider fearful experimental group, were 
instructed to think of anything for a five minute phase (i.e., to gage a within 
participant baseline SCL reading), following this participants were instructed to 
suppress thoughts of a ‘spider’ for the second five minute phase. Finally, participants 
were cycled into five minute a think free phase. Whereas the spider fearful and non 
spider fearful baseline groups had to think o f anything for the first five minutes, 
before engaging in two subsequent think free phases. During the second and third 
phases, all participants were required to signal the presence of the target thought 
(‘spider’) by . pressing the spacebar, this served as the behavioural dependent 
variable. The second dependent variable was the participants SCL reading in each of 
the three phases. It was predicted that the spider fearful group would signal the most 
unwanted intrusions behaviourally. Second, it was predicted that a difference in SCL
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would emerge between groups. With such mixed research findings on thought 
suppression and physiology, a more specific hypothesis on physiology was difficult. 
The results showed that spider fearful participants did indeed signal the highest 
occurrence of the unwanted thought, demonstrating the existence of an immediate 
enhancement with a high valence thought. However, in agreement with Experiment 
3, but contradictory to Experiment 1, no immediate enhancement or rebound effect 
emerged for the low valence group. Second, in terms of SCL, not only was there was 
no difference between high and low valence groups, but there was also no difference 
between the thought suppression and baseline groups, thereby finding no 
physiological effects of thought suppression.
6.2.1. Theoretical issues
The first issue worth noting from Chapter 3 was that participants in all non 
spider fearful groups, from both Experiment 3 and 4, did not experience an 
immediate enhancement effect or a subsequent rebound effect. This contrasts with 
previous research, which has suggested that low valence thoughts can cause such 
ironic thought suppression effects (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Lavy & Van Den 
Hout, 1990), and also directly contradicts the results of Experiment 1, which found 
both the immediate enhancement and rebound effects with the use of a neutral low 
valence thought. The reason for this is unclear. One potential explanation might be 
that a demand characteristic caused the participants to behave in such a way, for 
example perhaps those in the non spider fearful group thought they would be 
required to press the space bar less than their spider fearful counterparts. Although 
this seems unlikely as it would have been impossible for the participants to know 
what the ‘right’ amount of space bar presses would have been. Despite the reason for 
such a  result remaining unknown, the Chapter 3 found that high valence personally 
relevant thoughts produced a more pronounced immediate enhancement and rebound 
effects than neutral thoughts. This finding is important as high valence personally 
relevant thoughts are more likely to necessitate attempted suppression.
Second, unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 3 found that the focused 
distraction condition was ineffective when the unwanted thought was high in 
valence. The reason for such a finding is again unclear, as according to previous 
research and the ECH, those in the focused distraction condition should have
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experienced less unwanted thought intrusions. One reason why this might have 
occurred might be the lack of motivation for the suppression attempt when a neutral 
thought is employed. It is possible that the more determined one is to get rid o f an 
unwanted thought, the more emotionally engaged one will become with the 
suppression attempt, therefore the more distracters one will seek (Harvey & Bryant, 
1998). It is likely that the high valence nature of the unwanted thought caused 
participants to try harder to rid themselves of it, thereby increasing the amount of 
environmental distracters and reminder cues. This would suggest that the 
suppression of high valence stimuli is harder than the suppression of low valence 
stimuli, as not even those participants in the focused distraction condition, a 
technique which has been shown to reduce the effects o f suppression, could succeed 
in reducing the amount of unwanted thought intrusions when a high valence thought 
was employed. This lends support to the suggestion that thought suppression and 
clinical disorders may be linked, due to the inflated amount of unwanted intrusions 
that result from suppressing a high valence unwanted thought.
Third, some physiological effects of thought suppression were expected. 
However, not only was there no difference between the high valence and low 
valence groups, but there was also no difference between the thought suppression 
and baseline groups. Although this finding was not predicted there are theoretical 
reasons to support why this pattern of results emerged. First, it is possible that the 
high valence nature of the unwanted thought was not high valence enough to 
produce physiological results. For example, there was no spider, nor any threat o f an 
actual spider present during the experiment. Perhaps someone suppressing a higher 
valence thought, i.e. the recent death of a loved one, might have produced increased 
physiological responses. Second, all participants, regardless of whether they received 
a thought suppression or baseline instruction, experienced the same increases in SCL 
across: the three five minute phases. This finding warrants discussion as it suggests 
that thought suppression has no physiological effects at all. It remains totally 
uncertain why all participants experienced jumps from their initial baseline SCL 
measurement across the three phases. One possible explanation for this, which was 
discussed in Section 6.1.1., is that participants in the baseline condition also engaged 
in the suppression of the target item when exposed to the baseline instruction. This 
would account for the similar physiological reactions that all groups experienced
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across the three five minute phases. Thus, participants who engage in general 
suppression might experience a heightened SCL level in both the suppression and 
the think free phases.
Finally and briefly, as Chapter 2 of the current thesis employed the neutral 
thought o f ‘white bear’ at all times, Chapter 3 manipulated valence by asking all 
participants to suppress thoughts of a ‘spider’ only. Although it was assumed that 
the thought ‘spider’ to a non spider fearful participant would serve as a neutral 
stimulus, it is possible that participants are generally more reactive when suppressing 
‘spider’ than when suppressing the obviously neutral stimuli of ‘white bear’. Perhaps 
a more viable neutral condition would have been the inclusion of ‘white bear’ as the 
stimulus for the neutral group in valence concerned experiments.
6.2.2. Future Research
Future research in the area of valence should include unwanted thoughts that 
are higher in valence and personally relevant. For example, it seems unlikely that 
participants suppressing thoughts of a dead loved one will experience the same 
amount of unwanted thoughts and the same physiological reactions as a subclinical 
spider fearful participant. One could increase the valence in a laboratory setting in a 
number of ways. One example of this might involve instructing participants to 
suppress all ‘pain’ related thoughts while exposing them to a pain induction (e.g., 
cold pressor task) in order to determine what effect this would have on unwanted 
thought occurrence and physiology (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994; Cioffi & 
Hollaway, 1993). Additionally, a few studies have investigated thought suppression 
and valence by introducing behavioural dependent measures. For example, how 
much o f  a certain food would a dieter eat when instructed to suppress all thoughts of 
food. For example Herman & Mack (1975) asked dieting participants to suppress all 
thoughts o f ice cream before engaging in a milkshake ice cream test. Results showed 
that those in the experimental group ate significantly more ice cream than controls. 
Finally, the effects of suppressing high valence thoughts that mirror everyday 
problems, over a longer time phase in the real world, would be informative. For 
example, participants could be required to fill out a form indicating personally 
relevant content that would be subsequently employed as the target content to be 
suppressed. Recording instances o f the unwanted target could be measured via a self
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report form at the end of each day in order to determine the amount of unwanted 
thought intrusions participants would experience in the real world and over a longer 
period of time, when the suppression target is personally relevant.
6.3. Chapter 4: Summary
Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis repeatedly demonstrated the unsuccessful 
nature of attempted thought suppression. Chapter 4 o f the current thesis aimed to 
determine why such attempts were futile, whilst providing additional non self report 
measures of thought suppression. Theoretical accounts of thought suppression / the 
unsuccessful nature of thought suppression are scarce. The most widely accepted 
account in the literature is the Environmental Cueing Hypothesis (ECH: Wegner, 
1989). According to the ECH people naturally engage in unfocused distraction when 
suppressing. However, once the suppression attempt has failed, due to the automatic 
distracter search making the unwanted thought hyper-accessible (see Section
1.2.1.1.), the distracters that were used in the suppression attempt will become 
associated with the unwanted thought. This process will continue in cyclical fashion 
until a  number of intended distracter stimuli serve to actually remind the person of 
the unwanted thought. However, a behavioural phenomenon, stimulus equivalence, 
might be able to account for the unintentional as well as intentional relating between 
stimuli. The primary aim of Chapter 4 was to determine if the stimulus equivalence 
phenomena could build on Wegner’s ECH and account for the futile nature of 
attempted thought suppression.
To that end, Experiment 5 of the current thesis involved a novel procedure 
and paradigm. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups 
(suppression versus control). First, all participants were required to complete a 3 
class by 3 member equivalence training and testing procedure. One member from 
one o f  the classes was the target item to be suppressed. Subsequently all participants 
had to complete the typical five minute suppression phase where they were required 
to suppress all thoughts of the target item. The difference in procedure between the 
suppression and control groups involved the final phase experimental instruction. In 
this phase, all participants were required to attend to a computer screen which 
presented one word (i.e., stimuli from the three trained equivalence classes and 9
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novel stimuli) every ten seconds. Participants were instructed that they could remove 
any word from the screen by pressing the space bar. Participants in the suppression 
group were directly instructed to suppress all thoughts of the target word whereas 
those in the control group received no suppression instruction. It was predicted, in 
accordance with the stimulus equivalence literature, that participants in the 
suppression group would remove not only the target word from the screen, but also 
the target related class members (both directly trained and derived as related). 
Results showed that in the suppression group, the target, trained and derived words 
were removed from the screen significantly more than any other, suggesting that the 
target word, the trained word and the derived word all served to hamper the 
suppression attempt. No such effects were found in the control group, suggesting 
that it was the thought suppression instruction which caused the interference.
Recent third wave behavioural therapies have highlighted the importance of 
valued living (Plumb et al, 2009). Values, which can be defined as “freely chosen, 
verbally constructed consequences of ongoing, dynamic, evolving patterns of 
activity, which establish predominant reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in 
engagement in the valued behavioral pattern itse lf’ (Wilson & Duffene, in press), are 
the guidelines by which each individual lives their lives; every day we make choices 
which are either consistent or inconsistent with our values. However, it has been 
suggested that experiential avoidance, of which thought suppression is one form, can 
affect the choices that we make, thereby facilitating the avoidance o f living in a 
value consistent way. The aim of Experiments 6(a) and 6(b) o f the current thesis was 
to provide the first experimental demonstration of how thought suppression can alter 
personal choices. Specifically aiming to demonstrate how a transformation of 
suppression functions across directly trained and derived stimuli could model the 
affect that engaging in thought suppression has on behavioural choice. Experiment 
6(a) required participants to complete the traditional five minute suppression phase, 
before entering a dichotomous choice task. Participants were instructed to choose 
either a red door or a blue door for a ten trial phase, subsequently participants 
recycled into the dichotomous choice task. Prior to completion o f the second choice 
task the participants were instructed to suppress all thoughts of a target word 
(‘BEAR’). During the second choice task the target word and other novel words 
appeared behind their previously chosen door. It was predicted that if  attempted
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thought suppression alters choices, a gradual change in a participant’s original choice 
would emerge in order to avoid contact with the unwanted thought. Experiment 6 (a) 
found that participants altered their choices in order to avoid the unwanted thought. 
Experiment 6(b) extended Experiment 6(a) by demonstrating that stimuli related to 
the target unwanted thought can also produce a gradual change in participants’ 
choices.
6.3.1. Theoretical issues
One issue that emerged from the results o f Experiment 5 was that participants 
in the suppression group on average removed more unrelated words and removed 
them faster than participants in the control group.. It is possible that unrelated words 
may have been removed by both groups as a result of the process of generalization, 
and this effect may have been more pronounced in the case of participants in the 
experimental group as they were removing more words and at a faster rate than the 
control group. In addition, as indicated earlier, the rate of removal of unrelated words 
was very low for both groups; however, it was particularly close to zero in the 
control group for both quantity and latency indices and thus, even a relatively small 
difference between the groups might have resulted in significance.
A second criticism of Experiment 5 is the lack o f analyses conducted on the 
data from the five minute suppression phase. For example, it is possible that 
participants, who were more successful at suppressing their thoughts in the five 
minute suppression phase, were either more successful at not having the various 
words interfere, or parenthetically, they might have experienced some sort of 
rebound effect which gave them a pronounced bias to avoiding the target, trained and 
derived words. However, unfortunately this data was lost whilst the study was being 
conducted due to faults in the computer program so such an analysis was impossible 
to perform. Future research should further explore this issue.
One potential weakness of the Experiment 6(a) and 6(b) might that the study 
did noit include a control group. However, this issue has been previously controlled 
for by Hooper et al. (in press). These researchers included a control condition in their 
study (as in Experiment 5) that directly instructed participants to remove a target 
after equivalence and then tested to see whether the functions would transfer to other 
members of the equivalence class. Findings from this work indicated that after an 
instruction to remove a target, participants did not remove other class members.
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One interesting point that emerged from Experiments 6(a) and (b) was the 
possible effects of thought suppression on valued living. Derived stimulus relations 
(DSR) are said to underpin the ACT model of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1999). 
Values are a critical component of the ACT model (Plumb et al, in press). However, 
there is a lack of basic research linking DSR and valued living, the current 
experiments provided the first demonstration of how thought suppression and DSR 
can alter behavioural choices. Experiments 6(a) and 6(b) model how people may 
restrict their behaviour, in response to relations among stimuli, in attempts to avoid 
unwanted thoughts.
6.3.2. Future Research
The current studies are the first to successfully model the transfer of 
suppression functions via equivalence. Furthermore, these findings suggest a useful 
avenue for future research in the area of derived relational responding and thought 
suppression. Transfer o f function has often been demonstrated in the absence o f an 
explicit equivalence test (e.g., Barnes, Browne, Smeets and Roche, 1995). 
Demonstrating transfer o f function in the absence of an equivalence test would, 
arguably, provide an even more subtle example the transfer o f suppression functions. 
In the current experiments, even though participants are not directly trained to relate 
the A and C stimuli they do still relate them in the context of the equivalence test. 
Showing that transfer of function might still occur even in the absence of the relating 
o f these stimuli required by such a test would constitute an even better or stronger 
model of derived suppression as at no point before the avoidance phase would the 
participants have made the connection between the A and C stimuli..
It is also possible that the derived transfer o f suppression functions would not 
happen without an equivalence test. Barnes and Browne (1995) found that 
participants produced a correct derived performance, following repeated failures, 
when they were exposed to an equivalence testing procedure. The authors suggested 
that this provided evidence that testing procedures may sometimes facilitate derived 
behaviour (see Barnes & Keenan, 1993, p.78). Specifically, equivalence testing 
procedures expose participants to trials that pair the derived C-A stimuli together. It 
will be informative to investigate whether the derived thought suppression effect will 
be seen in the absence o f an equivalence test. To that end, participants could be
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exposed to the test for emergent relations at the end of the experimental session, as 
opposed to directly after training as in previous research (Staunton & Bames- 
Holmes, 2004).
The current study showed transfer of suppression / interference via 
equivalence; however, the derived relations literature has demonstrated responding 
in accordance with many patterns of relations in addition to equivalence. For 
example, studies have demonstrated responding in accordance with comparison, 
distinction, hierarchy, temporal and spatial relations, conditionality, causality, 
opposition and deictic (or perspective taking) relations (Dymond & Barnes, 1995; 
McHugh et al, 2004; Roche, et al., 2000; Steele & Hayes, 1991). One example that 
may be particularly interesting for future investigation in the area of thought 
suppression is the relation o f ‘opposition’. Typically when we try not to think of 
something we try to distract ourselves by thinking about something very different or 
opposite from the original stimulus. For example, in order to forget about the recent 
death of a loved one we may try to think of something contrasted with or opposite in 
important respects from death. Thus, whereas death is unknown and frightening, a 
person might choose to think about something familiar and comforting such as 
walking on the beach. Despite the fact that the distracting stimulus is seen as 
opposite, however, there may still be transfer of function in that the person is 
reminded of death by the ‘opposite’ stimulus. Given the potential importance of this 
phenomenon in which relations of opposition may be implicated in the derived 
transfer o f function, it may be useful for future research to attempt to model ‘derived 
suppression’ based on relations of opposition.
Several studies have demonstrated a transformation of functions in 
accordance with relations of opposition. Such studies have examined avoidance 
(Dymond et al, 2007), self discriminative (Dymond & Barnes, 1996), sexual arousal 
(Roche & Barnes, 1997) and consequential (Whelan & Bames-Holmes, 2004) 
functions. Therefore a natural extension of the current work would be to test for the 
transformation of suppression functions across opposition relations. What is 
particularly interesting in this respect is that in previous work, relations o f opposition 
have produced a transformation of functions in which the relation of opposition 
produced the ‘opposite’ functions from those inhering in the original stimulus. For 
example, if a stimulus ‘X ’ had punishing functions then the stimulus in opposition
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with CX ’ had reinforcing functions. However, in the context of thought suppression, 
a different pattern of transformation of functions may be seen in which stimuli 
ostensibly designated as ‘opposite’ to the original stimulus acquire the same function 
(i.e., suppression /interference). Further research will be needed to explore this issue.
6.4. Chapter 5: Summary
Chapter 4 of the current thesis suggests that one possible explanation for the 
counterproductive nature of thought suppression is directly and indirectly trained 
relations within the environment that serve to remind us of the unwanted thought. 
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 promoted a basic understanding of thought 
suppression, and provided additional explanation of the reasons why suppression 
attempts generalise readily to many different stimuli and circumstances. Such 
findings may be of particular interest to researchers working in clinical areas that are 
linked to high levels of thought suppression, such as depression, anxiety disorders, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, and phobias (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1990; Schell et 
al, 1991). Many researchers have argued for explanations o f thought suppression 
that rely on cognitive processes, such as the ECH (e.g., Wegner et al, 1987).
From a behaviour-analytic perspective, however, such explanations are 
incomplete, because they leave thought suppression, which is also behaviour, 
unexplained (Barnes, 1989; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). If  equivalence provides an 
adequate behavioural account of human language and cognition (e.g., Hayes et al, 
2001; Sidman, 1994), then the paradigm in Chapter 4 provides a potentially useful 
empirical avenue for the exploration of this phenomenon. Specifically, research 
into thought suppression in clinically relevant populations might provide new insight 
into the role of thought suppression in the acquisition, and maintenance, of 
maladaptive behaviour (see Section 1.3). Indeed, the success o f earlier programs of 
research that have explored human behaviour using the derived relational paradigm 
(e.g., Markham et al, 2002; Roche & Barnes, 1997; Roche et al, 2000) attest to the 
viability o f this suggestion.
The literature on thought suppression and emotional avoidance may help to 
explain how this might occur. For example, if  a person believes that certain thoughts 
and feelings explain certain behaviours (e.g., ‘I’m not going to try a new activity
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because I will be no good at it’) they may attempt to suppress these thoughts. 
However, data from thought suppression studies have shown that when participants 
were told to suppress a particular thought, they subsequently showed an increase in 
that suppressed thought, in contrast to subjects who were not given suppression 
instructions (Gold & Wegner, 1995; W enzlaff et al, 1991; see Section 1.2.8). 
Attempts to suppress thoughts such as ‘I am not good enough’, ‘I am not capable 
enough’, or ‘I’ll never be able to do this’, may, in fact, increase their functional 
importance, because suppression produces an increase in their significance for the 
person when they occur (i.e. ‘I shouldn’t be having that thought’), and also by 
actively trying to avoid certain thoughts, this behaviour in itself is linked verbally 
through derived relations to the thoughts that are being avoided.
For Hayes et al (1999) the negative effects of suppressed thoughts and 
feelings are evident in what has been termed “experiential/emotional avoidance.” 
Such avoidance occurs when an individual is “unwilling to remain in contact with 
particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, thoughts, memories and 
behavioural dispositions), and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these 
events and the contexts that occasion them” (Hayes et al, 1996, p. 1154). These 
steps could include actions such as thought suppression, and social withdrawal. For 
instance a patient with depression might decide to stay home from work because 
they believe the responsibilities at work are too great, and that they do not have the 
capabilities to live up to them. Avoiding work will likely be reinforced in the short 
term (by avoiding feelings of low efficacy). Consequently, this individual’s 
behaviour may become increasingly governed by this avoidance rule, to the extent 
that he or she remains increasingly reclusive.
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) provides a behavioural account o f how 
language and cognitions are learnt behaviour, and, as seen from the example above, 
how these processes can lead to experiential avoidance. The findings from Chapter 4 
modelled how thought suppression attempts can generalise through derived stimulus 
relations (DSR) providing support for this account. Traditionally, cognitive 
treatments have included techniques designed to alter the structure o f thoughts with 
the assumption that this will lead to changes in emotional response (e.g. Persons, 
1989). Alternatively acceptance-based approaches, in particular acceptance and 
commitment therapy (ACT), which is based on RFT principles (Hayes et al., 2001),
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assume that the psychopathology results from unhealthy methods of experiential 
avoidance as described above. These treatments encourage patients to behave 
effectively, and in accordance with valued life directions, which requires active 
contact with naturally occurring, sometimes aversive, private experiences (Hayes et 
al., 1996). Techniques such as acceptance, mindfulness, cognitive defusion, values, 
and committed action are used to help disrupt the relationship between cognitions 
and behaviour, rather than alter the cognition per se.
Chapter 5 of the current thesis aimed to directly test the relative effectiveness 
of components of the ACT model to thought suppression as coping strategies for 
unwanted thoughts. The first of these was Experiment 7 which compared 
mindfulness versus thought suppression in the management of unwanted thoughts. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups (mindfulness or thought 
suppression). Both experimental groups were exposed to an identical procedure with 
the exception o f the induction. In the first phase o f the experiment participants were 
required to view a disturbing image for a 20 second phase. Then they were instructed 
to complete a negative affect scale which measured their general emotional state. 
Next the participants had to complete a nine minute thought suppression/mindfulness 
induction whilst signalling the presence of unwanted thoughts by pressing the space 
bar, upon completion of the induction participants had to again complete the same 
negative affect scale. There were two dependent variables in the study 1). The 
number of space bar presses recorded during the induction phase and 2). The 
difference in negative affect scale score pre and post induction. It was predicted that 
participants in the mindfulness group would experience less unwanted thoughts 
during the induction, whilst also experiencing a greater increase in positive affect 
from pre to post induction. The findings reflected these predictions.
In order to avoid the self report nature o f Experiment 7, Experiment 8 
involved a behavioural dependent measure in comparing mindfulness versus thought 
suppression. Experiment 3 of the current thesis successfully demonstrated inflated 
self report of spider related thoughts for spider fearful participants demonstrating 
how thought suppression might contribute to the maintenance of phobia’s/ fearful 
behaviour. However, in Experiment 4 no physiological effects of the increased 
occurrence of spider related thoughts emerged, thus, raising a question over whether 
thought suppression does in fact contribute to phobia maintenance. Having modelled
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thought suppression in terms o f DSR in Chapter 4 and provided an alternative 
strategy in Experiment 7 (mindfulness), Experiment 8 was designed to provide an 
alternative dependent measure of the potential contribution thought suppression has 
in the maintenance of phobias. To that end, spider fearful participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three groups (i.e., thought suppression, mindfulness and 
unfocussed attention). An unfocussed attention induction was also included in 
Experiment 8 in response to a criticism made of Experiment 7 (see Section 6.4.2), 
namely that without a control group it is impossible to ascertain the success of either 
technique. All participants received their induction prior to completing the 
Behavioural Approach Test (BAT), which is a ten step test o f how close a participant 
is willing to get to a real life spider (Kindt & Brosschot, 1999). Participants also 
completed a state anxiety scale pre induction and post BAT in order to determine 
pre- and post experimental differences in anxiety levels. There were two dependent 
variables in Experiment 8, 1). The number o f steps spider fearful participants would 
progress through on the BAT after each induction and 2). The difference in anxiety 
levels between groups pre induction and post BAT. It was predicted that those 
exposed to the mindfulness induction would move through significantly more steps 
o f the BAT than the thought suppression and unfocused attention groups whilst 
experiencing less anxiety post BAT. Results were again in line with experimental 
predictions.
Together, Experiments 7 and 8 found evidence to suggest that mindfulness 
was a viable alternative to thought suppression in the management of unwanted 
thoughts. However, Experiments 7 and 8 o f the current thesis could be criticized for 
including strategy reminders during the thought suppression inductions (see Section
6.4.1.). Mindfulness is intrinsically experiential in nature and even short mindfulness 
analogue studies have involved inductions o f nine to ten minutes in length (see 
McHugh & Reed, 2010), Another component of the ACT model has been previously 
delivered in a simple pre-experimental instruction and has been demonstrated to 
provide behavioural gains on subsequent tasks (Masuda, Fendell, Feinstein & 
Sheehan, 2010). Although these authors have demonstrated stronger behavioural 
gains after more extensive defusion instructions, defusion may be a useful technique 
in comparing an instruction rather than induction based comparison with thought 
suppression. Defusion aims to enable the individual to come into contact with a self
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relevant unwanted thought, by training the individual to be less ‘fused’ with the 
thought; this provides stark contrast to a thought suppression attempt, which aims to 
reduce unwanted thought occurrence.
Given this definition, although mindfulness appeared like a meaningful 
strategy in coping with negatively affective external content (Experiment 7) and also 
for phobic related content (Experiment 8), the negative effects o f other forms of 
unwanted thoughts, such as thoughts that are self relevant to the participant (e.g., 
thoughts of not being good enough) may be more usefully circumvented by defusion 
(Masuda, et al 2004; Masuda, et al, 2009). Experiment 9 was conducted in order to 
determine whether it was the cue reminders during the thought suppression induction 
than rendered the suppression attempt in Experiments 7 and 8 futile. Additionally, 
Experiment 9 aimed to determine whether defusion could reduce the impact of 
negative content during a learned helplessness induction relative to thought 
suppression.
Experiment 9 of the current thesis involved randomly assigning participants 
to a thought suppression, defusion or control group. All groups completed an 
identical procedure with the exception of the induction they received. First, 
participants received their respective inductions (the thought suppression group 
received a thought suppression induction, the defusion group received a defusion 
induction and the control group received no induction). Second, all participants 
completed a learned helplessness induction (i.e., were exposed to an unsolvable 
task). Such inductions have been demonstrated to weaken participant’s performance 
on subsequent tasks due to the negative self attributions generated by participants 
during the task (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). When instructed to complete the task the 
participants were encouraged to use their coping strategy induction with any 
unwanted thoughts that they might have during the learned helplessness program. 
Finally, all participants were required to complete a maze task in as little time as 
possible, which served as the dependent variable.
The experiment aimed to determine if the inductions served to alleviate the 
effects of learned helplessness on the subsequent experimental task. In accordance 
with ACT, it was predicted that those in the defusion group would not let their self 
generated negative unwanted thoughts affect their task performance, as the defusion
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instruction would destabilise the verbal coherence of the negative relational networks 
associated with participants weak performance by providing them with 
comprehensive distance from these negative self attributional thoughts (Masuda, et 
al 2009). Therefore it was predicted that the defusion group would demonstrate 
significantly quicker times on the maze task than those in the thought suppression 
group and control group, whilst it was predicted that the thought suppression group 
would demonstrate significantly slower response times than the control group. The 
results, in line with the pre-experimental predictions, showed that the defusion group 
completed the maze task in significantly less time than the thought suppression 
group. However, contrary to the predictions, the defusion group and the thought 
suppression group did not score significantly less/more than the control group on the 
maze task. Therefore, although the negative effects of thought suppression were 
again apparent the utility of defusion warrants future research.
6.4.1. Theoretical issues
The results from the experiments in Chapter 5 provide some interesting 
results which give evidence to the efficacy of ACT based components over thought 
suppression in the management o f unwanted thoughts. However, there are a number 
o f issues which warrant discussion. Firstly, some discussion is needed as to why a 
shift was made from mindfulness to defusion in the last Experiment of the Chapter. 
For the most part this was done as a necessity; the thought suppression intervention 
which was used in Experiments 7 and 8 had come under some scrutiny, therefore we 
opted to use an instruction instead of an induction. However, as mindfulness is 
experiential in essence, giving a mindfulness instruction is not possible. Therefore, 
another technique, which could be administered via an instruction, was needed. It 
was for this reason that defusion was chosen. This shift could be seen as a large one 
as mindfulness and defusion are very different, however from an ACT perspective 
they both seek to disturb normal language processes (Hayes et al, 1999). 
Mindfulness, via attention, attempts to seek comprehensive distance from language. 
Defusion also attempts to seek this distance, however not via attention, instead by 
attacking the literal quality o f language.
Second, it could be argued that the focused breathing/mindfulness induction 
used in Experiments 7 and 8 could act as a form of distraction, thus a sophisticated
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form of thought suppression rather than a mindfulness induction. Previous research 
that has employed the focused distraction induction suggests this is not the case 
(McHugh et al., 2010). Specifically, in their study they exposed older participants to 
a card selection task that has been demonstrated to be impacted on by attentional 
deficits. Distraction leads to a higher cognitive load which should in practice hamper 
further performance on the card selection task. However, findings from this work 
indicated that the older participants in the focused attention induction demonstrated 
less decision making deficits in the task following this induction.
Third, the thought suppression induction used in Experiments 7 and 8, involved 
a strategy reminder every 30 seconds (i.e., not to think of the unwanted thought). It 
could be argued that the inclusion of such a reminder actually circumvents the 
thought suppression attempt. This procedural artifact rather than the thought 
suppression attempt per se could be what is mediating the inflated number of 
intrusions for this group. Future research should recruit a control group that receives 
the suppression instruction at the beginning of the suppression phase and no 
subsequent strategy reminders. However, the experimental findings of Chapter 4, 
that stimuli both directly and indirectly related to target remind us o f the to-be- 
suppressed item, and Chapter 3, that repeated suppression attempts maintain the 
occurrence of the unwanted thought, reduce the plausibility of this argument. It is 
likely from the former that the thought suppression induction has ecological validity 
and from the latter that the resultant negative behaviour was still the direct by 
product of attempted thought suppression and thus exactly what the study aimed to 
model.
Fourth, In Experiment 7, the mindfulness group displayed a significantly 
improved positive affect, from pre to post induction, when compared to the thought 
suppression group. However, the thought suppression group also significantly 
improved in positive affect from pre to post induction (se Section 5.1.2.). According 
to the thought suppression literature, attempts at suppressing unwanted thoughts 
should make those thoughts more salient within consciousness, in the current 
example one would have expected the thought suppression group to remain at a 
similar emotional level from pre to post induction. One potential reason for such a 
finding might lie in the personally relevant nature o f the unwanted thought. 
Specifically, immediately after having to suppress the thoughts associated with the
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gruesome picture of a dead person, it is unsurprising that participants had a low 
negative affect. However, due to the fact that the unwanted thoughts associated with 
that picture may not be of a personally relevant nature, it is not surprising that the 
participant’s emotional state improved over time. Perhaps a gruesome picture that 
held personal relevance would not cause the increase in positive affect found in the 
current experiment. Fifth, in Experiment 7, the addition of a control group, who 
received a control/unfocused attention induction might have shed more light on the 
experimental results. It is possible, for example, that participants will naturally 
improve in their emotional state without any induction. This could have shed light on 
the efficacy of the mindfulness and thought suppression inductions, as it is broadly 
possible that participants in a control group could have experienced an improved 
positive affect to a similar degree as those in the mindfulness group, thereby 
questioning whether mindfulness is an effective technique in the management of 
unwanted thoughts.
Finally, in Experiment 9, despite the defusion group completing the maze task 
in significantly less time than the thought suppression group, the expected 
differences between both groups and the control group were not found. Specifically, 
the defusion group did not complete the maze in significantly less time than the 
control group, and the thought suppression group did not complete the maze in 
significantly more time than the control group. There are a number o f potential 
reasons for this finding. First, in the current study, both defusion and thought 
suppression groups were only provided with a strategy instruction (i.e., no induction 
was provided as in Experiments 7 and 8). Perhaps the inclusion of an induction 
would have strengthened the differences between groups. Indeed recent research by 
Masuda et al (2010) details a two experiment study on defusion, in the first o f these 
experiments the authors found that a defusion instruction made a marked difference 
in the management of unwanted self negative referential thoughts. However, in their 
second experiment the authors included a defusion induction. The results showed 
that the participants who received the defusion induction experienced significantly 
less emotional discomfort and believability than those who received the defusion 
instruction. Second, despite the fact that the there was a low n in the study, the 
general predicted trend still emerged, with the defusion group completing the task 
with the fastest response speed and the thought suppression group completing the
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task with the slowest response speed. Future studies should increase the n of the 
study in order to determine whether this would strengthen the distinction between 
the two groups performance. Additionally, future studies should also include post 
maze self report measures where participants are asked how each technique affected 
their maze performance. For example, it is possible that thought suppression 
hampered maze performance due to the fact that interfering thoughts such as ‘I am 
probably not going to be very good at this’ kept rebounding. However, without such 
a measure this information is unknown.
Penultimately, previous defusion based research (Healy et al, 2009; Masuda et 
al, 2004; Masuda et al, 2009, Masuda et al, 2010) has all included believability 
measures. The primary aim of defusion is to enable the individual to become less 
fused with their thoughts, or to lessen their believability. However without any 
believability measure in place, it is impossible to determine if  participants became 
less fused as a result of the instruction, or more importantly, if  the results of the 
maze task occurred because the participants had engaged with their instruction. And 
finally, the use o f a maze task in the current setting may have provided an unreliable 
dependent measure which may have affected results, specifically maze tasks are 
susceptible to individual differences, i.e. some people are more practised at maze 
tasks than other. Therefore the inclusion of another dependent measure may be 
advantageous in future research.
6.4.2. Future Research
The three experiments reported in Chapter 5 compare the effectiveness of 
thought suppression versus the two ACT components, mindfulness and defusion. 
What is particularly important about this work is that it isolated two components of 
the act model and directly tested their effectiveness as alternatives to thought 
suppression for coping with unwanted thoughts. Research on individual components 
of the ACT model is an important endeavour (Hayes et al, 2006). Specifically, as 
mentioned in Section 1.3.2.2., component research lends to the development of 
accurate and functional therapeutic techniques that can be continually refined in 
accordance with their empirically demonstrated efficacy. Future research should 
build on the current studies to facilitate our understanding of the individual
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components of the ACT model by systematically testing the relative contribution of 
each in alleviating clinical problems.
6.5. Concluding Comments
The current thesis aimed to demonstrate why and how thought suppression is 
an ineffective coping strategy for unwanted thoughts and to model effective 
alternatives. The first two empirical chapters of the thesis aimed to answer the basic 
question ‘is it possible to suppress our thoughts?’ The general conclusion was that 
thought suppression is difficult. Participants, when asked not to think of a certain 
‘unwanted thought’ for a five minute period, would experience that exact thought 
around 7 times. Chapters 2 and 3 also raised some interesting issues which will 
warrant further research, specifically the validity o f the rebound phase and baseline 
thought suppression conditions. After having determined that engaging in thought 
suppression as a technique for managing unwanted thoughts may be a futile activity, 
Chapt er 4 of the thesis aimed to provide a behavioural explanation as to why thought 
suppression is difficult.
Chapter 4, via two novel thought suppression paradigms, showed that 
attempts to suppress one target thought were found to transfer to many other related 
stimuli, which may lead to maladaptive behaviours, such as avoiding situations 
where contact with these stimuli might arise. Although the current thesis was 
conducted entirely on a non-clinical population, it did model how suppression 
attempts might be produced and spread to stimuli that have not been directly related 
to the target unwanted thought. This improves upon previous cognitive and 
psychoanalytic models, which have difficulties in explaining why thought 
suppression is ineffective and counterproductive, and the precise mechanisms that 
cause suppression attempts to transfer across a wide range o f seemingly unrelated 
areas o f  a person’s life. Thus, this work in particular may be of specific significance 
to the development of treatment programmes within clinical populations where such 
experiential avoidance causes problems for patients. While this type of direct 
application was not the primary purpose of the current work, its use in this regard 
would certainly indicate yet another advantage of this avenue of research.
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Having provided a language based interpretation as to why thought 
suppression is futile, Chapter 5 of the current thesis aimed to explore alternative 
strategies for managing unwanted thoughts. The two strategies, mindfulness and 
defusion, both aimed to destabilize normal language processes, allowing a slightly 
different interaction with unwanted thoughts than avoidance techniques like thought 
suppression. The three studies in Chapter 5 displayed the efficacy of these 
techniques over thought suppression on three different behavioural measures. These 
results suggest that more research of this kind is needed in attempting to provide 
people from both the clinical and the sub-clinical realm different techniques for 
dealing with their unwanted psychological content.
Overall, the importance of the current work is exemplified in the fact that 
thought suppression is linked to many clinical disorders, such as depression and 
phobias, and the results of the current thesis can be applied to these clinical areas. 
However, it must be re-iterated that the studies presented in this thesis are basic 
analogue studies aimed to investigate the phenomena at the most basic level. 
Therefore any generalisation made to clinical populations must be made with 
caution. Indeed research which repeats the Experiments presented in this thesis, but 
with higher valence unwanted thoughts as found in clinical populations would be a 
useful addition to this body of research. Nevertheless, as a starting point, this thesis 
presents a clear picture of the maladaptive nature of thought suppression, and 
provides alternative techniques which are theory and research consistent.
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Appendix 1
A A Q -2
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a 
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.
f 1 ■ 2 3 4 5 6 7
I never 
true
very seldom 
true
seldom
true
sometimes
true
frequently
true
almost always 
true
always
true
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant.
- .........—  ™--.~ - .......... ....... ....... -r .™ ™ -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I would 
value.
p. I’m afraid of my feelings.
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.
p. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life.
6. I am in control of my life.
7. Emotions cause problems in my life.
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am.
9. Worries get in the way of my success.
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want to live my life.
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix 2
WBSI
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond honestly to  
each of the item s below. Be sure to answer every item by circling the appropriate letter beside each.
A = Strongly disagree 
B = Disagree
C = Neutral or don't know  
D = Agree 
E = Strongly agree
1. There are things 1 prefer not to  think about. A B C D E
2. Som etim es 1 w onder why 1 have the thoughts 1 do. A B C D E
3. 1 have thoughts that 1 cannot stop. A B C D E
4. There are im ages that com e to mind that 1 cannot erase. A B C D E
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea. A B C D E
6. 1 wish 1 could stop thinking o f certain things. A B C D E
7. Som etim es my mind races so fast 1 wish 1 could stop it. A B C D E
8. 1 always try to put problems out of mind. A B C D E
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head. A B C D E
10. There are things that 1 try not to  think about. A B C D E
11. Som etim es 1 really wish 1 could stop thinking. A B C D E
12. 1 often  do things to distract m yself from my thoughts. A B C D E
13. 1 have thoughts that 1 try to avoid. A B C D E
14. There are many thoughts that 1 have that 1 don't tell 
anyone.
A B C D E
15. Som etim es 1 stay busy just to  keep thoughts from A B C D E
intruding on my mind.
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Appendix 3
BDI-II
This questionnaire consists o f 21 statem ents. Please read each group o f statem ents carefully, and 
then pick out the one sta tem en t that best describes the way you have been feeling during th e  past 
tw o  w eek s, including today. Circle the number beside the statem ent you have picked. If several 
sta tem en ts in the group seem  to  apply well equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be 
sure that you do not choose more than one statem ent for any group, including item 16 (Changes in 
Sleeping Pattern) or item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
0 1 do not feel sad
1 1 feel sad much o f the tim e
2 1 am sad all o f the tim e
3 1 am so sad or unhappy that 1 can't stand it
2. Pessimism
0 1 am not discouraged by my future
1 1 feel more discouraged by my future than 1 used to  be
2 1 do not expect things to work out for me
3 1 feel my future is hopeless and will only get w orse
3. Past failure
0 1 do not feel like a failure
1 1 have failed m ore than 1 should have
2 As 1 look back, 1 se e  a lot o f failures
3 1 feel 1 am a total failure as a person
4. Loss o f pleasure
0 1 get as much pleasure as 1 ever did from the things 1 enjoy
1 1 don't enjoy things as much as 1 used to
2 1 get very little pleasure from the things 1 used to enjoy
3 1 can't get any pleasure from the things 1 used to enjoy
5. Guilty Feelings
0 I don't feel particularly guilty
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1 1 feel guilty over many things 1 have done or should have done
2 1 feel guilty m ost o f the tim e
3 1 feel guilty m ost o f the tim e
6. Punishment Feelings
0 1 don't feel 1 am being punished
1 1 feel 1 may be punished
2 1 expect to  be punished
3 1 feel 1 am being punished
7. Self-dislike
0 1 feel the sam e about m yself as ever
1 1 have lost confidence in m yself
2 1 am disappointed in myself
3 1 dislike m yself
8. Self-Criticalness
0 1 don't criticise or blame m yself more than usual
1 1 am m ore critical o f m yself than 1 used to  be
2 1 criticise m yself for all my failures
3 1 blame m yself for everything bad that happens
9. Suicidal Thoughts or W ishes
0 1 don't have any thought of killing m yself
1 1 have thoughts o f killing myself, but 1 would not carry them  out
2 1 would like to kill m yself
3 1 would kill m yself if 1 had the chance
10. Crying
0 1 don't cry anymore than 1 used to
1 1 cry m ore than 1 used to
2 1 cry over every little thing
3 1 feel like crying, but 1 can't
11. Agitation
/ippeiiuices
0 1 am no more restless or wound up than usual
1 1 feel m ore restless or wound up than usual
2 1 am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay still
3 1 am so restless or agitated that 1 have to keep moving or doing som ething
12. Loss of interest
0 1 have not lost interest in people or activities
1 1 am less interested in other people or things than before
2 1 have lost m ost of my interest in other people or things
3 It's hard to get interested in anything
13. Indecisiveness
0 1 make decisions about as well as ever
1 1 find it more difficult to make decisions than usual
2 1 have much greater difficulty in making decisions than usual
3 1 have trouble making any decisions
14. W orthlessness
0 1 do not feel 1 am w orthless
1 1 don't consider m yself as worthwhile and useful as 1 used to
2 1 feel more w orthless as com pared to other people
3 1 feel utterly w orthless
15. Loss of Energy
0 1 have as much energy as ever
1 1 have less energy than 1 used to have
2 1 don't have enough energy to  do very much
3 1 don't have enough energy to  do anything
16. Changes in Sleeping pattern
0 1 have not experienced any changes in my sleeping pattern
la
lb
1 sleep som ew hat more than usual 
1 sleep som ew hat less than usual
2a 1 sleep a lot m ore than usual
appendices
2b 1 sleep a lot less than usual
3a
3b
1 sleep  m ost o f the day
1 wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to sleep
17. Irritability
0 1 am no more irritable than usual
1 1 am more irritable than usual
2 1 am much more irritable than usual
3 1 am irritable all the tim e
18. Changes in Appetite
0 1 have not experienced any changes in my appetite
la My appetite is som ew hat less than usual
lb My appetite is som ew hat greater than usual
2a My appetite is much less than before
2b My appetite is much greater than usual
3a 1 have no appetite at all
3b 1 crave food all the tim e
19. Concentration Difficulty
0 1 can concentrate as well as ever
1 1 can't concentrate as well as usual
2 It's hard to  keep my mind on anything for very long
3 1 find 1 can't concentrate on anything
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 1 am no m ore tired or fatigued than usual
1 1 get m ore tired or fatigued than usual
2 1 am to tired or fatigued to do a lot o f the things 1 used to do
3 1 am to tired or fatigued to do m ost of the things 1 used to do
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 1 have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex
1 1 am less interested in sex than 1 used to be
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2 1 am much less interested in sex now
3 1 have lost interest in sex com pletely
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60 words
Bottle
Desk
Boat
Mobile phone
W indows
Trees
Football
Sand
Television
Map
Offices
Buildings
Cars
W aves
Socks
Leather
Pizza
Ice cream
W ine
Walls
Piercings
David Beckham
Swimming
Your house
Appendix 4
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A friend 
This room  
Rock climbing 
Holidays 
Tony Blair
|
| The new spaper
l
I Birds
| Cactus 
Americans 
A clock 
W ardrobe 
Helicopter 
Mickey M ouse 
An Actor 
A bridge 
A nose  
Doctors
| Lights 
The stars 
A plate 
Puppies 
Fireworks 
M agazines 
Juice 
Concert 
Parents 
Teachers
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Pipes
Guitar
Pencil
Coat
Mirror
Library
Mud
Birthday party
Keys
Books
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Appendix 5 
Fear of spider questionnaire
Below you will find a list o f statem ents. Please rate the truth o f each statem ent as it applies to  you. 
Use the following scale to  make your choice.
1 = never true 
2 = very seldom  true 
3 = seldom  true
4 = som etim es true
5 = frequently true
6 = alm ost always true 
7 = Always true
1. If I came across a spider now,
I would get help from someone else to remove it--------------------------- ---------
2. Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for spiders-----------------------------
3. If I saw a spider now, I would think it would harm me ---------
4. I now think a lot about spiders ---------
5. I would be somewhat afraid to enter a room now,
where I have seen a spider before ---------
6. I now would do anything to try to avoid a spider ---------
7. Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a spider ----------
8. If I encountered a spider now
I would be able to deal with it effectively--------------------------------------- ----------
9. If I encountered a spider now,
it would take a long time to get it out of my mind. ----------
10. If I came across a spider now,
I would leave the room ----------
11. If I saw a spider now,
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I would think it will try to jump on me
12. If I saw a spider now
I would ask someone else to kill it
13. If I saw a spider now
I would have images of it trying to get me
14. If I saw a spider now, I would be afraid of it
15. If I saw a spider now I would feel very panicky
16. Spiders are one of my worst fears
1 7 .1 would feel very nervous if I saw a spider now
18. If I saw a spider now, I would probably break out 
in a sweat and my heart would beat faster
Total
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory -S
STAI Form y-1
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below:
> Read each statement and then decide whether the statement is:
How you feel right now, that is/ at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers.
> Then indicate your response by circling one of the numbers to the right of the statement.
NOT AT ALL SOMEWHAT MODERATELY SO VERY MUCH SO
1 2 3 4
1.1 feel calm 1 2 3 4
2.1 feel secure 1 2 3 4
3.1 am tense 1 2 3 4
4.1 feel strained 1 2 3 4
5.1 feel at ease 1 2 3 4
6.1 feel upset 1 2 3 4
7.1 am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 1 2 3 4
8.1 feel satisfied 1 2 3 4
9.1 feel frightened 1 2 3 4
10.1 feel comfortable 1 2 3 4
11.1 feel self-confident 1 2 3 4
12.1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4
13.1 am jittery 1 2 3 4
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14.1 feel indecisive 1 2 3 4
15.1 am relaxed 1 2 3 4
16.1 feel content 1 2 3 4
17.1 am worried 1 2 3 4
18.1 feel confused 1 2 3 4
19.1 feel steady 1 2 3 4
20.1 feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
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Appendix 6
State Trait Anxiety Inventory -S
STAI Form y-2
Name...........................................................Date..........................
Directions; a number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement 
to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much 
time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.
21. 1 feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
22. 1 feel nervous and restless. 1 2 3 4
23. 1 feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4
24. 1 wish 1 could be as happy as others seem to be 1 2 3 4
25. 1 feel like a failure 1 2 3 4
26. 1 feel rested 1 2 3 4
27 1am 'cool calm and collected' 1 2 3 4
28. 1 feel that difficulties are piling up so that 1 cannot overcome them 1 2 3 4
29. 1 worry too much over something that really doesn't matter 1 2 3 4
30. 1 am happy 1 2 3 4
31. 1 have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4
32. 1 lack self confidence 1 2 3 4
33. 1 feel secure 1 2 3 4
34. 1 make decisions easily 1 2 3 4
35. 1 feel inadequate 1 2 3 4
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3 6 .1 am content 1 2  3 4
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my head and bother me 1 2  3 4
3 8 .1 take disappointment so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind 1 2  3 4
3 9 .1 am a steady person 1 2  3 4
4 0 .1 get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent
concerns and interests 1 2  3 4
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Appendix 7
Mindful, Awareness Attention Scale (MAAS)
Day-to-Day Experiences
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using 
the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have 
each experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather 
than what you think your experience should be. Please treat each item separately from 
every other item.
1 2 3 4 5 6
A lm o s t  V ery  S o m e w h a t S o m e w h a t V ery  A lm o st
A lw ays F req u en tly  F req u en tly  In freq u en tly  In freq u en tly  N e v e r
I could  be experiencing som e em otion  and n ot be conscious o f
it until som e time later. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I break or spill things because o f  carelessness, n ot paying
attention, or thinking o f  som ething else. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I find it difficult to stay focused  on  w hat’s happening in the
present. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m  going w ithout paying
attention to what I experience along the way. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I tend not to notice feelings o f  physical tension or discom fort
until they really grab m y attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I forget a p erson’s nam e alm ost as soon  as I’ve been told it
for the first time. 1 2 3 4 5 6
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It seem s I am “running on autom atic,” without m uch awareness
o f  what I’m  doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I get so focused on  the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch
with what I’m  doing right now  to get there. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I d o  jobs or tasks automatically, w ithout being aware o f  what
I'tn doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I find m yself listening to som eone with one ear, doing
som ething else at the same time. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I drive places on  ‘automatic pilot’ and then w onder w hy I w ent
there. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I find m yself preoccupied with the future or the past. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I find m yself doing things w ithout paying attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6
I snack w ithout being aware that I ’m  eating. 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Appendix8
Please rate your em otional state after having seen  the picture by circling on e o f the number below, 
with -50 signalling that the picture makes you feel very negative, and +50 signalling that the picture 
made u feel very positive.
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
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Appendix 9
Treatment adherence scale
Was it easy to follow the instructions provided on the audio tape?
YES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NO
To what extent did you implement the instructions provided on the audio tape when having 
thoughts about the picture you previously saw?
VERY MUCH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NOT AT ALL
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